The Art of Non-violence
Winning China Over to Tibet’s Story

Thubten Samphel

The Tibet Policy Institute
2017
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I am happy that the Tibet Policy Institute has come out with *The Art of Non-violence: Winning China Over to Tibet’s Story*. The Tibetan outreach to our Chinese brothers and sisters is an important effort on the part of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) to persuade the Chinese public that the Tibetan people’s non-violent struggle is neither anti-China nor anti-Chinese people. This protracted struggle is waged against the wrong policies the Chinese Communist Party implements in Tibet.

As a part of this effort to explain the nature of the Tibetan people’s struggle to the broader Chinese masses, CTA instituted many years ago a China Desk at the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR). The China Desk maintains a web site in the Chinese language, www.xizang-zhiye.org, to educate the Chinese public on the deteriorating conditions in Tibet, the just aspirations of the Tibetan people and a reasonable solution to the vexed issue of Tibet. The solution to this protracted issue is the Middle Way Approach which does not seek independence for Tibet but for all the Tibetan people to enjoy genuine autonomy as enshrined in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

Ever since Deng Xiaoping launched China on the transformative path of reform and opening up in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has consistently directed the CTA to engage with the Chinese students who streamed to the West to study at universities. At first the contacts were cautious and tentative. The response from the Chinese students studying in the West was lukewarm. Perhaps the Chinese students felt that they were in the West to master Western technological know-how to help China become a prosperous and modern nation and not become the standard bearers of a few scattered Tibetan refugees who they thought were intend on denigrating their beloved country.

All this changed in the aftermath of the crushing of the massive demonstrations by students on Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the
spring of 1989. At first the students were commemorating the death anniversary of Hu Yaobang, one of the most visionary and liberal Chinese leaders. Their sorrow soon turned into anger at the corruption that spawned the ruling elite. The students now demanded the end of corruption and freedom for the people. Tanks and the army were dispatched to crush the peaceful revolt. The Chinese students studying in the West then felt that if the Chinese Communist Party was able of killing the brightest and best of the children of China, then there must be a grain of truth to the Tibetan exiles’ story.

This change in attitude of the Chinese students to the issue of Tibet resulted in a series of Sino-Tibetan dialogue conferences. I myself organized several Sino-Tibetan dialogue conferences at Harvard when I was pursuing my doctoral thesis at the university.

The need for Tibetans to reach out to the Chinese public became more urgent in the wake of the Tibet-wide peaceful protests that engulfed the plateau in 2008. The peaceful uprising was brutally crushed, tens of hundreds were imprisoned, tortured and killed. The worldwide torch relay in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics was dogged by Tibet supporters. In response to both the peaceful protests in Tibet and the protests that dogged the Olympic torch relay, the Chinese Communist Party unleashed the full firepower of the state media, inflaming ethnic animosity between Tibetans and Chinese.

In view of the Chinese government’s deliberate attempt to sow ethnic hatred between Tibetans and Chinese, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, whenever he travelled abroad, went out of his way to meet Chinese scholars and students to explain to them that he supported the Beijing Olympics and the nature of the Tibetan people’s non-violent struggle.

The Central Tibetan Administration followed this up by appointing three Chinese-speaking officers at the Offices of Tibet in New York (later moved to Washington DC), Geneva and Canberra to intensify our outreach to the Chinese community abroad and to gain their support.

I am happy that this outreach is paying off. Thousands of Chinese scholars, writers and reporters, in the Mainland but mostly outside of China, have written articles in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Lama’s peaceful efforts to resolve the issue of Tibet. The latest example of this support and understanding is Jianglin Li’s massive and outstanding volume, *Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959*, published by Harvard University Press in 2016. The Chinese version of this book was published out of Taiwan several years ago. *Tibet in Agony* chronicles the brutality that was unleashed on the Tibetan people when they peacefully rose up against Chinese rule in 1959. The 1959 Tibetan uprising is a defining and epochal moment in Tibetan history and the way it was crushed is a wound that would never heal unless the issue of Tibet is resolved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tibetan people.

I hope that this report will serve as a useful handbook to all those interested in the growth of friendship, understanding and trust between Tibetans and Chinese that would one day mitigate the suffering of the Tibetan people.

Dr. Lobsang Sangay  
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May 2017
Preface

This report is a part of a larger research effort to identify the outcome of the Tibetan exiles’ outreach to the Chinese public. The current report consists of several important documents. They are Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation, an open letter issued to the Chinese government in 2008 in the aftermath of the Tibet-wide peaceful protests that erupted on the plateau and the subsequent crackdown. This open letter was signed by some of the leading lights of China’s shrinking liberal world, including Liu Xiaobo, the imprisoned Nobel laureate. The other is the Gongmeng Tibet Report which examines with meticulous research the causes of Tibetan discontent.

This report also contains the outcome of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue conference held in Geneva in 2009. We also have Wang Lixiong’s interview with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the conversation between the Tibetan leader and two Chinese lawyers and His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s tweets with young Chinese in China.

I would like to thank my colleague Tashi Tenzin for retrieving these documents from the Internet and for his cut-and-paste work with many of my articles related to the subject. I also thank my other colleague, Mrs Tenzin Pema, for proof reading the report with me.

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12 May 2017
He was gaunt with a slight, scattered mustache. He wore a white shirt buttoned up to the neck. He was probably in his sixties when I first met him. He lived as a refugee in the Tibetan settlement of Bylakuppe in south India. In the mid-1980’s he was in Dharamsala, the headquarters of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to receive medical treatment. He lodged in a single room below the old Kashag building in the compound of the Central Tibetan Administration.


In 1958, Jiang Hao Ting, a colonel in the artillery regiment of the People’s Liberation Army in Lhasa, defected to the Tibetan army. For the ill-equipped Tibetan army, he carried with him some awesome firepower, four rifles with 650 rounds of ammunition. Later, Jiang Hao Ting joined the Tibetan resistance. Adrug Gompo Tashi, the resistance leader, gave him a Tibetan name: Lobsang Tashi.

When the armed Tibetan resistance collapsed in Tibet, Gya Lobsang Tashi joined the Tibetan exodus to India. He lived and worked as a Tibetan refugee and married a Tibetan woman. He spoke Tibetan like any Tibetan. Gya Lobsang Tashi died in 1986 in the Tibetan refugee settlement in Bylakuppe.

In the foreword to Gya Lobsang Tashi’s biography in Tibetan, Gya Lobsang Tashi and Chushi Gandruk, Chinese Lobsang Tashi and Tibetan Resistance) His Holiness the Dalai Lama writes, “The late Jiang Hao Ting or Gya Lobsang Tashi was a great friend of Tibet who in 1958 escaped the Chinese military and voluntarily joined the Chushi Gandruk” - the Tibetan resistance. His Holiness the Dalai Lama hoped that his biography would serve as a useful reference tool for later generations of Tibetans.

In the ongoing tussle between Tibet and China, Jiang Hao Ting was the first Chinese to side with the Tibetans. Since then the interaction between Tibetans and Chinese has grown. Today it spawns a cottage industry of Sino-Tibetan dialogue conferences, Chinese intellectuals speaking up for Tibet in books and essays, increasing number of
young, educated Chinese being attracted to Tibetan Buddhism and a sub-culture of Tibet drifters who are fascinated with Tibetan culture and find Tibet’s vast open space and clean environment uplifting and invigorating. On the overall fate of Tibet, China might be winning the war but in this specific battle Tibet’s soft power is making huge strikes in convincing increasing numbers of Chinese scholars and writers to tell the Tibet story to a Chinese audience.

Can this interaction be sustained? Will changing the mind of the Chinese people on the issue of Tibet affect Chinese government policy? Will the liberal Chinese intellectuals’ support for the Dalai Lama’s peace initiatives and the embrace of Tibetan Buddhism by a growing numbers of young Chinese professionals shape the Party’s policy towards Tibet?

This study will examine whether the Tibetan exiles, having won the international community over to their side of the argument, could succeed in winning the Chinese public over to their story.

Opinion is divided.

Some European officials when hearing about the Tibetan outreach to the Chinese are stunned beyond belief by Tibetan naivety. “Best of luck. There are 1.3 billion Chinese!”

However, some Chinese intellectuals are optimistic about the outcome of the interface between Tibetans and Chinese. Yu Jie, now in America, the author of Wen Jiabao: China’s Best Actor, and a friend of the Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, commenting on the 2010 discussions between the His Holiness Dalai Lama and Chinese netizens in an interview with Radio Free Asia, said, “The scale of the dialogue is not that big, just several thousand [participants]. However, I believe its influence and impact are getting bigger and bigger. One day it will defeat all distorted propaganda on the Dalai Lama and truth in Tibet.”

One intense interaction between Tibet and China took place in the mid-1950s. That was the time His Holiness the Dalai Lama visited China. An aspect of the Tibetan leader little noted by scholars is the extensive contacts he had with the revolutionary leaders who created modern China. His Holiness the Dalai Lama was in China for al-
most a year from 1954 to 1955. During this period he learnt Chinese and came to understand the ideals of socialism as explained to him by his Chinese hosts. More importantly, the Tibetan spiritual and political leader met with the top echelon of the Chinese communist leadership, including Chairman Mao Zedong, who, according to the Tibetan leader, treated him as a “father would treat a son.” His Chinese hosts took His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a grand tour of new China to bring home to the Tibetan leader the benefits of socialism. He witnessed the effective governance these leaders provided to turn their vast and impoverished country into a modern and egalitarian society.

How did the new socialist China affect the views and shape the thinking of His Holiness the Dalai Lama? Did this experience later resurface in his worldview and the governance he provided in exile? At the time for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and for China the world was fresh and new. He was 19, in the prime of youth and open to the new world he saw being re-created in China. For China the period was a fresh start, after a century of humiliation under Western imperialism, enervating warlordism, civil war, Japanese invasion and pervasive and crippling corruption. His Holiness the Dalai Lama visited China at a time when the country’s revolutionary zeal was at its height, when its collective determination to create a just and equal society was unsullied by the ideological madness and physical carnage that followed. It was a time when new China showed the Tibetan leader its better side.

New China in the person of Mao Zedong also showed Tibet’s political leader and its foremost spiritual master its ambivalence to Tibetan Buddhism. His Holiness the Dalai Lama recounts this episode in his autobiography, My Land and My People:

A few days later I had a message from Mao Tse-tung to say that he was coming to see me in an hour’s time. When he arrived he said he had merely come to call. Then something made him say that Buddhism was quite a good religion, and Lord Buddha, although he was a prince, had given a good deal of thought to the question of improving the conditions of the people. He also observed that the Goddess Tara was a kind-hearted woman. After a very few minutes, he left. I was quite bewildered by these remarks and did not know what to make of them.
My final interview with this remarkable man was toward the end of my visit to China. I was at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly when I received a message asking me to go to see him at this house. By then, I had been able to complete a tour of the Chinese provinces, and I was able to tell him truthfully that I had been greatly impressed and interested by all the development projects I had seen. Then he started to give me a long lecture about the true form of democracy, and advised me how to become a leader of the people and how to take heed of their suggestions. And then he edged closer to me on his chair and whispered: I understand you very well. But of course, religion is poison. It has two great defects: It undermines the race, and secondly it retards the progress of the country. Tibet and Mongolia have both been poisoned by it.

Marx’s dictum that religion was the opiate of the people rode roughshod over whatever personal regard or sensitivity Mao might have had towards Buddhism. Before and during the Cultural Revolution religion was the target of communist wrath. Monasteries were reduced to ruins, temples were destroyed and monks were disrobed. This was an attempt by new China to prevent the fumes of opiate from sullying socialism. In Tibet the destruction of Tibetan Buddhism had an overwhelmingly political overtone. There could not be two suns in the same sky. Buddhism must melt under the rays of the socialist sun.

Despite these, the ideas of socialism His Holiness the Dalai Lama learnt in China stayed with him. One is his articulation of the concept of universal responsibility, of acting locally but thinking globally. As he says:

In Buddhist practice we get so used to this idea of nonviolence and the ending of all suffering that we become accustomed to not harming or destroying anything indiscriminately. Although we do not believe that trees or flowers have minds, we treat them also with respect. Thus we share a sense of universal responsibility for both mankind and nature.

Anyone would think this kind of thinking comes entirely from his Buddhist background, from the Buddhist concept of the interdependence of everything. No, the Dalai Lama said in 2007 during a visit to Australia. The idea also came from communist international, from the toiling workers and peasants of the world expressing their
solidarity with other suffering workers and peasants.

In 1979 the Dalai Lama blessed the founding of a Tibetan Communist Party (TCP) in exile by a group of young educated refugees. He hoped that the Tibetan Communist Party in exile would serve as a bridge to those Tibetans in Tibet who shared the ideas and ideals of a socialist Tibet. But this ideological bridge between the Tibetan exiles and their compatriots in Tibet collapsed when the TCP decided to close its communist shop.

But the most far-reaching of the China experience which stayed with the Dalai Lama was his ability and willingness to reach to the Chinese people. The need to reach out to the Chinese became especially acute when in the wake of the peaceful uprisings that erupted throughout Tibet in 2008, the Chinese authorities used its awesome media firepower to stoke ethnic hostility between Tibetans and Chinese. The Chinese authorities, as a part of the state repression, were literally using the enormous public anger of the Chinese on the hapless minority Tibetans. In view of this, the Tibetan leader found it necessary to go out of his way to explain to Chinese scholars and students the nature of the Tibetan people’s struggle. The Middle-Way Policy did not seek independence for Tibet. It sought real autonomy under a single administration within the scope of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China. His efforts to reach out to the Chinese paid off. He was able to win the trust and respect of a growing number of Chinese netizens. In fact, there are some Chinese who are amplifying the Dalai Lama’s voice in China. Beyond the radar of China’s censors and whispered in the din of China’s Internet chatter are expressions of Chinese support and sympathy.

In the wake of the widespread and sustained protests that erupted in Tibet in 2009, Chinese intellectuals’ expression of sympathy for Tibetan grievances was loud and clear. A letter, signed by the leading lights of China, including by the imprisoned Nobel Laureate, Liu Xiaobo and more than 340 others, urged the Chinese authorities to hold direct dialogue with His Holiness the Dalai Lama to resolve the issue. The open letter published on the website of Human Rights Watch on 21 March 2008 is called Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation. Suggestion one said, “At present the one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media is having the effect of stirring up inter-ethnic animosity and aggravating an already
tense situation. This is extremely detrimental to the long-term goal of safeguarding national unity. We call for such propaganda to be stopped.”

Suggestion two said, “We support the Dalai Lama’s appeal for peace, and hope that the ethnic conflict can be dealt with according to the principles of goodwill, and non-violence. We condemn any violent act against innocent people, strongly urge the Chinese government to stop the violent suppression, and appeal to the Tibetan people not to engage in violent activities.”

Suggestion ten said, “The disturbances in Tibet in the 1980s were limited to Lhasa, whereas this time they have spread to many Tibetan areas. This deterioration indicates that there are serious mistakes in the work that has been done in regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments must conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and fundamentally change the failed nationality policies.”

All the recommendations in the Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation are published as appendix in this report.

Similarly, in May 2009, Gongmeng, a law firm in Beijing that advocates the rule of law, published a detailed report investigating the causes of Tibetan discontent. It cited China’s policy failure as a major cause. The reported recommended that Beijing in future base its Tibet policy on the aspirations of the Tibetan people. The report, called An Investigative Report into the Social and Economic Causes of the 3.14 Incident in Tibetan Areas, was put in the public domain in April 2009. It was published by Gongmeng Law Research Center.

The report made nine recommendations to the Chinese government. The first recommendation said, “Earnestly listen to the voices of ordinary Tibetans and on the basis of respecting and protecting each other the Tibetan people’s rights and interests adjust policy and thinking in Tibetan areas to formulate development policies which are suited to the characteristics of the Tibetan areas, and which accord with the wishes of the Tibetan people.”

This exhaustive report too is published as an appendix for readers and researchers interested in the issue.
One burning topic of discussion between Tibetan exiles and the Chinese on the Mainland is the spate of fiery deaths that engulf Tibet today. So far, 146 Tibetans have set themselves on fire since 2009. All of them called for freedom in Tibet and the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to his homeland. When informed of these self-immolations, the reaction from the Chinese netizens is one of shock and disbelief. Even when images of self-immolations were sent to them, the sentiment of the majority Chinese netizens is, this can’t be happening in China.

