In the field of international relations, two categories of voices are generally considered important. They are those of experts that include scholars and journalists who have a carefully-considered take on various issues. And the other is that of practitioners. Practitioners are politicians and bureaucrats that are at the forefront of many decision-making platforms. Often, they are in an enviable position, particularly when it comes to access to various sorts of information that forms the foundation for policy making. At the same time, they have a good bearing on many things that transpire behind the scenes.
Since the pre-pandemic Doklam standoff between India and China in 2017, there is a renewed interest in comprehending China. Scholars generally tend to bemoan the lack of interest and understanding by decision-makers. However, in India it is peculiar that it has been practitioners that came up with best triangular scholarship on China-India-Tibet in recent years. As to how, why and what, it deserves a separate article. It should be noted that, all of them without an exception are former diplomats that have in the past represented India.
However, in this section of the report, it will try to distill key ideas from one such practitioner and how his observations can help us understand China. Or at least, it will serve as a fodder to think about the nature and future trajectory of Xi Jinping’s China. The practitioner whose work will be discussed here is the former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd. He was appointed by the Australian government to serve at its 23rd Ambassador of Australia to the United States in March of 2023. He had earlier graduated from the Australian National University with honors in Chinese studies and is said to be fluent in Chinese.
Related to the work discussed here, he began studying for a doctorate on Xi Jinping thoughts at Jesus College, Oxford. In 2022, he was conferred PhD on his thesis titled, “China’s new Marxist nationalism: defining Xi Jinping’s ideological worldview”.
The perspective offered by Kevin Rudd is concise and incredibly visual. He was clearly working on two projects concurrently. He writes in his book, “My Oxford thesis has been an academic accompaniment to this book as I grappled with Xi’s writings, speeches, and decisions over his term in office. I hope it has deepened the analysis underpinning my conclusions on what I describe as a future concept of managed strategic competition between the US and China.”
To what extend his doctoral work has spilled into his popular book on China-US rivalry — The Avoidable War is an entirely an enterprise unto itself, whether worthy of such labour is a separate question. Suffice to say, his work is worthy of reading to understand what a leading politician and a diplomat has to say on China.
How Xi Jinping sees China is articulated in a chapter of his book titled — Understanding Xi Jinping’s Worldview: Ten Concentric Circles of Interest. Rest of the book expands on these ten concentric circles. Let’s take a look at these ten concentric circles and try to see where Tibet configures in this schema. The book is clearly intended to be read widely, hence it shied away from employing academic jargons and incredibly readable.
- The centrality of Xi and the party and the hard business of staying in power
This remains at the core of Xi’s worldview. This is the nucleus to which other concerns are subservient to. It emphasises primacy of the party to remain in power. In this — Xi Jinping — the author argues, is driven by the agenda to secure his legacy that would exceed Deng Xiaoping and at least be considered on par with Mao Zedong.
- Maintaining and securing national unity
This revolves around the unity and “territorial integrity of the motherland.” Kevin argues that such worldview would advance party’s resolve to retain stronghold over Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong is “non-negotiable.” Other foundational idea is the “return” of Taiwan. This, he sees it as an “unfinished” business following Mao’s revolution and establishment of the PRC in 1949.
- Growing the Chinese economy
This remains crucial to Xi Jinping’s ambition. Under his leadership, China has locked its horn against the US. With economic growth stagnating, it remains crucial for Xi Jinping to position China to leverage growth in the age of Artificial Intelligence and meeting its energy needs, particularly when combating climate change will put constraints on unfettered use of fossil fuels.
- Environmental sustainability
Since China’s economy took off, environmental concerns were secondary when compared to wealth accumulation. However, in recent years, sustainability is a major concern. Chinese citizens are also asking for better and clean environment. More crucially, China is aware that its economic development, international prestige and its national security is tied to environmental stability.
Moreover, the party has also realized that environmental devastation, including the global climate crisis, threatens the future of China’s economic development, international image, and ultimately its national security.
- Modernizing the military
Xi’s ambition to gain control over military is a common knowledge. And as a chairman of the Central Military Commission, he has made numerous changes in the leadership, institutions and structure. Under him, the People’s Liberation Army is turned from a mass land army to tasking them with maintenance of internal security and a combative force against its supposed neighbours.
- Managing China’s neighboring states
PRC maintains borders with fourteen neighbouring states. According to the author, China has historically maintained a defensive approach to neighbours. And hence, PRC has an entrenched approach that prioritizes defensive view when it comes to China’s national security.
- Securing China’s maritime periphery in East Asia and the west Pacific
According to the author, China sees its maritime neighbors aligned against her. As seen from Beijing, with a ring of US allies from South Korea to Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines and Australia. It should be noted that under Xi, China’s military capability has expanded in naval and air forces. Whilst, its army has shrunk. Xi would ideally want to secure its claims over East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Taiwan without ever having to fire a shot. Thereby, displacing US as a dominant power in Asia Pacific.
- Securing China’s western continental periphery
China would seek to establish a strategic and economic leverage across the Eurasian continent. That is to say, from Western Europe to the Middle East to Africa. Most emblematic to pursue this interest is in its effort to push through the Belt and Road Initiative.
- Increasing Chinese leverage across the developing world
China sees itself as the leader of the developing world. PRC wants to fashion in the image of its past leaders who took significant leadership in the Non-Alignment Movement.
- Rewriting the global rules-based order
China would like to posture itself as the voice of the global south. And with this it seeks to challenge the post-war global order. It seeks greater share in global governance and in some cases to lead. However, in certain cases it seeks to alter the global order and salvage more spaces for China.
It remains crucial to see where Tibet configures in how Xi Jinping sees China and the world. Of course, this is observed under the framework as suggested in Kevin Rudd’s book. Here it would be insightful to see where and how Tibet stands in the grand scheme of things, as Xi Jinping remains at the helm. It is no exaggeration to say that Tibet features prominently in the way Xi perceives China and the world. It should go without saying that Xi has plenty on his plate already. At the heart of Xi’s perception as suggested by Kevin Rudd, Xi places his whole might at his disposal to retain the primacy of CCP over China. Hence, any assertion of Tibet’s history and its sovereignty – no matter how forcefully and legitimately argued—will be seen as an affront to his and CCP’s rule over China, by corollary to Tibet. Next to the core of his perception — in the ring of concentric circles, is the idea of China’s sovereignty. It doesn’t need any reminding, China rests on its default argument whenever any question is raised against its policies in Tibet. Any minor criticism of China’s rule over Tibet is construed—or perhaps misconstrued as an assault on its sovereignty. One must also take a look at the last of the circles. That is that of China wanting to alter the world order. China feels that it deserves a bigger chair in deciding world affairs. It wants to seek to alter the global order that was shaped after the world war. This is exemplified by China wanting to have more say in world affairs and wanting to shape discourse at the same time. For instance, China wishes to insert development in human rights discourses. That may seem benign but what it does is, it blunts any arguments advanced in defense of human rights of people living within the borders of what is now considered as the People’s Republic of China. There is plenty to ruminate and to think about on how China sees the world and where Tibet is configured within Xi Jinping’s worldview. A robust discussion will surely help in CTA’s approach towards Xi Jinping and China.