Buried in the widespread sentiment of disbelief are also expressions of support and understanding, says Tsering Wangmo, who heads Drelwa, a Tibetan NGO based in Dharamsala, the seat of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in north India. Drelwa consist of six young Chinese-speaking Tibetans who daily surmount the Great Firewall of China to carry on a conversation with netizens in China. One netizen writes, “You Tibetans are not alone. We are also frustrated by rising food and rent prices. Though we haven’t heard about the self-immolations, we understand the reasons for the frustration arising out of a loss of hope.”

Another blames the Chinese Communist Party for the increasing cases of Tibetans resorting to self-immolation. He says, “The CCP hides the truth and spreads distorted information. The CCP suppresses not only Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs but the Chinese people. The Chinese people don’t know the truth because all channels of free information are blocked. To solve all these problems, China must tread on the path of democracy.”

These are some of the sentiments of support and sympathy whispered beyond the radar of China’s censor and below the din of China’s Internet chatter.

Others openly express what they feel about the self-immolations going on in Tibet. For example, in an interview for the Foreign Policy magazine in its September-October 2012 issue, Ai Weiwei, the world famous Chinese artist, made these comments. “The one exception is Tibet, because of its natural resources, but the Tibetan people are burning themselves to death. Already over 40 of them in the past two years, and nobody’s talking about it.”
When asked whether he had been to Lhasa before, Ai Weiwei said, “No. I would feel ashamed to go. I think to respect [the Tibetans] is not to touch them, to leave them alone.”

Ran Yunfei, one of China’s most outspoken public intellectuals, in an interview to Ian Johnson for the New York Review of Books, said, “The communists really destroyed religion. They don’t understand it at all. Look at Tibet. I told the guobao (state security agents) that, “you guys have gone too far. You don’t allow them to hang pictures of the Dalai Lama. You don’t have faith so you don’t understand. So the Tibetans get very angry and depressed. And then you go into temples and instead hang pictures of Mao and Jiang (Zemin) or Hu (Jintao). You’ve gone overboard! This isn’t right. Think about it. No wonder they set themselves on fire.”

Despite these expression of sympathy and the growing appeal of the Dalai Lama’s message of reconciliation to young Chinese both within and outside China, official Chinese view of the Tibetan leader is well known. Successive party officials have called the Tibetan leader a “wolf in monk’s robes” or “a devil with a human face, but with a heart of a beast.” On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party assumes the exalted status of being the “real Buddha” to the Tibetan people, and on this account it has a couple of times declared Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, the “happiest city” in China.

Since no survey has been done, we don’t know whether the ordinary Chinese buy their government’s argument about the Tibetan spiritual leader, or the situation on the ground in Tibet. The consensus is that the vast majority of Chinese do not question the party’s views of the Dalai Lama, nor the conditions prevailing on the plateau.

However, a recent report, a collection of comments on the tightening restrictions on the roof of the world by Chinese microbloggers, reveals the unsettling questions that pop up in their minds when Chinese tourists are confronted with the grim reality in Tibet. Has Life Here Been Always Like This? is a report issued by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), an advocacy group based in Washington, D.C. The report says, “Despite authorities’ efforts to crack down on social media, ICT was able to collect hundreds of images and message from the popular Chinese microblogging site, SinaWeibo, using crowd-sourced perspective of Chinese tourists to further docu-
ment the harsh security measures implemented in Tibet by Chinese authorities.”

The report is a survey of Internet chatter by Chinese tourists to Tibet from 2011 to 2012. It includes images of a highly militarized Tibet and the Chinese tourists’ expressions of shock, irritation and even fear at China’s bristling military muscle on display in Tibet. A SinaWeibo (Chinese version of Twitter) posting of 2011, quoted in the report, likened the situation in eastern Tibet to “a war zone.” The comment said, “Yesterday I drove along the Xianshul River fault line from Luhuo (Dranggo) to Chengdu, Tawu County was like a war zone. People’s Armed Police and Public Security standing along the street, heavily-armed Special Police at each door! We were told you can’t stay overnight in the county town, and you can’t stay on these streets!”

Another posting lamented, “On the way back to Lhasa from the lake my ID card was inspected multiple times...If you take a picture of a fire truck they’ll make you delete it...Think again about taking a picture of Special Police vehicle...What is wrong with this society? The cost of maintaining stability is truly high! (2012)”

The cost of maintaining stability might be truly high but the authorities want to make it higher. Several years ago, the authorities allowed Chinese scholars to engage in an open debate about changing policy towards the minorities. In the wake of the peaceful protests that erupted throughout Tibet in 2008 and the violence that shook Xinjiang in 2009, Chinese scholars worried about the fragmentation of China along ethnic lines. They recommended tighter restrictions on minorities. Party scholars and some officials advocated a policy doing away with the minorities and suggested their “fusion” with the dominant Han majority.

Why did the Chinese authorities allow this open, public debate on China’s minority policy? Was the party gauging public opinion before launching into a hardline minority policy?

Whatever it is, the majority view of Chinese intellectuals on the party’s current minority policy is that it is a major failure. The public outburst of such sentiments have been prompted by the 2008 protests that swept Tibet and the 2009 violence in Urumqi in Xinjiang.
in China’s far west. The 2013 suicide attack in the centre of Beijing, the kniving to death of 29 bystanders while injuring 130 others at the Kunming railway station and the recent spate of violence in Xinjiang during and after President Xi Jinping’s visit to the region make these scholars fret over the cohesion of the Chinese state. This concern over the continued cohesion of China compels scholars to recommend policy options that would do away with separate identities for the minorities.

The various strands of thinking of some of China’s respected scholars and top officials dealing with minority issues on how to make adjustment to minority policy in order to strengthen national cohesion have been compiled and analysed by James Leibold in his concise and comprehensive study, Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?

Chinese thinking on a new minority policy could be categorised into the following: thinking of establishment scholars and officials, ultra-nationalists, liberals and the party establishment. The common strand on how China should treat its minorities is the spectre of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the implosion of the Soviet Union. To avoid such a fate, rather than expanding autonomy and minority freedom, scholars and officials alike recommend curtailing autonomy and doing away with preferential treatment to minorities who are considered too “pampered” under the current dispensation.

Leading the charge in “correcting” China’s minority policy are Ma Rong, director and dean of sociology of Peking University, Hu Angang, director of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies at Tsinghua University and Zhu Weiqun, once the executive director of the United Front Work Department, the party’s top office that supervises minority policy. They recommend minority distinctions should be done away with and the minorities fused in the “melting pot” of Chineseness. They cite the melting-pot models of America, India and Brazil as roaring successes.

Some want to go further. General Liu Yazhou, a son-in-law of the late Chinese president Li Xiannian, and the political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University, recommends the breaking up of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang into smaller units and encouraging more migration of Chinese settlers to these regions to cement Beijing’s rule.
In face of such an onslaught, how do the Chinese liberals view the issue? According to Leibold, the Chinese liberals are on retreat. Or, more to the point, they are in jail. Chinese liberals’ earlier talk of granting self-determination to the minorities finds no place in Charter 08, the document that articulates the highest aspirations of a section of Chinese society on how they want their country to evolve. According to Leibold, Liu Xiaobo’s (the jailed Nobel laureate) argument is that democratization for the whole of China is a pre-condition for any solution to the issue of Tibet. But that is something furthest from the mind of policy-makers who shape minority policy.

Missing from Leibold’s analysis is other voices in the Chinese establishment that suggest a different way of dealing, if not with the minorities, but with the Dalai Lama. Jin Wei of the central party school in Beijing recommends that China invite the Dalai Lama to Hong Kong or even to Tibet to secure his co-operation in deciding his successor.

Missing too from the whole spectrum of China’s clamorous discourse on changes to its minority policy is the voices of the minorities themselves. In what some scholars call the second generation of minority policy there is not even a hint of consulting the minorities of their future status in the country. The consensus is that the minorities need not be told that they are not what they say they are. If these dangerous policy recommendations are carried out, China will be igniting a bigger conflagration than the scattered fires China is busy trying to put off in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The melting-pot system works in America, India and Brazil precisely because these are robust democracies with long-established consultative political cultures. Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongolians are struggling to survive as distinct ethnic identities because even under China’s current minority policy they have been left out of the decision-making process.

Within the party establishment one of the loudest supporters of minorities’ “fusion” with the majority Hans is Zhu Weiqun, formerly of the United Front and the principal counterpart to Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, the special envoy and envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama when they engaged in extensive discussions on Tibet between 2002 to 2010. Zhu Weiqun’s is the loudest voice in China’s
anti-splittism bureaucracy. He supports “ethnic fusion” and “melting pot” for the minorities. Instead of reducing tension by working towards loosening restrictions on minorities, China’s anti-splittism bureaucracy want the authorities to put the minorities under tighter control. What is the reason?

The reason was explained by a Chinese participant from Canada at the international Sino-Tibetan conference held in Geneva in August 2009. He said that the biggest stumbling block to any resolution of the Tibet issue is the network of organs in the party, government and army that constitute China’s vast anti-splittism bureaucracy. He said China’s current “anti-splittism rampage gives career and livelihood to about 400,000 cadres involved in the campaign. If the dialogue between Dharamsala and Beijing succeeds, these people will be out of jobs the next day. The speaker said this bureaucratic grip on policy-makers in Beijing is the real reason why there is no positive response from Beijing to Dharamsala’s overtures and fresh ideas.

Inspite of the enormous strides Tibetans have made in reaching out to the Chinese and because of Beijing’s hardline attitude to any mutually beneficial resolution to the issue of Tibet, one comes to the conclusion that no struggle in the world is as unequal as the one between Tibet and China.

China is the world’s second largest economy and, according to economists, set to eclipse that of America’s in the coming two decades. Its military is the largest in the world. On top of this, Beijing’s position in Tibet is unassailable, reinforced by a network of all-weather roads, airports and an expanding railway line that are integrating the world’s highest, largest and remotest plateau more closely to the mainland.

Abroad China uses its economic weight to its advantage. It punishes countries whose leaders meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama by withdrawing commercial deals or sometimes cutting off trade ties. Caught between the importance of improving commercial relations with China and protecting human rights, China’s trading partners invariably succumb to Chinese pressure by not meeting the Tibetan leader. Scholars consider this as “the Dalai Lama effect on international trade.”
Viewed from this perspective, some commentators believe the Tibetan people’s struggle for greater freedom in Tibet as punching above their weight. These commentators liken the worldwide Tibet movement for restoration of human rights in Tibet as beating a dead yak to life. Chinese officials put it more succinctly. They call the Tibetan exiles’ international efforts as “a fly flapping its wings against the king of mountains.” Given the skyrocketing asymmetry between Tibetans and China in terms of power, political, military and economic, it comes as no surprise that these observers view Tibet as a lost cause.

But in one area Tibetans have scored a significant victory over China. In the war of words between Dharamsala and Beijing that has simmered and flared for more than six decades Tibetans have won the argument, if not the war, of what is the issue of Tibet. The argument is about both the nature of the old Tibetan society and the Chinese rule in Tibet.

Official China’s argument is that old Tibet was a feudal serfdom, a minority of serf-owners oppressing the majority serfs. China’s invasion of Tibet was a ‘liberation’, bringing freedom, happiness and development to the backward Tibetans steeped in feudal superstition. Chinese authorities say their policies in Tibet have made it enjoy the highest GDP growth in the country and the Tibetans masters of their own affairs.

The Tibetan argument is that Tibet was an independent nation before the Chinese invasion of the country in 1950. Tibetans view Chinese rule in Tibet as an occupation and its policies directed towards economic marginalization, cultural assimilation, social exclusion and ethnic swamping of the country by the majority Han population. Tibetans decry China’s destruction of Tibet’s Buddhist civilization.

How a handful of Tibetan refugees won their argument in the court of international public opinion is a story of tenacity and an inexhaustible supply of optimism.

The beginning of this story was less than hopeful and mired in mistaken identity. Though His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s dramatic escape across the Himalayas in 1959 became the story of the year, the international media which rushed to Tezpur in north-eastern India to cover the story did not know who the 14th Dalai Lama was. A
Reuters’ photographer snapped a picture of a gorgeously attired lama and sent it to London as the first photo of the Dalai Lama since his safe arrival on Indian soil. The Reuters’ head office in London shot back, “Your Dalai Lama has a beard. The real one doesn’t!,” or words to this effect.

No struggle could say it set off on an auspicious start when the leader of that struggle who is the pontiff of the Buddhist church was barely recognized by the international media. This lack of recognition was confounded by the challenge of surviving in the modern world where for the Tibetan refugees everything was strange and new, except the sky and earth.

Given China’s enormous media reach and now with consequential economic clout, how a group of non-entities from a remote and inconsequential land, albeit exotic, managed to grab the attention of the world and hold it for so long is the story of Tibet in exile. In telling its story to the world, Tibet in exile weaved all the elements of its Buddhist civilization into a compelling narrative that has spawned a global industry in Tibetan Buddhism, culture and history.

Brand Tibet is a global brand, comparable in its appeal if not in its influence with China’s economic juggernaut rolling across the planet. Contrary to the forces that have sparked China’s economic miracle based on interests and profit, Brand Tibet’s appeal is the message of ancient Tibet based on the values of non-violence and compassion and, in a world increasingly facing dwindling resources, the message of living within one’s means.

There are plenty of books that cover the spread of Tibetan Buddhism in the West, Latin America and South-east Asia. Many writers have also followed the Dalai Lama in his worldwide campaign trail for greater freedoms in Tibet. But these works fail to fully explore one element of the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan exiles’ efforts. The issue largely ignored in the face-off between Tibet and China is the attitude of Chinese scholars to the question of Tibet and the increasing embrace of Tibetan Buddhism by young Chinese professionals. This interaction might or might not be a tipping point for Tibet but has the potential of shaping Chinese view of Tibetan culture in a much more positive light. As mentioned before, Chinese intellectuals’ view of the issue of Tibet is reflected in such reports as the Gongmeng Ti-

Facilitated by Wang Lixiong, the Beijing-based Chinese scholar, His Holiness the Dalai Lama joined in two separate discussions with Chinese netizens in May and August in 2010, answering questions on his successor, his approach to resolving the issue of Tibet, the nature of autonomy for Tibet, whether Tibetans would stick to non-violence after his demise and relations between Tibetans and Chinese. One of these discussions had 1,543 Chinese participants from the mainland who submitted 326 questions. Chinese netizens voted for the final ten questions, which were then answered by the Tibetan leader.

Again, organised by Wang Lixiong, on 4 January 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama took part in a video conference with two Chinese lawyers. One question to the Tibetan leader was: “My question to you, my teacher, is the struggle of non-violence and truth (non-cooperation) effective in confronting communist China? If yes, in what ways the Tibetan people are benefited by non-violence and truth?”

And this is how His Holiness the Dalai Lama answered:

I always tell the same thing to Tibetans. And I want to mention here that even though our consistent stand of middle-way policy based on the foundation of non-violence has not yielded tangible result through dialogue with the Chinese government, it has helped us in getting strong support from the Chinese intellectuals, students and those who are interested in and aware of the reality. This is the result of my efforts.

It is difficult to deal with the Chinese government, but I think despite our inability to maintain extensive contacts with the Chinese intellectuals and public, our stand will win their support and it will continue to grow. It was some months after the Tiananmen event, I met some Chinese friends at Harvard University as I happened to be at that time in the US. After I explained to them our position, they said the entire Chinese people would support the stand of the Dalai Lama if they know about it.

Wang Lixiong, the writer and scholar who looks into ethnic issues
in China, explains the background of the conversation between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and young netizens in China. In The Dialogue (documentary) posted in YouTube, Wang Lixiong explains:

The thing is, these sorts of communications and dialogues with the Dalai Lama have always been severely hindered. After using Twitter, I have been wondering if we can do it with Twitter. But if it’s like this... I have personally met the Dalai Lama several times. Of course, I know how difficult each meeting was. It needed lots of arrangements; his time was limited and a lot of time was wasted with interpretation. Actually, it was hard to set up even one meeting. And we had very little interaction. But now we have the internet which can break through the limitations of time and space. Then why can’t we use it?

The Dalai Lama himself particularly wants Han Chinese intellectuals and ordinary people to really understand his opinions. What, ultimately, is his attitude towards independence? What are his thoughts about the future of Tibet? As for ordinary Han intellectuals and common people - they know almost nothing about the Dalai Lama - and certainly want to know what he’s all about.

So in May, 2010, I met the Dalai Lama in New York and had my first face to face dialogue with him. But it was different from before. First I told my Twitter - mates about the idea - to put questions to the Dalai Lama together. At the very same time, we found a tool - “Moderator,” a software program for moderating, made by Google. Now we also use this software - so that netizens in China can use it to ask questions. Anyone can ask his or her questions - and others can express their attitudes towards it - “agree”, “like”, “not agree very much”, or “oppose”. This form of kind of vote. The software can sort the questions - putting the most popular first. So, within 2 or 3 days, more than 1,000 questions had been put forth. And nearly 10,000 people voted. Of course, the site was soon closed by the Chinese Government. Even so - we’d already gotten so many questions and votes.

Tibetan ability to tell their story convincingly to the Chinese might determine the outcome of the story itself. Joseph S. Nye, the Harvard University professor who came up with the “soft power” concepts, explains this in his new book, The Future of Power. “On increasing number of issues in the 21st century, war is not the ultimate arbiter... Outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins but also by whose story wins.
In articulating this view, Joseph Nye echoes the military precepts of Sun Tzu, who lived around the same time as Confucius. In his classic text on military strategy, The Art of War, ancient China’s master military strategist reveals this piece of gem:

Ultimate excellence lies
Not winning
Every battle
But defeating the enemy
Without ever fighting
March 21, 2008 8:00PM EDT

Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation

by Some Chinese Intellectuals

Languages Available In

简体中文

English

1. At present the one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media is having the effect of stirring up inter-ethnic animosity and aggravating an already tense situation. This is extremely detrimental to the long-term goal of safeguarding national unity. We call for such propaganda to be stopped.

2. We support the Dalai Lama’s appeal for peace, and hope that the ethnic conflict can be dealt with according to the principles of goodwill, peace, and non-violence. We condemn any violent act against innocent people, strongly urge the Chinese government to stop the violent suppression, and appeal to the Tibetan people likewise not to engage in violent activities.

3. The Chinese government claims that “there is sufficient evidence to prove this incident was organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai clique.” We hope that the government will show proof of this. In order to change the international community’s negative view and distrustful attitude, we also suggest that the government invite the United Nation’s Commission on Human Rights to carry out an independent investigation of the evidence, the course of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.

4. In our opinion, such Cultural-Revolution-like language as “the Dalai Lama is a jackal in Buddhist monk’s robes and an evil spirit with a human face and the heart of a beast” used by the Chinese
Communist Party leadership in the Tibet Autonomous Region is of no help in easing the situation, nor is it beneficial to the Chinese government’s image. As the Chinese government is committed to integrating into the international community, we maintain that it should display a style of governing that conforms to the standards of modern civilization.

5. We note that on the very day when the violence erupted in Lhasa (March 14), the leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region declared that “there is sufficient evidence to prove this incident was organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai clique.” This shows that the authorities in Tibet knew in advance that the riot would occur, yet did nothing effective to prevent the incident from happening or escalating. If there was a dereliction of duty, a serious investigation must be carried out to determine this and deal with it accordingly.

6. If in the end it cannot be proved that this was an organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated event but was instead a “popular revolt” triggered by events, then the authorities should pursue those responsible for inciting the popular revolt and concocting false information to deceive the Central Government and the people; they should also seriously reflect on what can be learned from this event so as to avoid taking the same course in the future.

7. We strongly demand that the authorities not subject every Tibetan to political investigation or revenge. The trials of those who have been arrested must be carried out according to judicial procedures that are open, just, and transparent so as to ensure that all parties are satisfied.

8. We urge the Chinese government to allow credible national and international media to go into Tibetan areas to conduct independent interviews and news reports. In our view, the current news blockade cannot gain credit with the Chinese people or the international community, and is harmful to the credibility of the Chinese government. If the government grasps the true situation, it need not fear challenges. Only by adopting an open attitude can we turn around the international community’s distrust of our government.

9. We appeal to the Chinese people and overseas Chinese to be calm
and tolerant, and to reflect deeply on what is happening. Adopting a posture of aggressive nationalism will only invite antipathy from the international community and harm China’s international image.

10. The disturbances in Tibet in the 1980s were limited to Lhasa, whereas this time they have spread to many Tibetan areas. This deterioration indicates that there are serious mistakes in the work that has been done with regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments must conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and fundamentally change the failed nationality policies.

11. In order to prevent similar incidents from happening in future, the government must abide by the freedom of religious belief and the freedom of speech explicitly enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, thereby allowing the Tibetan people fully to express their grievances and hopes, and permitting citizens of all nationalities freely to criticize and make suggestions regarding the government’s nationality policies.

12. We hold that we must eliminate animosity and bring about national reconciliation, not continue to increase divisions between nationalities. A country that wishes to avoid the partition of its territory must first avoid divisions among its nationalities. Therefore, we appeal to the leaders of our country to hold direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama. We hope that the Chinese and Tibetan people will do away with the misunderstandings between them, develop their interactions with each other, and achieve unity. Government departments as much as popular organizations and religious figures should make great efforts toward this goal.

Signatures:

Wang Lixiong (Beijing, Writer)
Liu Xiaobo (Beijing, Freelance Writer)
Zhang Zuhua (Beijing, scholar of constitutionalism)
ShaYexin (Shanghai, writer, Chinese Muslim)
Yu Haocheng (Beijing, jurist)
Ding Zilin (Beijing, professor)
Jiang peikun (Beijing, professor)
Yu Jie (Beijing, writer)
Sun Wenguang (Shangdong, professor)
Ran Yunfei (Sichuan, editor, Tujia nationality)
PuZhiqiang (Beijing, lawyer)
Teng Biao (Beijing, Writer and scholar)
Liao Yiwu (Sichuan, writer)
Wang Qisheng (Beijing, scholar)
Zhang Xianling (Beijing, engineer)
XuJue (Beijing, research fellow)
Li Jun (Gansu, photographer)
Gao Yu (Beijing, journalist)
Wang Debang (Beijing, freelance writer)
Zhao Dagong (Shenzhen, freelance writer)
Jiang Danwen (Shanghai, writer)
Liu Yi (Gansu, painter)
XuHui (Beijing, writer)
Wang Tiancheng (Beijing, scholar)
Wen kejian (Hangzhou, freelance)
Li Hai (Beijing, freelance writer)
TianYongde (Inner Mongolia, folk human rights activists)
ZanAizong (Hangzhou, journalist)
Liu Yiming (Hubei, freelance writer)

The rules of signing one’s name are as follows:
1. Open signature
2. Only accept the signature with one’s own name or commonly used pen name
3. One needs to include one’s name, the province of one’s current residence, occupation
4. The e-mails for one to send one’s signature: xizangwenti@gmail.com

Source: https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/21/twelve-suggestions-dealing-tibetan-situation

A Sino-Tibetan conference ‘Finding Common Ground’ was held in Geneva from 6-8 August 2009 attended by Chinese and Tibetan scholars, educators, writers and human rights advocates. The aims of the conference are to inform the Chinese people and the international community that Tibetan culture and way of life are gravely endangered and that the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people are seriously being violated by the Chinese regime. In addition, the conference aims to outline effective measures to support the Tibetan people in their struggle to regain their freedom and to sustain and promote its unique culture. In this way, the conference will also respond to the heartfelt remarks made by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in His opening address.

Based on these aims, the conference has reached the following common positions:

I. Fundamental Values and Principles

The universal values established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which include freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, equality and coexistence of multiple cultures, are the fundamental spiritual values and principles that the conference has followed.

II. The Origin and Nature of the Tibetan Issue

1. The root cause of the Tibetan issue is not a conflict between the Chinese people and the Tibetan people, but rather the autocratic rule of the People’s Republic of China in Tibet and its cultural genocide in Tibet.

2. The Beijing government’s claim that ‘Tibet has always been a part of China’ is factually incorrect.

3. Tibetan culture, religion, language and way of life are on the
verge of extinction.

4 The Tibetan people have been deprived of their fundamental human rights including the rights to national self-determination, political participation and religious belief.

5 The official media of the Chinese government distorts the nature of the Tibetan issue and incites confrontation between the two peoples.

III. Ways Towards Resolving the Tibetan Issue

1 Respect the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people, including the right to political participation and the right of religious freedom and belief.

2 The resolution of the Tibetan issue is closely related to the democratization of China.

3 The Chinese people should engage in a critical reflection on Han chauvinism and fully respect Tibetan culture and way of life.

4 The Chinese government must comply with the principle of the rule of law.

5 The participants fully respect the Middle-Way Approach proposed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

6 The undeniable right of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to return to his homeland must be respected.

IV. Recommendations to the Tibetan Government in Exile

1 To establish Sino-Tibetan friendship associations, Sino-Tibetan forums and civil society organizations across the world in order to promote cultural exchange and emotional ties between the two peoples.

2 To establish a research institute for Chinese and Tibetan scholars to promote the study of Tibetan history and culture for the purpose of recovering historical facts.
3 To adopt measures to counteract the blockage of information on His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the monopoly on Tibetan issues by the Chinese regime, which would facilitate access to independent information for the Chinese people and the international community.

4 To create favorable conditions for His Holiness the Dalai Lama to promote his values to the Chinese community as a contribution to the renewal of spiritual values amongst the Chinese people.

The common wish of this Sino-Tibetan conference is for the Tibetan people to regain freedom and to prevent the extinction of Tibetan culture. We share a fundamental belief: freedom is the highest value; Tibetan culture is a precious treasure among the many cultures of humanity. Without freedom for Tibet, there will be no freedom for China. The extinction of Tibetan culture would not only be a tragedy for the Tibetan people, but would be a disgrace for the Chinese people and an irreplaceable loss for the whole of humanity.

Participants of the Geneva Sino-Tibetan Conference 8 August 2009

A full documentation of the conference is available at: www.tibet-china-conference.org

[1] This document has been translated into English from the Chinese original. In case of any discrepancies, the Chinese original is the final and authoritative document.

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An investigative report into the social and economic causes of the 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas

Gongmeng Law Research Center

Contributors: LiKun, Huang Li, LiXiang

Research: LiKun, Huang Li, LiXiang, Wang Hongzhe

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Foreword

From March to April of 2008, a series of mass violent incidents occurred in the Lhasa, Gannan [Tib:Kanlho, in Gansu province] and Aba [Tib:Ngaba, in Sichuan province] regions of our country. The locations of these incidents were the two Tibetan regions of U-Tsang and Amdo.[1][5] More than a thousand local youths and monks participated in the destruction of government offices, shops and other public installations, and even resorted to violent attacks against innocent people. What could have made the youths in these Tibetan areas including monk become protagonists in these violent incidents? Was it, as the propaganda tells us, a set of violent political and religious demands, or was it a concentrated release of discontent with life in this society? Chinese and western media have been engaging in a heated debate with each other using all manner of ideological approaches to explain these incidents including “Tibetan independence,” “human rights” and “cultural genocide.”

The 3.14 incident[2][6] of course had its external causes, such as the political and religious demands from groups of Tibetans in exile overseas, and the influence of the Dalai
Lama abroad. However, such a large social contradiction could not have been created solely by external factors; there must have been internal causes, but the news reports gave little detailed consideration to exposing the social roots of these violent incidents. Under the influence of nationalist sentiment, there were some reports that even broadened mistrust and mutual criticisms between the nationalities. The lack of field research into the living conditions of Tibetans has been detrimental to clearly understanding the nature of social contradictions in Tibetan areas on a theoretical level, and has been detrimental to resolving problems on a practical level. What is the current state of education and employment in Tibetan areas? What are the lives and thoughts of ordinary people? The strong motivation for Gongmeng to undertake this research is an attempt to analyze the social roots of the background to this “sudden” incident, and by means of local research and interviews understand in a relatively objective way Tibetan areas in a state of change, to deepen understanding and inclusiveness between the nationalities, and to promote harmonious relations between the nationalities.

Sincere form and opening up, enormous changes have occurred in the mechanisms of China’s social power and wealth distribution. In a society undergoing such dramatic changes and opening up ever quicker to the outside world, all nationalities in our country are facing entirely new developmental needs and directional choices, and relations between the nationalities are evincing a complex intertwining of old and new contradictions. The original intention and core aim of our survey is to “understand,” with the theme being “The social origins of the Tibet problem and changes to social life in Tibetan areas in recent years.” As the times change, the lives of each of the ethnic peoples also change. Choosing the perspective of “change” enables covering the old people who have experienced “serfdom to land reforms to reform and opening up,” but even more it is hoped attention thus can be focused on those Tibetan youths who were born during and after the 70sand who have grown up in Tibetan areas facing the impacts of globalization and modernization. As the future of Tibetan areas, the circumstances and perspectives of their lives are very different to those of their parents, and there is now a new frame
of reference for measuring reality. No longer is it the serf society of before, but a modern life where one stands alone in the throng of the world; and no longer is it as self-sustaining Tibet protected by the natural environment, but a realm which whether actively or passively is intimately connected to all of China and the rest of the world. In the intense process of evolutionary social reform, the problems and challenges faced by society in Tibetan areas seem even more severe and pressing because of their special nature.

This survey chose as its research locations Hezuo city [Tib: Tsoe] and Xiahe [Tib: Labrang] county in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Tibetan region of Amdo, and Lhasa City and Naidong [Tib: Nedong] county, both in the Tibetan region of U-Tsang. Gannan autonomous prefecture in the Tibetan region of Amdo is an important source of the Tibetan people’s culture and art. Over the course of a long history, the Tibetan region of Amdo has been at the frontline of cultural exchange and intermingling between Tibetan and Han peoples. This region is classic model for researching Tibetan people’s social changes. Lhasa and Shannan in the Tibetan region of U-Tsang are the ancestral lands of Tibetan culture and the ancient political and cultural centers of Tibet. Sincere form and opening up, both U-Tsang and Amdo have been experiencing rapid process of modernization. External factors continue to impact upon and alter their appearance. The reason for choosing these two regions is also because both have differing historical traditions and structural characteristics. The differences and similarities between them highlight the complexity and difficulty of the problems in Tibetan areas. Based on the sourcing and compilation of documentation, the panel visited scholars and specialists, monks, farmers, nomads, artists, entrepreneurs and migrants in the above-described locales, and it is hoped that by means of coming into personal contact with these voices that a more clear and objective outline of ordinary people’s living conditions in Tibetan areas can be gained.

In light of previous experiences and limited research times, structured interviews and questionnaires are not suited to the low levels of education locally, in addition to language and cultural differences on the actual circumstances of the research. Unstructured interviews acquired rich social material to the greatest degree, and were able to adapt flexibly to the interviewees’ situations. Therefore, the panel
adopted a combination of participatory observation and unstructured interviews as a social research methodology, combining general observations of the social situation with individual case analyses. The two eventual methodologies were in-depth interviews and small group discussions.

We consider that the problem of nationalities in the context of globalization is the most important matter in the political life of an ethnic country [a multi-ethnic state]. Based on the principles of understanding and respect, the protection and amelioration of relations between all nationalities should receive even greater attention. For a long time, the “Tibet question” has been one of the hottest and most complex nationality issues. In recent years, contradictions and conflicts in Tibetan areas have taken an ugly turn, which on the one hand has been due to theoretical blind spots created over a long period due to ideological considerations, and on the other hand because there has not been enough attention paid to the new and prominent problems and contradictions that have emerged as a result of change.

Under present conditions, if contradictions and problems in ethnic autonomous areas such as Tibetan regions are to be fundamentally resolved, it is most important that there be thorough investigations into the thinking, economics and living conditions of those regions’ masses. Understanding is a precondition for discussion, unity and development. If the promotion of healthy development in Tibetan areas is truly desired then there must be a change in thinking and an adjustment in thinking behind the current nationality theories and policies; the transformation must be from being a state of nationalities [a multi-ethnic state] concerned about nationalities from a macro perspective to one which is concerned with real problems such as the basic livelihoods of ethnic minorities in the nationality areas, the protection of their rights and interests, and the fostering of civic awareness and long-term social development.

We call for more to take the standpoint of the Tibetan people and non-Han and non-politicized ideologies in order to seek out a path of development which respects Tibetan social characteristics and motivations, and constructs a harmonious society with Tibetan characteristics. In reality, in facing traditional contradictions and the conflicts of modern development, the Han and Tibetan people are facing the same problems, and need the wise appreciation of each other and
to learn from and encourage one and other. We hope that by means of our report, the central government and Chinese people outside of Tibetan areas will be able to deepen their understanding of social change in Tibetan areas, and it is hoped that on the basis of mutual trust that a truly healthy and harmonious Tibet can be established.

I: Economic and social changes in Tibetan areas amid a process of rapid modernization

Research remains focused on the true situation of social structures and the 3.14 incident. Even though research was carried out in the field for only a month, we deeply sensed the popular discontent and anger behind the incidents, and the complexity of their social roots. All of the various contradictions that arose during the incident have their historical sources, and there is no way to avoid reasons of religious sentiment and ethnic identity, nor the profound reality of problems of conflicts of interest. Our research can only touch upon the broader questions, but attempting to go into the topic of the process of rapid modernization in Tibet should elicit more attention and deeper discussion of this question. Of course, the rapid process of modernization in Tibetan areas was not the cause or fuse that directly led to the 3.14 incident, and indeed that is not necessarily the nature and core of the Tibet question. However, we hope that it will provide a background for an understanding to changes in Tibetan society and offer an avenue for appreciating the thoughts and actions of the masses in Tibetan areas today.

In just a few short decades, the Tibetan people's world has changed from tradition to modern against the background of a great and unified China's rise, and the renaissance of a modern China on a rapid path of marketization. From a relatively closed and traditional religious society with a tribal culture, it has moved toward being a modernized and open society; from the simple life of farming and herding it has moved toward marketization and a commoditized modern economy; and from a life of deeply held religious convictions toward a modern values system in conflict with religious sentiment. In a nationalities state [a multi-ethnic state] and in other modern systems of legal discourse, the Tibetan people face multiple schisms and dislocations including their status as citizens, their status as an ethnic people and their religious status. Any nationality or people facing such hurried and imposed changes would inevitably feel ill-at-ease.
and full of contradictions. Objectively speaking, this hurried process of modernization and the path it has taken are not the result of choices made by Tibetans of their own volition; there were very many powerful external forces at play. Changes to economic and social structures and the legacies of history in Tibetan regions have all become interwoven. In the course of researching and interviewing, we saw on more than one occasion the schisms, bitterness and hardships being faced in Tibetan areas today.

Following 3.14, as far as Han people and the government were concerned there was a lot of misunderstanding and even recrimination against Tibetans: the state has given so much support and assistance to Tibetans and Tibetan areas and so why were they “making trouble”. But as far as Tibetans are concerned, the sole standard for modernized lives and the various “developments” shouldn’t just be the standard of prosperity. The assistance and “development” brought by the Han is often accompanied by forced change and conflicts, and the wishes of the Tibetan people themselves are not respected. “A Tibetan’s prosperity is more about freedoms such as religious belief, a respect for people, a respect for life, the kind of prosperity you get from extending charity to others.” (Interviewee, Longbu [Tib: Norbu].) “Reform and opening up brought with it new values for the Tibetan people […] forcing people to accept ‘development as the last word,’ and forcing them to accept ‘consumption as the last word’. In this process […] of transforming a people who had originally based their values on faith at the same time as transforming Tibet itself by means of modernization the lives of the people there were also transformed.” (Interviewee, Lixiaoshan.) From the level of actual benefits, the current rapid process of modernization has not given the ordinary Tibetan people any greater developmental benefits; indeed, they are becoming increasingly marginalized.

An important perspective for interpreting the 3.14 incident is that it was reaction made under stress by a society and people to the various changes that have been taking place in their lives over the past few decades. The notion that appears impossible to understand is the implication that reasonable demands were being vented, and this is precisely what we need to understand and reflect upon.
I, a) The centrally-directed rapid process of modernization

The scholar and Rev Martin Fischer points out in his book “state growth and social exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of recent economic growth, “that since the establishment of the new China, Tibetan areas have undergone an entirely new modernization process. This process has been carried out under the direction of the new China. On the one hand this process of modernization has transformed Tibetan areas from traditional to modern, greatly improving the fundamental appearance of Tibetan areas and raising the standards of living for the Tibetan people. But this process of development the logic of development and the path and speed of development has also had adverse impacts upon Tibetan areas. Tibetans in Tibetan areas are being increasingly socially marginalized. Mel Goldstein describes his understanding of the1989 incident in his book “the snow lion and the dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama”. He considers that it was not solely due to historical reasons, and that one must also look at the contradictions and problems created by rapid modernization and planned economic development. Since the 90s onwards, the rapid process of modernization (marketization) in Tibet and the thinking behind the “development” policies has not in truth helped Tibetan regions realize a smooth transition to modernization, and in fact in many fields (economics, society, culture, recognition of ethnic identity) structures have been created which marginalize Tibetans, and which have intensified a series of contradictions. This is also why that before the 80s and 90s even though the levels of social and economic development in Tibetan areas were more lagging than they are today, compared to today the stability was far better. This derives from the inevitability of fierce conflict between traditions in Tibetan areas and among Tibetan people and the process of modernization; and to ascertain degree it derives from the Tibetan people’s own inability to guide and control with any true significance the path and speed of the modernization process. First, there follows an overview and brief analysis of the main stages of the modernization process in Tibetan areas promoted by the center.

Establishing a new modernization process for Tibet has been the main theme of decisions on the fate of Tibet and the Tibetan people since the 20th century. From the 50s onwards the central people’s government has promoted comprehensive reforms in Tibetan
areas, breaking away from traditional social, political and economic structures to establish new social foundations. This modernization movement has important political significance aimed at promoting the establishment of a new legitimacy; and at the same time as impacting profoundly upon the political, economic and social structures in Tibetan areas it has also impacted upon such deep-rooted core issues in Tibetan areas as religion and culture. And therefore, since the founding of the new China the central government's policies on the process of modernization in Tibet can be roughly divided into two phases: the first phase is the reforms in Tibetan areas from the founding of the new China until the cultural revolution, and the second phase continues on with reform and opening up and the process of marketization across all of China, and the rapid process of modernization that started in the 80s and 90s.

I, a) (1) The first phase: comprehensive reform of the original Tibetan political structures and economic forms, and the establishment of a systematized foundation.

After the new political regime was established in China in 1949, “political integration” was promoted throughout the entire country in order to clarify power relations between the center and the localities, and to renew local power structures. In ethnic minority regions the system of ethnic autonomy was established based on the demarcations of “nationalities” and their recognition, modeled on the soviet system. By means of the “gradual” establishment of different levels of government in nationality areas, and by abolishing the privileges of religious leaders and tribal chiefs, and then moving on to abolishing theocratic systems and tribal systems, an effective means of governance over the ethnic minority regions was established by the central government. Due to some historical and particular differences in the center-local power relations, in political and religious relations, and in Han-Tibetan relations, U-Tsang showed more complexities and passivity than Amdo when changing from a theocratic system to a system of local regional ethnic autonomy under the central leadership. However, whether in the region of Amdo or U-Tsang, the systematic changes were a process of destroying the old and establishing the new.

On the economic front, starting from the end of the 50s the center promoted land reforms in the regions of U-Tsang and Amdo, abol-
ishing such basic economic systems and structures as the monastery and tribal economies, abolishing feudal serfdom and bonded indenture, and distributing the fundamental means of production such as the land and livestock among the farmers and nomads. Following reforms to the fundamental means of production, the farmers and nomads acquired production materials and there was a large rise in the standard of living for the entire Tibetan people. At the time, the core industries in Tibetan areas were agriculture and basic handicrafts. Changes to this economic foundation brought great changes to the people’s standards of living in Tibetan areas, and to ascertain degree successfully established a new legitimacy and approval in Tibetan areas. (The research panel saw during visits to the homes of many of the farmers and nomads that portraits of Chairman Mao were on display.) Under the system of the planned economy, Tibetan areas started receiving a large amount of human, material and financial support from the center. On a systematic level, changes to the political system and the economic foundations put all Tibetan areas on a par with Han areas. At the same time, changes were occurring to social structures throughout all Tibetan areas.

I, a) (2) The process of modernization against the background of comprehensive marketization in the 1980s and 1990s.

With the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the center’s policies on Tibetan areas entered a new phase. This phase was a period of the center comprehensively resuming and refocusing its work in Tibetan areas in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. In the early 80s, even though there was now systematic “unity,” the overall state of society and the economy in Tibetan areas and the living conditions for the Tibetan people still lagged far behind those in Han areas. Furthermore, when the center was reflecting on Cultural Revolution-era policies in Tibet, they hoped they would be able to regain their prestige among people in Tibetan areas by means of focusing on economic development and people’s standards of living. At the heart of the new policies was the rapid development of the economy in Tibetan areas with an even greater degree of support from the center, promoting stability by means of development and promoting development by means of stability. With a further increase in speed in the process of modernization raising the standard of living for the Tibetan people, it was hoped to further change the traditional
political, economic, cultural and identity structures in Tibetan areas, and establish and strengthen the legitimacy and recognition of long-term stability in Tibetan areas. This basic spirit is fully reflected in the last two decades of Tibet work. Policies in the new phase have on the one hand been a continuation of those started by the center in 1959, the progress of which was interrupted by the cultural revolution in Tibetan areas, and on the other hand a clear promotion of the comprehensive and deep changes in Tibetan areas brought by modernization and directed by the center.

In March 1984, the center convened the second Tibet work forum, and in the summary pointed out: on the basis of the new situation of continuous development, revise concrete policies to promote reforms to the economic body, placing the economy without any shadow of a doubt on top, and making the Tibetan people prosperous as soon as possible. The center invested in the construction of more than 40 large-scale infrastructural projects, providing enormous support for constructing a modern economy in Tibetan areas, particularly in the Tibet Autonomous Region. In October 1989, the “summary of the central politburo standing committee’s forum on Tibet work” emphasized: two main issues must be firmly grasped in Tibet work, namely stability in the political situation and economic development. From June 25 to 27, 2001, the party center and the state council convened the fourth Tibet work forum, where it was decided to extend cadre’ said Tibet work to 20 years, at the same time as being made to comprehensively cover all counties, cities and prefectures in Tibet.

With regard to agricultural areas in Tibetan regions, the main policy changes took place in the 80s and at the start of the 90s. Tibetan areas promoted the household contract responsibility system. In farming areas, the promoted policy was the “long-term right to use and independently operate land by individual households”; in nomadic areas the promoted policy was “the long-term policy of individual households’ ownership, raising and management of livestock.” This promoted the farmers and nomads’ enthusiasm for production.

In the course of industrialization and urbanization, the state used financial preference to speedup investment in the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects such as road and rail, driving economic development in the entire region, improving communication
conditions and the investment environment in Tibetan areas, and driving related industrial development including the tourism industry and various natural resource extraction and service industries. Some industrial projects and industrial development was consciously supported in Tibetan areas, promoting the development of the service industry and tourism industry. At the same time, and starting in the mid-90s, non-Tibetans were allowed [yunxu] into Tibetan areas (mainly in the Tibet Autonomous Region) to start their own businesses.

In the area of social welfare, core regions in Tibetan areas (mainly important cities such as Lhasa) were given major funding to provide free education and various other social benefits and public undertakings. Impoverished agricultural areas were given state support and funding for poverty relief. In the area of grass-roots power structures, attention was paid to non-Tibetans who had a good education going into Tibet in order to further stabilize the local power structures. In the fields of culture and education, a new Tibetan elite was nurtured by means of basic education in Tibetan areas and the establishment of Tibetan schools and Tibetan classes in the interior.

The direction of the new policies in fact contained two levels. One was a focus on the development of a modernized economy and social welfare, and the other, reflecting on errors during the Cultural Revolution, was to concentrate upon and respect “Tibetan” characteristics in Tibetan areas, supporting local Tibetan officials and paying attention to cultural and educational undertakings in Tibetan areas in order to carry on and recover Tibetan cultural and religious life and encourage use of the Tibetan language. This was manifested within two important trends, one was marketization and the other was a revival of religious life.

The new systematic structures in the first phase changed the nature of the relationship between the center and Tibetan areas both the Tibetan regions and localities. The system’s uniformity and direct rule meant that the development of Tibet and all of China was directly bound together. In the 80s and beginning of the 90s while all of China was starting to feel its way into a development phase of rapid and comprehensive marketization, development in Tibetan areas was consciously integrated into the rapid modernization process across all of China. Economic development and the marketization
and modernization of all social life in Tibetan areas became the core thinking for resolving problems in Tibetan areas.

After the Cultural Revolution, the center’s Tibet policies went through a process of recovery and relaxation. This was manifested to a certain degree in hopes for policies that would respect the characteristics of “Tibetans and Tibetan areas.” But these relaxations did not overcome the fundamental demands for political legitimacy and stability. With regard to the contradictory attitude toward religion in Tibetan areas, at the end of the 80s a period of instability in Lhasa and calls for dialogue with the Dalai Lama which were repeatedly frustrated, inevitably made the Center unwilling to cede anymore ground. The core of policies throughout all Tibetan areas increasingly fell into the logic of “development” a focus on economic development and a process of modernization led by the “Han nationality.”

The engine for this “development” taking place waste direct transfer of large amounts of finance and the construction of basic infrastructure. This preferential treatment demonstrated a strong intent to pour money into Tibet’s ethnic minority regions (with Lhasa as the center). Tibet’s own economy, based on traditional agriculture, had not truly developed or become dynamic. Throughout the entire process, too little attention was paid to truly understanding Tibetan areas, the characteristics of development in Tibetan areas or the broader needs and desires of the Tibetan masses.

I, b) The social consequences arising from a process of rapid modernization under a specially formulated path

Specially formulated policies and development logic and specially formulated development paths and speeds of development have all given rise to specially formulated social consequences, which have created various characteristics in economic forms, social structures and social psychology in Tibetan areas.

I, b)(1) Economic life in Tibetan areas under the “diffusion” model of economic development

From the start of the 50s and 60s Tibetan areas underwent two distinct phases of modernization and change. Several scholars have already noted the internal logic of this modernization process. Professor Marong
pointed out in “Tibet’s economic for mandate changes “that chang-
es to Tibetan areas’ economic form manifest a “diffusion model” of
modernization, where the social structures and economic structures
in the central areas “diffuse” out toward the outlying regions. This
“diffusion” has been carried out under the guidance and promotion
of the central government, making it impossible to escape the de-
mands for consistency toward the concept of “unity” and the narrow
Han view of development.

The process of modernization in Tibetan areas is first and foremost
built on the foundations of the “great destruction and great recon-
struction” of political, economic and social structures in Tibetan
areas, with the complete overthrow of former structures and sys-
tems replaced by a new “unified” system implanted into Tibet. This
process has served the establishment of a new political legitimacy.
Secondly, the maintenance and promotion of this process of mod-
ernization to a certain degree relies upon the external support and
aid of the central government. Thirdly, the choice of path for mod-
ernization can never escape the effects of political stability and the
logic of ideology, which exposes an internal contradiction between
“development” and “stability”.

Research by scholars such as Professor Marong into Tibet’s economic
structures, particularly in the Lhasa area, has shown that a process
of rapid urbanization is directly concomitant with financial support
from the center. In view of natural and social conditions in Tibet,
“implanting” processes of industrialization have all ultimately failed.
With the help of high welfare and government purchasing, Lhasa has
created a consumer economy. But as far as ordinary agricultural areas
are concerned, they invariably face the same difficulties as China’s in-
terior countryside natural weaknesses in the modernization process
of a poor and primitive agriculture industry. In the last 20 years (or
more accurately, in the last 30 years), there have been great changes
in urbanization, basic infrastructure construction, the degree of ac-
tivity in the market economy in Tibetan areas and even the degree of
closeness in economic ties with Han areas.

In this process of modernization, agriculture as the traditional in-
dustry is in a vulnerable position, and evidently restricted by poor
natural conditions. As representative of a traditionally agricultural
area, Gannan prefecture is located in a relatively vulnerable place.
During our research in Gannan, Gannan autonomous prefecture was still a nationally designated poverty relief area. The economic structures based on animal husbandry have left Gannan’s Tibetan areas relatively poor, and the standard of living for ordinary farmers and nomads is below the subsistence level. Aside from investing in production, the normal farmer and nomad’s disposable income each year does not amount to much. When researching in Xiahe, local scholars told us that aside from basic agriculture, local industrial systems are practically absent. Former processing industries surrounding agriculture, such as weaving and slaughtering operations, have all closed. And the tourism industry, based around Labrang monastery in Xiahe, only has an open season for around six months between May and October of each year. Restricted by specially formulated industrial structures and natural conditions, the majority of regions in Tibetan areas are always in a vulnerable position within the modernization process, whereas those developed areas with Lhasa at the center receive welfare and important supplementary payments under the preferential support from the center. Starting in the 90s, the large amounts of preferential financial support to the local government, the large investments in basic infrastructure construction and the high benefits for urban residents all rapidly changed the appearance of Lhasa, and drove a thriving commodity economy. Levels of income among Tibet’s permanent residents reached the same levels as developed regions such as Beijing and Shanghai, far above and beyond normal farmers and nomads in Tibetan areas. As a modern city, Lhasa has all the signs of prosperity. Through our interviews we sensed that Lhasa’s position and appearance as the central metropolis of Tibetan areas started to gain pace in the late 90s, and that after 2000 this formation became rapid. By coming into contact with the research of former scholars and people from the city of Lhasa itself, we discovered that Lhasa’s urban standard of living, the income of its permanent residents and its modern lifestyle is no less than in any city found in the developed Han areas. This is in stark contrast to Tibetan areas outside the central area, such as Amdo (where agriculture is the main industry). When comparing Tibetan areas and Han areas amid the process of rapid modernization and hastened marketization, different regions within Tibetan areas and urban and rural areas within Tibetan areas all demonstrate a relentless trend of growing disparities.
Additionally, under major government policies such as the “western development campaign” and strategies for the rapid development of Tibetan areas, as well as other enormous investment projects, the development of the urban commodity economy and with the thriving tourist industry, there has been a constant stream of people from the interior flooding into Tibetan areas looking for economic opportunity. New economic opportunity is stirring population movement within Tibetan areas, as well as drawing in large-scale populations of incomers into the middle of Tibetan areas. Lhasa is a prominent example of such economic migrants. All along, the government has had a policy of not interfering in this process.

I, b) (2) the increasing marginalization of Tibetans in the modernization process

Starting in 1959, there was an evident development in agricultural production in Tibetan areas, but fundamentally there were no changes to the economic structures centered on agriculture. With the deepening of the modernization process, the weakness in the position of agriculture became ever more evident, and there was a variety of reasons for the stagnation of agriculture’s modernization process. At the same time, leading industries in urban areas failed to be setup from the start, and the state’s continued support and investments in fact led to large-scale losses. The same modernization path in the interior when implemented in Tibetan areas was impractical, irrational, and lacked the social basis for success. The center’s strong support only made Tibetan areas overly dependent upon the central government, and a “dependency model economy” evolved. Gannan local government’s fiscal income amounts to an extremely small part of the total annual finances (often less than one tenth), with the source of most finances being central funding. This same sort of situation exists in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Even though the state injects a great deal each year, the funds are actually of very little help to the independence of the local economy. Due to the lack of any core superior industries, agriculture is still in an elementary phase, and the motivation for a commoditized economy in the central areas comes from the Non-Tibetan masses. The modernization process throughout all Tibetan areas has no vitality of its own, and cannot bring any benefit to ordinary Tibetan people.

The state’s major preferential policies and support have not been of
any effective benefit to the main body of Tibetan people. Tibetan people have no way of quickly entering the comprehensive modernization process, and genuine support and protection for each individuals in fact lacking. A marker of the modernization process is people escaping from traditional arrangements to engage in the progress of modernization. This is related to the question of opportunity and is also connected to the question of skills. With regard to Tibetans, there are enormous problems in these two areas in the current process modernization in Tibetan areas.

First is the problem of opportunity. If it is said that the 50s and 60s changed the lives of ordinary Tibetans and brought benefits to the majority of Tibetans, then what is possibly being brought by the current rapid process of modernization is Tibetan areas becoming disparate, and a gap growing between rich and poor. The specially formulated modernization process and the logic of the policies and preferential support have been divisive in consequence and created a sense of relative deprivation which is in need of examination.

In our interviews we discovered among ordinary Tibetans (particularly those Tibetan masses who experienced the 50s and 60s) a high degree of reverence for MaoZedong. Following the “liberation of the serfs” and the thorough smashing of the former economic and social structures in Tibetan areas, changes to the grass-roots government and the economic foundations as well as the conflict between the new ideology and tradition in Tibetan areas actually favored Tibetan individuals. A lot of people recalling the Chairman Mao era said it was good and very fair. Many local intellectuals admitted that they had been raised to their current positions and lives because of Chairman Mao and the government.

Following the 90s a trend emerged of Tibetan areas becoming increasingly disparate and less equal. The state’s support and various assistance programs were all focused on cities, on large-scale infrastructure construction, and on servicing the urban populations. There has been far from adequate guidance and investment in agriculture the main industry in Tibetan areas; and there has been in adequate attention on the production and enterprise of ordinary farmers and nomads. When interviewing farmers and nomads in Xiahe County in Gannan, a lot of farmers and nomads told us that they didn’t have the funds to expand production and could only maintain a certain
scale of production. If they wanted to raise more sheep or cattle they were restricted by limitations on pasture and funds. They wanted to open a store but had no capital. There were in fact very few Tibetan stores along the most thriving local streets, where most were run by Hui[3][7] people. And these operators had been running for more than 10 years and their families were relatively well off. When we asked if there were any local assistance programs such as small loans where they lived, they all said it was extremely difficult to borrow money without capital. It was discovered during the interviews that because a lot of people had no opportunity to develop locally (no livestock, land or no capital to start any other enterprise), they were considering leaving to find work. On the one hand they are restrained by the production characteristics of traditional agriculture and the demands of labor, and on the other hand they are restrained by language and skills, and have very few true opportunities. Furthermore, the opportunities and long-term prospects presented by agriculture are limited. Many young Tibetan migrant workers who leave in search of work head for the cities where they either engage in petty trade or do the most unskilled laboring work on building sites, relying on introductions by people from their hometowns who had previously left and found work.

When interviewing teachers in Tibetan areas, they all said that Tibetan children who received an education were all unwilling to return home and do farm work. Having been educated and seen the outside world via all kinds of media they tended toward the outside world but had no way of getting there, but there was no way back either. A lot of young people congregate in some towns, where they see their own lack of attainments and feel a sense of powerlessness through not being able to participate, as well as experiencing exclusion to various degrees (in terms of language and in terms of opportunity).

Following the large-scale development of urban infrastructures, tourism and service industries in Lhasa, the economy has increasingly flourished, and the state has adopted a completely open strategy on economic development opportunities and employment opportunities in Tibetan areas. Large numbers of Han and Hui have been drawn into small businesses, food services and tourism industries. The people drawing the greatest benefits from the thriving economy are the incomers, the non-Tibetans; and because Tibetans lack
capital and skills, this is contributing to them becoming increasingly marginalized. In Lhasa, there are Sichuan restaurants everywhere, run by people from Sichuan. Taxi drivers are mainly non-Tibetan outsiders from Henan, Sichuan, Hunan and Shaanxi. Travel agencies are nearly all owned by outsiders, and the tourist souvenir and handicraft trade in the stores around the barkhor are mostly owned by Hui from Gannan and Qinghai, and not Tibetans. Many items of Tibetan handicrafts come from Yunnan, they come from Zhejiang, and they come from Nepal. A Professor in art history from Tibet university told us it was painful to see that most of the purely local handicrafts in the streets were shipped in, and a lot of the “fake Tibetan jewelry” had been made by traders from Zhejiang in workshops in the suburbs of Lhasa.

And secondly is the question of skills and mentality. In the larger modernized cities such as Lhasa, participating in large-scale infrastructure construction and the urban economy and social development that it drives requires the individual to have the necessary skills, capital and levels of education. And these are what Tibetan people lack. We discovered during our visit to Gannan that seeing as the majority of young Tibetans born in the 80s were only educated to the level of elementary school, the levels of education among young people of our own generation are far lower than in Han areas. Even three to five years ago, the drop-out rate in elementary schools in Tibetan areas was as high as 30%, and the average education was only elementary school-level. (Problems of education and Tibetan youth are detailed below.) In interviews with numerous Tibetan youths, they all said leaving to search for work was not easy. One of the main problems was language, because they can’t communicate fluently in Chinese. In Lhasa, being able to speak Chinese doesn’t mean being able to find a job. A lot of people are unwilling to employ Tibetans because they consider them to be “lazy”. This lack of skills coupled with a lack of “enthusiasm” for commercial concepts makes it difficult to compete for work with non-Tibetan labor from the interior and surrounding areas. To a large extent, non-Tibetans control all major aspects of the local economy. Economically, in terms of skills and in terms of adapting to value systems, Tibetans have no way of competing with non-Tibetans in the modernization process.

In the ever faster process of modernization, Tibetan areas are be-
coming increasingly disparate. The differences between Lhasa, which is cast in the role of a window on to a “modern Tibetan city,” and normal Tibetan pastoral areas in terms of their social and economic structures and basic appearance are getting bigger by the day. Why should attention be paid to the question of this “split Tibet”? Because we discovered in the interviews that Tibetan people’s feelings and understanding for modernization don’t come directly from Han areas but from Lhasa. Many of the ordinary Tibetans we interviewed in Gannan said they had been to Lhasa looking for work, on business, or visiting friends and family in Lhasa. As the center of the Tibetan people’s religion and ethnic identity, at the same time as being a modernized center, Lhasa has an extremely important influence on how Tibetans see their people and themselves within the process of modernization. And furthermore, via mass media and the experiences of friends and family who have left to find work, differences in development in Tibetan areas and non-Tibetan areas are being experienced daily by Tibetans.

“People in the 60s and 70s, people who went through the Cultural Revolution, that generation of people’s faith in the communist party is 100%, including people in the nomadic areas. But people in their thirties and under, especially people who graduated from upper-middle and lower-middle school and have traveled, or people who know a little about Tibetan history, they’re actually quite radical. […] The 80s and 90s seemed to be a turning point, and the Tibetan birth-rate was higher. But they couldn’t get into higher education and an awful lot of them remain idle at home. […] They know a lot about the outside world and have very active minds. They think, why everyone is so developed and why are we so poor, why are we sitting on dirt and tending flocks.” (Interviewee, researcher Dongzhi [Tib:Dhundup].)

I, b) (3) The Tibetan people’s sense of panic and powerlessness amid rapid modernization

A taxi driver in Lhasa described to us a scene he saw when he first arrived in Lhasa in 03: A Tibetan was urinating into the gutter by the side of the road. As an outsider, the taxi driver didn’t know what to make of what he was seeing. And as far as Tibetans are concerned, they feel awkward and embarrassed when faced with such external conflicts. When the land you’re accustomed to living in, and the land of the culture you identify with, when the lifestyle and religiosity is
suddenly changed into a “modern city” that you no longer recognize; when you can no longer find work in your own land, and feel the unfairness of lack of opportunity, and when you realize that your core value systems are under attack, then the Tibetan people’s panic and sense of crisis is not difficult to understand.

Taking the Tibetan monastic masses as an example: traditionally, monks were the most cultured and the most influential strata in all Tibetan society, they were the Tibetan intelligentsia, receiving broad reverence and esteem. As far as Tibetans are concerned, for whom religion is central, a religious life and the monks were the most important part of their lives. During the course of our interviews, practically all of the Tibetans maintained their religious lives, sometimes taking circumambulations, going to the monastery on the 15th day of the 1st month, and requesting prayers from the lama when they encountered hardships. They included old people and included young people and children. But what cannot be denied is that the process of modernization has been in constant conflict with the monks and the religious life in Tibetan areas. The researcher (Tsatsa) (Deputy director of the Xiahe Tibetology institute) said when he received us for an interview, religious life in Tibetan areas and the monks are currently facing an enormous transition and conflict: the problem of how to face secularization. He thinks that young monks have a sense of crisis. This comes from the modernized life-style that more and more is seeping into society in Tibetan areas, and even into the lives of monks. Visiting many of the monks’ homes, we saw that they had dvd players and movies from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

In the evening a lot of the monks rushed away to go online and chat using instant messaging. The younger monks knew even more about the outside world, and they’ve started magazines and love all things new and actively study English. We asked a lot of Tibetans what they thought of this, and the majority of Tibetans took a very lenient attitude, thinking that such things in themselves were not actually in conflict with pure faith. But there were also several scholars who said that this manifested the difference between the younger monks and the older monks. When interviewing renqing [Rinchen] lama at Hongjiao[‘red hat’, Nyingma] monastery, he said that the teachers there wouldn’t let them go to such places, that they’d beat them if they did, but they were actually powerless to do any-
thing. Concern for the affairs of the world is a very important part of faith, but how to strike a balance between concern for the real world and the purity of faith is a difficulty faced by all monks, and indeed all Tibetans. With the steady infiltration of modernized values, it has become very important to the future of Tibetan areas how monks see themselves and their position in the changing Tibetan society. Having been through the Cultural Revolution, there’s now a gap in the ages of the inheritors of religious culture in Tibetan areas, with a lack of middle-aged monks leaving a weakness in influence and transmission from older monks to younger monks.

In the process of modernization, economic structures and political structures in Han areas and Tibetan areas have been made uniform. As “backward” areas, Tibetan areas had to catch up with “progressive” areas and keep up with the “modern”. But the Tibetan people have not had adequate opportunity or skills to respond. Large numbers of incomers and rapid social changes have brought conflicts to culture, lifestyles and even to values. In the past, contacts between Tibetan areas and the interior were often very limited, but the specially formulated development process opened up Tibetan areas in an instant, opening up for attack every single key area of nationalities’ life from the economy, power structure, religious life, lifestyle and population structures. When the Tibetan people have a sense of unfairness and loss in the economic and social changes resulting from the modernization process led by Han and by the state, this can strengthen yet further their ethnic identity and how they identify with their traditions, giving rise to conflict between the traditional and the modern, and conflict between the ethnicities.

In sum, to understand the 3.14 incident, the present in Tibetan areas must be understood, and close attention must be paid to the core question of the process of modernization in Tibetan areas. If it’s said that the modernization process of the Tibetan people is an irreversible historical trend, then how the Tibetan people and Tibetan areas progress toward modernization is worthy of in-depth consideration. The prominent contradictions and conflicts in Tibetan areas are not solely the remnants of history, they are also problems arising from the current situation in the path of modernization and the strength and manner of its implementation. From the 1989 incident until the 3.14 incident this year, an important dimension to social structures
has been the adverse effects of the modernization process the core of which is the marginalization of the Tibetan people and the discontent this has brought.

II: Hardships faced by young Tibetans born in the 70s and 80s

The main participants in the 3.14 incident were young 20-to-30-year olds, and the attitudes and behavior of these young people cannot escape our close attention and consideration. Young Tibetans born during reform and opening up had a far higher material standard of living that their parents’ generation, but they still harbor some extreme grievances which exploded out in violence. As described above, this new generation of young Tibetans has been living in a rapidly changing society, and their lifestyles and thinking is different from their parents’ generation. We discovered during our survey that young Tibetans face the following kinds of difficulties:

Serious problems in basic education

2007 statistics show: the average term of education in Tibetan areas is less than four years, and the high-school enrolment rate is extremely low. The employment problem is extremely protracted, with the poor levels of education among nationalities meaning they have no competitive advantage. Even those Tibetan university students in education are still mostly studying the arts and humanities, and less are studying engineering or the sciences; more are studying traditional topics, and fewer are studying new topics; more study theoretic aspects and fewer study practical areas which does not harmonize with the needs of education and society, and even creates a disconnect.

First, basic levels of education are extremely low, and the majority of adults at the grass-roots are illiterate. Traveling in towns and the countryside in Tibetan areas, there’s a dizzying array of large-character banners propagandizing “universalize nine-year compulsory education,” and encouraging farmers and nomads to send their children to school. But it was learned from the local masses that these policies have only been implemented in the last three years, and even only in the past year. According to the “Gannan prefecture ‘two basicallys’ resolute implementation plan,” [4][8] the time table for universalizing nine-year education is “Hezuo [Tib: Tsoe] city and lintan [Tib: Lintan] county in 2005, Diebu[Tewo] county and zhuo-

In the sangke and qingshui areas of xiahe in Gannan we visited the homes of a dozen or so farming and nomadic families, where children under the age of 10 almost without exception were in school. Due to the large amount of subsidies issued by the government, a farming or nomadic family could send children to school without any further costs, and could even receive bonuses and awards. Parents are therefore naturally willing to send their children to school, and planned for children to stay in school until lower middle school.

However, the majority of children of farmers and nomads who are over the age of 15, and particularly those over the age of 20, hadn’t even graduated from elementary school and are even illiterate. While it is gratifying to see work on universalizing nine years of compulsory education in full swing, it is feared that the effects will only be seen 10 years from now, and the “problem as a remnant of history” of adult illiteracy is set to remain with us. The rate of adult illiteracy is enormous, which has its reasons in conditions of external deficiencies as well as its internal reasons.

There is a traditional view that the study of books has no use. Production structures among families in Tibetan areas are still based on raising livestock, and when children go to school they no longer have the time to help the family tend animals. When they finish their studies, it’s difficult for them to remain in the towns without the necessary contacts, but when they return to their old homes they’ve lost their animal husbandry and farming skills. There’s a sentiment gaining ground that “reading books is useless” where study is of no help in making ends meet for the family. At present, there have been no qualitative changes in family production structures in semi-nomadic and semi-arable Tibetan areas, and therefore there hasn’t been much change in families’ attitudes toward education. Sending children under the age of 10 to school is connected to a large extent to government policies those who don’t send their children can be fined and those that do can be rewarded; but heads of families are still un-
clear about the benefits of education. During the interviews, heads of families of ten expressed that if children stayed in school until lower middle school as the policy demanded, then that was all that was needed the family needs work hands to tend the animals. And youths around the age of 20 are not keen on receiving a basic education. Local governments in Tibetan areas have in recent years carried out illiteracy eradication work, but the policies are very difficult to implement at the grass-roots level with all of the male youths having gone elsewhere to earn money, leaving no one willing to take part in the free training. When conducting interviews in the Qingshui region, the local villagers said that whenever the higher administrations came to inspect illiteracy eradication work, the township called the youths who had left to work back for 10 days of mandatory training. Ten days later they’re issued with an elementary school graduation certificate, and as such they’re counted during the inspection as having “escaped illiteracy”. In the nomadic areas, we only came across one student who had stayed in school through senior middle school in Xiahe, who was a girl by the name of cairang zhouma [Tib: Tsering Dolma]. Her cousin is the head of the village and her family is relatively well off. She has relatives in the town and was therefore able to study all the way through until senior middle school, but when she was asked whether any of the girls in her village were also able to go to school, she said “They all married young.”

In addition, the local quality of teachers and standards of education are low. The conditions in many grass-roots schools in Tibetan areas are extremely poor with backward education foundations, extremely difficult work, and it is very hard to attract basic-level teaching talent. In particular, there is a lack of high-level and highly educated teaching talent, and in remote areas there is even only “one school, one teacher.” The panel interviewed two graduate students, yuanwei, who had gone to Lhasa from the interior to help teach at the Tibet teacher training college in Lhasa, and they said: “We saw the lack of teachers in the mountainous areas, and even though we wanted to go there to help out, we just couldn’t even our most basic living requirements couldn’t be met in places like that, never mind about teaching.”

In Xiahe County, we interviewed an elementary school teacher who was teaching in the countryside, and because there were so many stu-
dents and so few teachers, each teacher worked more than 13 hours a day. After the “two basicallys” policy was implemented, remuneration for the students was good, but remuneration for the teachers did not improve and even got worse. According to this teacher, his salary had only risen by 500 Yuan since 1998. Eighty percent of the teachers at the school wanted to change profession, and they were only continuing to teach because there was no other trade for them to turn to. Under such conditions, the teachers’ enthusiasm for their work can only be guessed at. Cairang dongzhu [Tib: Tsering Dhondup], who researches the state of education in Tibetan areas at the Xiahe Tibetan studies institute, says “When we go and conduct research in the field, some teachers say that their only wish would be for a cell-phone mast to be built close to the school in their villages in the evenings they could chat with family then they’d be happy.”

All students taught by yuandwei, the two research students working as teaching support Tibet teachers training college in Lhasa, are studying to be teachers, and during vacations they also give correspondence courses to students who are middle and elementary school teachers from villages and towns all over Tibet. According to what they told us, there is cause for serious concern based solely on the level of education among these teachers themselves, with even their Chinese not up to grade including some very elementary errors, and even being unable to find correct answers during open-book physics exams. And teachers such as these are made “elementary teaching specialists” after 14 days of specialist training.

II, b) Vocational education and the lack of social opportunity

Tibetan youths broadly lack the technical skills and social paths to lead them into a modern industrial society, and it is very difficult for them to go back to a traditional agricultural society. Along with basic education, Tibetan youths’ vocational skills are also cause for extreme concern. By means of practical observation, the panel thinks that when considered from an even more practical point of view, as far as people of 20 years old and above are concerned, realizing universal basic education would be extremely difficult to attain, and that furthermore the reality of the problem cannot be immediately addressed. Resolving the problem of employment for urban Tibetan youth is far more urgent. Having the ability to practically apply labor skills will enable quicker and more effective integration into modern
society. The reality of the situation is that employment skills training in Gannan Tibetan autonomous prefecture got off to a late start and has developed slowly. At present there are five vocational middle schools, but the schools and their buildings are all old and dilapidated, and there is no teacher training apparatus, severely impeding the coordinated development of basic education and vocational skills training throughout the entire prefecture. Professor Nawang jinmei [Tib: Ngawang Jigme] from Tibet university gave a very concrete and representative example. “When Lhasa railway station was being built the land used to be agricultural, but it was razed to build the station. The state gave the farmers a great deal of compensation, but the education levels of the farmers was very low, and they didn’t really know about money. In a flash, they had several tens of thousands of Yuan. And so they spent it wildly, with the children buying cars and motorbikes and hanging out, and within one or two years all the money was gone. They’d previously relied on growing crops to make money, but now they had no land, they had no education, no work, and under such social pressure is it any wonder they became so easily led as soon as they were provoked? And so policies such as these actually bring out the worst in them.” This example shows the difficulties faced by many Tibetan youths, where originally they lived in a traditional agricultural society, and with the progression of reform and opening up they were rolled into an industrial society. But they had grown up and lived in agricultural or nomadic families, and their skills were in planting fields and tending herds. As soon as they got to the cities, they couldn’t do factory or building site work, and from language to work skills it is very hard for them to compete with job-hunters from the interior. Nomads on the Ganga grasslands interviewed by the panel had many youths from their village who had left to find work but their Chinese was not good and so they could only work on building sites or do menial heavy lifting work.

Of all the factors restricting Tibetan youth from going to cities to live and work aside from a lack of technical skills, a “social path” is also a well-known but little acknowledged obstacle. A so-called social path is also commonly known as a “connection” [menlu]. As presented by the panel in descriptions in the sections above, the majority of heads of households had a very passive attitude toward their children going to upper middle school or taking the university entrance exam. “Even though they’ve finished high school, the uni-
versity entrance exams are very difficult, and even if they get in the family has no connections [menlu] and so they can’t stay in the town and work for the government.”

Duoji caidan [Tib: Dorjee Tseten], the boss of the zhuoma [Tib: Dolma] restaurant in Xiahe County, says: “Families who want to send children to university have to sell livestock, and then what do they do later? If you go to school but don’t get into university then generally all you can do is go to Hezuo [Tib: Tsoe] teacher training college, and if you want to stay in the town after graduating from teacher training the only option is to be a teacher. To be a teacher in a city, you also need connections [menlu], jobs are not guaranteed for students who graduate from the teacher training college, except to officials or people from well-to-do families.” Duoji caidan’s father is a business man, who over the years accumulated some wealth. And although he himself had never been to school, he was still regarded as successful. When mention is made of the men he grew up with since being a child together, Duoji caidan uses a single word to describe their lives: “Muddled.” They’ve never studied, have no connections [menlu], have no family wealth, and they are not willing to go home and tend the herds, but they can’t just loiter in the cities and so become a surging under current of “unstable factors”.

II, c) The sense of relative deprivation while living in a more open process of modernization as a catalyst for strengthening nationalist sentiment

If it can be said that the standard of living among Tibetans in their 50s and 60s represents the enormous transformations that have taken places in deliberation and reform and opening up, then it can also be said that the lives of younger Tibetans in their 30s and under area manifestation of the increasingly wide gap between Tibetan areas and the interior, and the growing gulf between the power-holders in Tibetan areas and the ordinary people. During the course of our interviews we could sense an evident difference in the way the elderly, young people and youth referred to themselves. In the language of the older people, we’d often hear such vocabulary as “cadre” or “commune member”. However, this was not so among the youth, where phrases such as “we Tibetans” or “our nationality” often appeared in their speech.
Along with a sense of relative deprivation comes various kinds of senses of difference, including the differences between center and margins, Han and Tibetan, and officials and ordinary people. Dongzhi [Tib: Dhundup], a researcher at the Gansu Tibetan studies institute, said: “The greatest outcome of reform and opening up has been the elimination of traditional outlooks among young people, the transformation of outlooks. (After the 3.14 incident), people in their 50s and above were extremely upset, wondering why they caused so much trouble. The older ordinary people and the older monks all thought this was a bad thing.”

The research panel was amazed to discover that Tibetan ethnic awareness was actually inspired by the 3.14 incident. This was especially because after the 3.14 incident and before the conclusion of the Olympics, a series of “preventative measures” adopted by the government such as Tibetans receiving “special treatment” at airports and public spaces in the interior made the Tibetan people, and in particular the youth, sense their “differences” even more obviously. A Tibetan girl called baima jizong [Tib: Pema Jetsun] described what she endured in Beijing during the Olympics: “I went to Beijing representing a certain company in Lhasa to participate in training by the central communist youth league, and because I was Tibetan not a single hotel let me stay. I got angry and argued, saying what they were doing was racist!”

II, d) The loss and forgetting of one’s nationality’s traditional culture and history

Amid the impact of modern concepts from the outside, youths in Tibetan areas expressed to different degrees the forgetting and loss of their own nationality’s traditions, history and culture. This was manifested most in the form of barriers to the passing on of the Tibetan language and script, and the lack of any systematic knowledge about their nationality’s history and culture.

First of all, as an important catalyst for Tibetan culture, certain impediments have appeared to the transmission of the Tibetan language and script. Which teachers are most lacking in Tibetan areas today? When we started we would have guessed it was English or Chinese teachers, or mathematics. But in the course of our survey students and teachers broadly reflected that the largest shortfall of
teachers in Tibetan areas today is in Tibetan language teachers. And furthermore, in interviews with a dozen or so elementary school students, when asked what was the most difficult subject to study, they all responded “Tibetan” and the easiest to study was “Chinese.” Even though they could speak Tibetan, there were however extremely few teachers who could undertake the teaching of Tibetan, and give in-depth explanations of the Tibetan language to the students.

The importance of language for transmitting a nationality’s culture goes without saying, and there are many in the Tibetan language teaching elite expressing concern about the current status quo. As the ethnic studies scholar Professor Marong has written, “The formal texts of a people’s history, and the recalling for later generations of the people’s own epic poems of heroism, a people’s astronomy, mathematics, medicine, architecture, literature and agronomy this collection of knowledge and culture is all recorded in that people’s written language. It is therefore a catalyst for that people’s traditions and culture, entrusting and manifesting the deep emotions that a people’s elite groupings and broad masses has for their history and culture. A people’s language becomes an emblem of that people’s culture. And therefore the future prospects of a people’s language and script often receives a great deal of attention from that people’s leadership figures, elite groupings and broad masses, who consider that the language and the future development prospects for that people are very closely connected.”

Secondly, there is a lack of systematic knowledge about their own nationalities’ history. The occurrence of the 3.14 incident and the lack of historical knowledge among some Tibetan youths is in fact very closely related. They do not understand the connection between their own nationality and the motherland throughout the historical course of development, and do not understand their nationality’s cultural traditions and historical demands. In the course of our survey, we learned that current teaching materials in middle and elementary schools in Tibetan areas that there is an extreme lack of historical content about the Tibetan nationality themselves, not to mention any kind of systematic study of Tibetan history. Professor awang jinmei [Tib: Ngawang Jigme] from Tibet university said that some university students in the fine arts department could make immaculate copies of thanka paintings, but if they are asked what they
have painted, they are unable to answer, they don’t know who these people in the paintings are, nor what is the historical allegory. Wei, the teaching support at the Tibet higher teaching training College, said that when he told students in class about the heavenly branches and earthly stems in Han culture, the students were very interested. When he’d finished, he asked if any of the students could tell him about the Tibetan calendar, and there wasn’t a single student in the entire class who could explain the Tibetan calendar to him. The Tibetan translations of teaching materials from the interior which are used by students in Tibetan areas do not have separate syllabuses on Tibetan history and culture, which has led to a desensitizing to the transmission of culture and an increase in the numbers of Tibetans who have no interest in their nationalities’ history, and it is extremely difficult to find any youths who have a thorough understanding of their history and culture.

III: The main problems with structures of governance in Tibetan areas

The 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas has a complex social background, and aside from going into the confusion and conflict brought about by the “development” logic discussed above against the background of modernization, the research group also paid close attention to the historical and current political ecology in Tibetan areas. Under the guidance of the powerful logic of “development,” politics took on a role of unrivalled importance in social processes.

Since the Ming and Qing, and particularly in the modern era, two problems have faced the social situation in the two Tibetan regions of Amdo and U-Tsang: one has been a problem with structures of the ruling state’s power systems, or to put it another way, the process of incorporating Tibetan regional culture as a regional society into the politicized structures of the ruling state’s systems; and two, the problem of adapting a society’s internal structures, In particular, the problems of adjustments to society and politics within a process of modernization. Objectively speaking, as of now these problems have still not been properly resolved. Naturally, the evident contradictions in Tibetan areas are mainly products of the process of modernization, but among them there are also historical ailments which have been transformed and changed under modern conditions, and which are the accumulation of certain
unsuccessful factors in the search since the Qing dynasty to find a model of governance for Tibetan areas.

III, a) The evolution of structures of governance in Tibetan areas

Han departmentalism developed to its most extreme form during the Qing dynasty, where a central and already established ruling state was entered into by ethnic minorities. In order to ensure their own legitimacy and to construct authority for the ruling state, emperor Shunzhi and emperor Kangxi vigorously promoted “Manchurian-Han unity,” and emperor Yongzheng clamped down hard on anti-Qing nationalist sentiment exclusionary of the Manchu, creating an ideological campaign which rejected the debate of Chinese and Non-Chinese. They attempted to use the ideology of Confucianism to instill a patriarchal practice of rites in all levels of society in order to demonstrate that the Manchurian Qing had orthodox Confucianist and political Legitimacy, constructing a ruling state authority that comported to tradition. However, these efforts unavoidably created inner structural contradictions. First, even though the Qing dynasty rulers all along spoke of “Manchurian-Han unity” and “one family under heaven,” in reality there were still differences of “Manchurian-Han” and “Chinese-foreign,” and the distinctions of “inner-outer.” Secondly, although part of the polity, it seemed that all non-Han in the country were no longer the “barbarians”, but as far as the Han in the interior were concerned, the non-Sinicized peoples, or the peoples whose sinicization progress was still relatively low were the “barbarians” outside the Confucian family circle. This could not but have an impact on the nationality policies of the Qing dynasty and its Confucian culture, which on the one hand enabled it to look at its shortcomings and adopt a political strategy of “soft and moderate”; on the other hand, the strong sense of identity toward the state political authority created by the cultural tensions possibly made the Qing dynasty treat ethnic peoples with discrimination and bias, adopting differing strategies and governance Policies from repression to appeasement.

Even though the Qing dynasty’s political strategies of rule over the various nationalities changed from “outside” to “inside,” the fun-
damental aim pursued however was one of “to not cause trouble is prime,” one which never actually changed. Under the guidance of the patriarchal concept of “races not like i,” local officials did not actually rule their regions actively. Serious but localized incidents were treated as “locals against locals” with no bearing on them; but if the contradictions grew greater, it was called “the locals, unusually boorish, are ignorant of the law,” and it was requested “apply extreme force and show no mercy”. Such cultural tensions created a weakening of identification with the authority of the ruling state, which not only reduced the effectiveness of the state’s power and operations, it also made the state unwilling to become too involved in social life in Tibetan areas. With the arrival of the modern era and in order to cope with the growing crises in the border areas, the Qing dynasty did everything they could to exert a “unified” policy for the western regions and the interior to try to eradicate the possible threat brought by the disaffection of the ethnic minorities in the border areas. However, when the state authorities were faced with the regional social authorities in Tibetan areas, they were already in a weakened condition.

The political power of the Qing dynasty collapsed in the 1911 revolution under an anti-Qing wave Republican China replaced the old feudal empire, and promoted a course for China’s political modernization. However, the disintegration of the old authority did not produce a correspondingly new authority. The absence of the political authorities’ role during the period of republican China meant that the government had no choice but to rely on old structures to maintain local society. Furthermore, even though the republican government in Nanjing declared the “republic of five races,” they still unconsciously regarded the ethnic areas in the western regions as a cultural border, and equated ethnic peoples as representative of remote and backward barbarians. The so-called standard of the central plains emphasizes a degree of similarity in cultural traditions. With this dual central and marginal cultural and political perspective, Tibetan are as are regarded as a cultural desert. Under this influence, the Republican government’s policies no matter whether it was the direct rule over Gannan or the indirect management over U-Tsang and Qinghai with a heavy reliance on other forces there was no ability or will to effect any change to the society and lives of all nationalities living in Tibetan areas.
It must be pointed out that the degree of contradictions in the Amdo Tibetan regions was different than in the U-Tsang region. Under the traditional political setup, an extremely remote place where state political order was negligible. In the empire of the central plains based on an agricultural civilization, the system of “counties and prefectures” had a great impact on the Tibetan area of Amdo, its system of rule maintaining a semblance of unity with the central plains; but because U-Tsang had never been a part of a system, even just this semblance did not exist in the slightest. During the republican period, the title of “Security Commander So-and-So” could earn the recognition of the upper classes in Amdo, but it was completely unfamiliar to the elites of the U-Tsang region. The U-Tsang region of Tibet was more “pure” than the Amdo region in terms of a singular culture and the composition of the people, where in particular there was a lack of Amdo’s widespread bilingual elites, and the local elites instead held traditional Tibetan culture in very high esteem. In addition, at the start of the late Qing period, the elites in U-Tsang learned a great deal about foreign culture via India, and there were many in the aristocracy who were fluent in English. And therefore, efforts to insert U-Tsang into the systems of a modern state inevitably brought even more drastic changes which were particularly felt by the elite strata. The knowledge that the local power elites in Amdo had of the modernization process was closely related to the modernization process in the interior, and they themselves were very active in taking initiatives. But as far as the majority of the elites in U-Tsang were concerned, such modernization was more imposed and more sudden, and the modernization described by many of the U-Tsang elites was not that modernization was a natural component of the modernization of all China, but the result of compulsion from the political authorities on the central plains. Under the influence of the modern concept of “ethnic self-determination,” part of the overseas U-Tsang elite regarded the “Center-U-Tsang” relationship merely as a relationship of “religious conferral,” which produced the illusion of a “state”.

In 1949, the republic of China was replaced by the people’s republic of China, completing the second regime-change in the process of China’s political modernization. After the new government was established, it similarly promoted “unified” polices; however, the “unified” policies this time had new content. The so-called new content
no longer borrowed from or upheld the old grass-roots community organizations or the old social structures, but instead smashed the old and established the new; and no longer would the benefits and privileges for extremely small numbers of the aristocracy and religious leaders be upheld in ethnic nationality areas. These new “unified” policies gained the support of the broad masses in Tibetan areas, and a good mass foundation was put down for the new and mandatory changes to be made to the social system. Under the new system of unified governance and economy, there were prominent changes made to society in Tibetan areas, and the ruling positions, traditional privileges and benefits of the old aristocracy and upper echelons of the religious person ages came under attack. Among these, a small number of people took the risk of starting a rebellion in 1958 [sic] to oppose the historic and great changes in nationality areas. But once the rebellion had been put down, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution and under the impact of the ultra-leftist line, the state authorities and local government ignored characteristics of social history, cultural traditions and folk production, lifestyles and religious beliefs in the nationality regions, and ignoring also development levels of productive forces in these areas and differences with the interior in the process of modernization, attempted to use even more forceful administrative means and organizational methods to carry out in a short time a mandatory and thorough transformation of society in the nationality areas. Even though these attempts to “help shoots grow by tugging them” and meddling in the affairs of others were able to produce superficial results in the short term, it was very difficult to fundamentally resolve problems, but very easy to lead to a conflict in people’s hearts and a strong reaction due to various cultural factors.

It can therefore be seen from this that the process of political modernization in Tibetan areas without doubt needs the effective implementation of nationality policies by the state, along with handling connections with local power structures in Tibetan areas. Two strategies are seen to be at play when the state is faced with local societies: causal system change, and mandatory systems. First, the state’s actions and abilities in Tibetan areas are decided upon by two aspects:

(1) The political authority of the state and the strength of the state’s mobilization of resources fundamentally decides the scale of a state’s
ability to change a regional society, and whether it adopts causal change or mandatory change;

(2) The degree to which the normative values professed by the state coincide with the regional social values dictates the direction of the state’s treatment of those regional social values, as well as the degree of the regional society’s acceptance of the state’s political authority. Second, and as far as Tibetan regional society is concerned where the regional characteristics of culture and society have always been so deeply ingrained, depending on different powers or on local power structure with long and twisting tendrils that have grown over a longtime, the greatest contradictions appear in the struggles and cooperation between the state and the local power structures, the using, the hood winking, the controlling and toying. This not only includes the game between state and local political and economic groupings, it also includes the game played against time between the roles of modern and religion, and cultural and ideological forces. What direction this will eventually take is strongly related to power and strategy, but in the final analysis the standard for government policies in Tibetan areas lies in the question of identity.

Summarizing the reasons for the development of unhealthy power structures in Tibetan areas since the Qing dynasty and the republic of China, subjectively appears in the acceptance of status in Tibetan areas.

(1) The state has not regarded the people living in these regions as being equally qualified as subjects or citizens, and regards them as outsiders;

(2) Representatives of the state’s political power in these areas are seen as playing the role of a cultural superior who cannot face up to cultural diversity, cannot conceive of how to adapt to the culture, cannot create new understandings to complete the transformation of the masses’ identity status in Tibetan areas, and establish a concept of nation. Therefore, under conditions of lacking a basic concept of nationhood, there is no way of avoiding the contradictions between status and roles. History’s greatest lesson is that the main body of the masses in Tibetan areas lack a fundamental ideological identification with the state. This has led to a strange situation where state authorities within areas of authority in Tibetan areas have to rely on
religious authority or local key cadres in order to function effectively.

The people’s republic of China during the 60s and 70s resolved the problems of status and identity relatively well among the masses in Tibetan areas, completing the first large-scale mandatory system change in the process of modernization, as well as firmly establishing an overwhelming advantage for the state’s political authority within the local power structures. However, due to ideological rigidity and the reality of factors within the establishment, Tibetans went from “putting down the rebellion” to the new establishment of new power elites which gradually replaced the traditional elites in Tibetan areas. This became a political force heavily relied upon by the central government, but this force gradually created new problems during the changes. The contradictions between uni-polar political thought and the multi-polar regions once again appeared, and under the dual impacts of globalization and the renaissance of religious forces upon identity along with the “filter” of the new local power elites, the acknowledgment of “errors” between the state powers and the ordinary people in Tibetan areas is now a relatively concentrated contradiction in society in Tibetan areas.

III, b) Problems in power structures within regional autonomy in Tibetan areas

The Qing political maneuvers of “locals ruling locals,” and the modern political concept of “ethnic autonomy” along with the early successes of the soviet models have all had a profound impact upon our nation’s planning for the basic system of “ethnic regional autonomy.” Ethnic regional autonomy is a theoretical guide and planning system, the value of which was affirmed during its implementation in our country’s Tibetan areas from the 60s to the 90s. However, its implementation in recent years has presented some new problems and challenges to be faced.

The central government considers that: “Ethnic minority cadres understand their own people’s history, they understand their own people’s language and customs, they have a strong desire for the revitalization of their own people, and they are able to fully reflect the wishes and requirements of their own people. They have an irreplaceable role to play when resolving nationality problems, when handling the relationship between an ethnic area’s interests and the
interests of the entire nation, and when upholding the legal interests of nationality regions and the ethnic minority masses. "In November 1950, there was the central government state council’s promulgation of the “Pilot program for the training of ethnic minority cadres,” there then came the third plenary session of the eleventh party congress and its demand to speed up the training of political and specialist ethnic minority cadres, and in December 1993 there was the “Suggestions for further improving work to select and train ethnic minority cadres” issued jointly by the organization department and the united front work department, all the way through until 2005 when Hujintao at the central nationalities work conference emphasized the need to “recognize the importance of training ethnic minority cadres, to have not only warm concern and strict demands of ethnic minority cadres, but also to have full confidence and offer a free rein, and select even more outstanding ethnic minority cadres particularly young cadres to be installed into leadership positions at all levels. "Over more than 50 years of efforts by the central government and the localities, a “relatively ample in number, rationally structured, and basically professionally equipped” corps of ethnic minority cadres was formed in each ethnic minority locality. As of 2007, the number of ethnic minority cadres had grown from around 10,000 during the early period of the nation’s founding to 3 million people now. In addition, the uniqueness of Tibet also lies in the tens of thousands of cadres from the interior who have answered the party’s call in the more than 50 years since the peaceful liberation to “aid Tibet” and participate in construction. Since 1994 and the start of the Aid Tibet project, four groups of almost 4000 cadres have been dispatched to work in Tibet by the center, by state organs, provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and state-owned enterprises.

Autonomy is based on areas where ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities, and is necessarily accompanied by a localized system of officials, and over the course of several decades of organization and construction a large number of administrative officials and power-holders has been created. Subsequent problems have started to become more difficult:

III, b) (1) unlike in non-autonomous areas, it is difficult for local officials in Tibetan areas to crossover the large distances for exchanges and to assume or leave a posting. Historical experience has told us
that the mobility of officials has been poor, which can create locally fixed power networks, which inevitably lead to a high incidence of corruption and dereliction of duty. “Deep-rooted” local power elite networks have formed in many Tibetan areas, where it has become routine for the local authorities to be rent-seekers and for the administration to be inefficient. The complexity of Tibetan areas also shows in the renaissance of traditional religious forces over the past 10 years and more, where officials, the new economic aristocracy and religious forces have bound together to create a new power framework and a “new aristocracy”. “In reality, the background to the planning system in Tibetan areas has become a question of the right to distribute natural resources. There are vested interests at every level, and significant obstacles to breakthroughs in the system.” (Interviewee, drweiming, a scholar at the North West nationalities institute.)

Unlike the traditional aristocracy, the characteristics of this new aristocratic class are:

(1) The senior positions they occupy are legitimized, they have more complex social resources, and they are even more powerful;

(2) If the traditional aristocracy can be said to have derived their legitimacy more from the “internal source” of clan and religious associations in Tibetan areas, then this new aristocracy derives its legitimacy more from the “external source” of central government affirmation. The differences in these forms of legitimacy become apparent during times of social contradiction when the “new aristocracy” are unable to become the “authority” that ordinary Tibetan people themselves can approve of. When differences appear between the state and ordinary people, it is difficult for the “new aristocracy” to play the role of a “buffer”.

(3) Although the degree of power held by the “new aristocracy” may not be as great as the old aristocracy, their loyalty to the central government is much stronger. The first pursuit of the old aristocracy between the dual imperatives of “their land” and the “state” was “protect the land and calm the people,” and to seek “political balance”. Conversely, due to the gradual fragmentation of local, tribal and religious restraints upon the new aristocracy, more often than not, ordinary people in Tibetan areas will not regard them as “one of their own,” and therefore the consequences of some of the new
aristocracy’s misconduct are then “logically” borne by the central government.

III, b) (2) Due to the special nature of the political environment in Tibetan areas, “stability” in the state’s Tibet policies has special significance. The center considers that “If there is not a stable social environment, then all talk of development is empty.” Even though “development and stability” are the trains of thought for government work in ethnic areas, in the actual exercise of power “stability” takes on an overwhelming importance. Relying upon Tibetan officials and cadres for stability in Tibetan areas has become logical and they have been greatly empowered by the center. But there is a lack of any effective supervision over the local officials, and there are many people who have learned how to use stability to protect themselves. Under “stability and development, “a blind spot in power supervision in nationality areas has been created. “Foreign forces” and “Tibet independence” are used by many local officials as fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in governance and to repress social discontent. Some officials will often turn social problems under their jurisdiction into “matters of the utmost concern,” elevating everything to the level of splittist forces in order to conceal their errors. In its follow-up interviews, the research panel discovered that in a certain county the government defined its handling of a compensation dispute between nomads and a local hydropower station as an incident of “anti-splittism and upholding stability.” As one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, Mr. Pingcuo wangjie [Tib: Phuntso Wangyal] has said “There’s a large group of people in the government who eat the food of anti-splittism. They take every opportunity to play the splittism card, and while on the face of it they shout about anti-splittism, in reality their personal interests are involved. They are unable to admit their mistakes and instead put all of their effort into shifting accountability onto ‘hostile foreign forces’. And thus they are able to consolidate their positions and their interests, allowing them to accumulate even more power and resources.”

The pursuit of stability and fear of chaos has taken root in the inertia of some officials, which in reality is a psychological deflection of their low administrative abilities and backward understanding of governance. Under the concept of “one less thing to do is better than one more,” religious gatherings of relatively large numbers of people have
been postponed, restricted or even canceled; with an attitude of “olicies from above, counter measures from below,” local authorities contravene the constitution and “Regional ethnic autonomy law,” but at present the corresponding supervisory and accountability systems are still incomplete. Basang luobu[Tib: Pasang Norbu], the private secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional people’s congress says that implementing and breaking the law, legal corruption and poor understanding of legal concepts are prominent problems for legal construction in nationality areas. During the research panel’s interviews in Gannan there was a nomad who said “Security is a mess. They (the police) don’t care. If our sheep or cattle are stolen by someone, you can report it to the police and they’ll take the thief in, hold them for two days then let them go. But you don’t get your sheep or cattle back: the money from selling them is split up among the police.” (Interviewee, a nomad in qu’ao, Xiahe.)

It should be added that because of the influence of religious thinking and levels of education, the degree to which ordinary people in Tibetan areas are inculcated with politics is far lower than in the interior, to the extent that many people cannot differentiate between central government policies and local regulations, or the difference between central decision-making and local actions, and the central government is often made the scapegoat for local errors. The research panel also discovered in the course of its interviews that many among the masses use “cadre” and “nomad” to differentiate between their own and all other levels of government, and think that “before, the cadres were good, now the cadres are sometimes good, sometimes bad.” (Interviewee, a nomad on the dajiutan grasslands.)

III, b) (3) The expenditure model of financial structures and obstacles to cadres’ governance abilities.

During the period of the eleventh five year plan, the total amount of money sent just to Tibet using normal transfer payments, system subsidies and special subsidies amounted to 4.75 trillion Yuan [US$693.5 billion], with funds given by the central government amounting to 90% of Tibet’s total expenditure. When researching in the Tibetan area of Amdo, an official said that a certain county’s fiscal income was more than 10 million Yuan, but financial support is more than 400 million Yuan, meaning the shortcoming is made up forty times over from central transfer payments.
At the third Tibet work forum in 1994, it was decided to adopt practices of “division of responsibility, targeted support, and regular rotation,” and transfer cadres from relevant provinces, metropolises and central government organs to do focused aid work in Tibet. At the fourth Tibet work forum in 2001, it was decided to extend the period of cadres doing focused aid Tibet work by another 10 years, and at the same time it was decided to cover all counties, cities and prefectures in Tibetan areas. For many years, favorable policies in Tibetan areas have given a great deal of support in the form of funding, projects and materials, and improved the basic infrastructure conditions in Tibet. But at the same time it has also created officials in Tibetan areas who put all of their efforts into ways of demanding money and projects from the center, and they take far more interest in operating their own social networks than they do in practical social and economic construction.

At present, the problem of cadres’ knowledge structures in Tibetan areas is becoming more prominent: on the one hand, there is a shortage of specialist cadres and personnel needed for social and economic development; on the other hand, there are large and swelling numbers of party, government and industrial work unit personnel. The political cadres are largely redundant, whereas there’s a serious lack of technical, managerial and technology cadres. During the panel’s interviews in Tibetan areas, it was discovered that deputy officials in a certain prefectural recreation and sports bureau were only educated to the level of elementary school.

In December 1993, the central organization department, the central united front work department and the state ethnic affairs commission jointly issued “Suggestions for further improving work to select and train ethnic minority cadres,” which was to “train and create a corps of ethnic minority cadres who are equipped with both morals and talent, who are politically pure and diligent, who closely connect with people of all nationalities, a corps which is multi-talented, equipped with specializations and rationally constructed, and which is able to adapt to the requirements of reform and opening up and the development of the socialist market economy.” Judging from the present, if this aim is to ever be achieved there is still a very long way to go.
IV: The government’s errors in handling the follow-up to the 3.14 incident

The research panel discovered that the 3.14 incident was caused by the confluence of many factors, including psychological loss created by development, discontent among economic classes, the question of migrants, influences from abroad, religious sentiment, and on-scene “mass reactions,” which cannot be simply reduced to “splittist violence.” We advocate that the handling of the aftermath of the 3.14 incident should have been to quickly pacify the incident, to decisively resolve contradictions, actively appease the masses, handle officials’ dereliction of duty, and actively promote the roles of stronger inter-ethnic unity and harmony. But looking at the handling in the current situation, there are some quite major errors in government policy. The government’s forceful propaganda and incautious handling have in fact driven outcomes in the opposite direction.

IV, a) The ensuing over-propagandizing of “violence” was used to make the 3.14 incident ever larger, which created certain oppositional ethnic sentiments. Depictions of the violence in Lhasa and Gannan were seen barely 10 hours later on television and the internet and seen all over the country and even the entire world, with an intensive depiction of violent acts by some Tibetans. And the sole cause given for the protests was simply “foreign forces,” which made Han citizens, who lack any practical understanding of Tibetan areas, form feelings of racist sentiment toward the Tibetan masses as a result. Such propaganda actions are in the long run detrimental to ethnic unity.

The fascination that Han citizens have expressed toward Tibetan culture changed to fear and hatred of the Tibetan masses, and Tibetans were rendered as a people incapable of gratitude. After the incident, the research panel discovered many internet discussion forums were filled with fanatical abuse by Chinese and Tibetan internet users, which only deepened the misunderstandings. Mr. nongbu [Tib: Norbu] told the research panel that when his Han friends saw the pictures they almost cut all communication with him, which was extremely difficult for him to take.

(Interviewee, Nongbu, international NGO worker and khampa Tibetan.) It can be seen therefore that the government’s press releases
went out quickly, intuitively and effectively, but their potential negative effects cannot be underestimated. When handling matters in such a way, what's damaged is the Tibetan people's support for unity, and what's harmed is relations between the Han and Tibetans.

IV, b) Defining the 3.14 incident as "beating, smashing, looting and burning by Tibetan splittists" lacks political wisdom. The armed insurrection in Tibetan areas toward the end of the 50s has been defined as class struggle, and has not risen to being racial confrontation. The main thrust of policies was to "strike hard against a few arch culprits and appease the broad masses of farmers and nomads." The policies were adjusted, and reform of ownership systems became means for resolving problems at the time, and contradictions were quickly resolved. But today, when faced with "beating, smashing, looting and burning," and "the Dalai clique's organized, premeditated and meticulously planned" splittist activities, the excessive response of governments all over Tibet was to regard every tree and blade of grass as a potential enemy soldier. Local policy turned to strict monitoring where everyone was suspect, “everyone has to pass a political test,” which was bound to lead to even more Tibetans becoming discontented, and created discord and dissension far and wide. Even more dangerous was that this suspicion and exclusion of Tibetans slowly spread to many places in the interior and there was some very unfair treatment. During the course of the panel's interviews, many Tibetan elites said that they had been heavily searched at airports and hotels, and that their sense of patriotism had suffered.

IV, c) The poor understanding of the Tibetan people's religious sentiment led to errors in the way monks and monasteries were treated in the wake of the 3.14 incident. Monks are the clergy in Tibetan areas who not only offer people spiritual guidance, they are also Tibet's traditional intelligentsia, and Tibetan astronomy, the calendar, medicine and law were all produced by this grouping. In Tibetan areas where there is widespread faith, monks have extremely high social prestige. Therefore, the government’s serious handling of relations with monks and monasteries and positive interactions would in the long-term be extremely beneficial to Tibet’s stability. Furthermore, when handling matters post-3.14, many high status monasteries were ordered to be investigated, and for a short time closed for rectification; itinerant monks with household registrations elsewhere
were driven out and traveling stopped; and all monasteries had to carryout “socialist and patriotic education.” In reality, such actions were a form of interference for the monks who wanted nothing to do with politics and were concentrated on their practice, and the outcome may not be positive. The panel happened to chance upon several rule of law propaganda activities which had interrupted the normal activities of services and practice, and the monks were complaining.

V: Problems of Tibetan religion and culture during this current complex phase

In the process of promoting the process of modernization in Tibetan areas, the question of Tibetan religion and culture is eternal and unavoidable. Any social and economic activity by humanity is carried out within determined system and culture, and then interacts with it. The main body of Tibetan religious culture is Tibetan Buddhism: it is not only an important constituent part of Tibetan culture, it is also the main source of thinking for how Tibetan religious culture comports with the logic of historical development. And in this regard, the connection between so-called modernization and Tibetan religious culture can more importantly be regarded as the connection between modernization and Tibetan Buddhism. The director of the Tibet academy of social sciences, ciren jiabu[Tib: Tsering Gyalpo] says, “Our government does not interfere with freedom of religious belief, but nor does it encourage religion. In reality, Tibetan Buddhism is not merely another form of religion, it is a field of learning, and it is more accurate to call it the dharma law than the law of the Buddha. How to guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the construction of a harmonious society is a key question.”

When we understand modernization as the social changes and transitions brought about by the gradual strengthening of the modern and the gradual weakening of the traditional in the modern era of the history of the world, a possibility is presented to us of re-examining the relationship between modernization and religion from a new and broader perspective, and to open a new path. The latest developments in modernization theory state that there is not a state of anti-thesis between the modern and the traditional, and that “the traditional interior of every society has the possibility of developing into the modern, and therefore, modernization is the process where
systems and value judgments within traditions respond on a functional level to the demands and constant adaptations of the modern.” The strengths and weaknesses of such adaptability are defined by the compatibility of the modern and traditional, and in situations where there is little compatibility and there is a lack of modern factors, then the power of government authorities must be relied upon to effect mandatory system changes. Of course, when the state is promoting transformation, the systems in advanced countries should not just be blindly copied, but they should start out from the cultural traditions found within the country, otherwise “if the cultural values of a society and the differences in its social customs are ignored, then the foreign systems that are introduced with new technologies have no way of serving the desired outcomes and can only cause social chaos.” Evidently, as far as post-modernized countries and regions are concerned, the start of the modernization process is usually founded on mandatory systemic changes, and on the basis of the consequent outcomes of mandatory change, causal systemic change can be effected. On the basis of this significance, we consider that Tibetan Buddhism is the basis of traditional Tibetan systems and culture in Tibetan areas, and not only should it not be regarded as an obstacle to modernization, it should actually be regarded as a reliable traditional resource for providing a functional basis for promoting the process of modernization in Tibetan areas. Only then can we hope to see the early realization of modernization in Tibetan areas.

On the other hand, we have to break through the arguments from the radical proponents of secularization, and get over the old-fashioned religious epistemology where religious systems, behaviors and ideologies have lost their social significance, and establish an understanding that religion can fully go hand-in-hand with modernization. This has already been proven to be the reality in the modern world. The process of secularization is a reductive force upon Tibetan Buddhism, but it cannot lead to fundamental change of the disappearance of Tibetan Buddhism: “secularization only changes Tibetan Buddhism and weakens its traditional roles, and this is an inevitable process of change brought about by Tibetan Buddhism’s own transformation of its internal structures.”

To conclude the theoretical discussion, we will look back once again at the Tibetan areas of our country, where it can be seen that in prac-
tice there are numerous variations and contradictions arising from the intertwining of the process of modernization and religious culture. First of all, the mandatory systemic changes by state political forces cleared obstacles and presented conditions for the modernization of the Amdo Tibetan region, but it has not been possible to carry out causal system changes, and it has not been possible to eradicate the impact of errors made during the process of mandatory change. Since the establishment of the new China and under the leadership of the party and government, regional ethnic autonomy has generally been realized in the Tibetan region of Amdo, and the Tibetan people have exercised the right to be their own masters. This earth shaking social transformation has brought vitality to the government, economy and culture of the Amdo region: with the gradual elimination of feudal and religious privilege, the state of impoverishment has improved greatly. However, due to the malignant developments of the extreme left during the Cultural Revolution which damaged the party’s nationality policies and religion policies, customs created over a long historical period in the Amdo region and the masses’ normal religious activities were completely disregarded in a deliberate attempt to destroy religion, to irrationally destroy all monasteries, to denounce senior religious person ages and compel them to return to secular life. This forced religious activities underground, seriously wounding the religious sensibilities of the believing masses and giving rise to mass discontent. Following the third plenary session of the eleventh party congress when out of the chaos order was restored, policies to protect and respect the freedom of religious belief were enacted and religious activities at the monasteries gradually resumed. The newly re-opened monasteries operated on principles of democratic management, and monastery democratic management committees were established, and were composed of monks who uphold the party’s direction and policies and who are patriotic, and who were elected by the faithful masses and the monastery’s monks, thereby gradually putting religious policies on to a standardized path.

However, two types of contradiction remain at present:

(1) There is a rigidity and backwardness in political discourse at the national level with regard to religion and relevant policies and measures, which has led to inconsistencies in the relationship between
modernization and religion and the relationship between socialism and the realm of religion, and inconsistencies between theory and practice;

(2) Local officials still have no understanding of how to recognize the relation between the status of citizen and the status of religious individual, and there is even a phenomenon of monks being forced to retire by means of patriotic education. The existence of such a situation will inevitably have an impact on how religious believers regard the political authority of the state, and how the state’s causal changes to Tibetan Buddhism enacted on the basis of mandatory change will impact the transformative functions of Tibetan Buddhism to functions of modernization.

Secondly, once Tibetan Buddhism was released from mandatory repression there was a period of strong flexibility and renewal, and its own schisms and contradictions inevitably appeared. In the early period of reform and opening up in the Amdo area where the masses’ deep religiosity had been repressed, they showed a very warm enthusiasm for religious activities. Later, and in the wake of regional economic construction, cultural education and the development and progress of scientific, technical and communications undertakings, there was a fundamental change to the formerly feudal and semi-feudal society, and there was a change in people’s thinking particularly the thinking among people in the arable areas along communication lines, where there were enormous changes. Among some of the middle-aged, religious concepts had already started to gradually weaken. Under such circumstances, a trend started within the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries themselves toward secularization:

(1) There was an increase in “lay characteristics” among religious personnel;

(2) Monasteries’ organizational functions became more utilitarian, and the monasteries’ organizational management became more democratized;

(3) The beliefs of the faithful were transformed, their motivations became pragmatic, there were formative changes to religious practices and rituals, and where reverence was towards the morality of senior teachers. Nevertheless, due to the special nature in which Ti-
betan Buddhism is propagated and which makes it an indispensable element in the socialization and internalization process for every single person in Tibetan areas, it therefore has an extremely broad influence. However, such changes are likely to eventually bring changes to religion’s internal power structures as well as changes to the role and Hue of authority, there by bringing about a change to the internal structures of religion as well as renewed adjustments to its relationship with society. And under such circumstances, there are questions of how should Tibetan Buddhism’s religious authority and local power be regarded, and how should the questions of monasteries and monks be managed.

In summation, at present the state lacks adequate preparation and actions for changes under the new situation, and there are serious shortcomings on how to effectively use the traditional resource of Tibetan Buddhism to promote the process of modernization in Tibetan areas, as well as how to adjust strategies to the changing situation, how to coordinate the relationship between the state and religion, to reduce unnecessary ideological conflicts, or how to remodel Tibetan identity and their self-image within nationality and religion policies. This should be the root cause that created the current complex problems in the Tibetan areas.

VI: Conclusion and recommendations

For the sake of the long-term harmony and unity of the state, the 3.14 incident in Tibet is worthy of our deep reflection. If external factors alone are emphasized and we ignore reflections upon internal social and political structures, this would be irresponsible to the long-term interests of the state. Against the great background of modernization, although there have been great developments to the economy in Tibetan areas, compared to other provinces, other countries, and even ordinary people of other nationalities living in Tibetan areas, it is still evidently backward. This is particularly so when more and more people from elsewhere are acquiring great wealth in Tibetan areas, and unintentionally creating a sense of relative deprivation. At the same time, religious traditions have come under attack from modernization, and many young Tibetans have been cast into a state of puzzlement and confusion. Behind all of these questions lies an urgent problem, and that is the problems in our country’s political structures. Power relations from top to bottom have created
a group of local Tibetan cadres who use the resources of authority that come to them from above in order to build a complex network of contacts in nationality areas, where the state’s economic assistance largely becomes used for career projects for the few, or for the personal wealth of the few. They are not good at facing the masses, not good at facing a society in the process of development and with a plurality of thought, and they frequently stir up social contradictions and then hope that the central government will foot the bill. Ordinary Tibetans have a far keener and evident sense of deprivation than any sense of government help, and like many people living in provinces in the interior, are deeply discontented with the local power-brokers. This accumulation of frustration and anger over a long period of time with the added fuses of religion and external forces led to the 3.14 incident.

We believe that at present, there is no factual basis for the “extinction of Tibet” as described by some. In the main, Han-Tibetan relations are good. However, following the chaos of 3.14 in Tibetan areas we discovered that there are many prominent contradictions and hardships in society in Tibetan areas. We tried to understand this situation by means of research and documentary analysis, and to understand the living conditions of the masses in Tibetan areas. This report is only the reflection of a merest glimpse, and such perspectives can in no way cover all of the issues facing Tibetan areas. However, it has been based on the intention to understand the changes taking place in Tibetan areas, and at the same time it is hoped that it will bring about further and ever more detailed exploration.

We call for ethnic relations of “unity, equality, mutual assistance, harmony and people first,” “and “a unified multi-ethnic joint struggle, common construction, common prosperity and shared success.” The pre requisite is for the government to fully recognize the citizen status of ordinary people in Tibetan areas, to ensure the rights and interests of ordinary Tibetan people, and that conceptual thinking needs to adapt to the social reality of Tibetan areas in a period of rapid modernization, where it is hoped to be able to be unencumbered by current ideological frameworks to broaden horizons and make policy breakthroughs.

In focusing its research on the social factors of the “3.14 incident,” the research panel presents the following suggestions:
1 Earnestly listen to the voices of ordinary Tibetans and on the basis of respecting and protecting each of the Tibetan people’s rights and interests, adjust policy and thinking in Tibetan areas to formulate development policies which are suited to the characteristics of Tibetan areas, and which accord with the wishes of the Tibetan people.

2 Guide the rational development of economic structures in Tibetan areas, paying particular attention to guiding all Tibetans to share in acquiring ample benefits from opportunity and development. Pay attention to nurturing local economic entities; in the process of support, pay close attention to changing the degree of serious inequalities, reducing the discrepancy between urban and rural rich and poor in Tibetan areas; extend the scope of aid Tibet to Tibetan Autonomous areas outside Tibet. Continue the model of economic development based on a combination of financial aid, technical assistance and human resource expertise, and adopt measures to attract foreign investment at the same time as taking appropriate measures to protect local industries. In the labor market pay close attention to fully protecting the employment rights of Tibetan people. In farming and nomadic regions within Tibetan areas, promote support and protections which benefit the individual.

3 Increase effective supervision over local power structures in the implementation of regional ethnic autonomy policies, and speedup the process of democratizing power structures. End tolerance of corruption, poor administrative abilities and dereliction of duty which is apparent in government in Tibetan areas, and in particular of those officials who suppress local social problems in the name of “anti-splittism.” Establish more rational and democratic selection policies for Tibetan cadres in order to optimize current cadre structures.

4 Pay close attention to the living situation of young Tibetans, and with the greatest good faith resolve current education problems in Tibetan areas, particularly the problems of rural education and education for farmers and nomads, and by means of subsidies and guidance entice children to complete nine-year compulsory education. Continue to develop and
encourage training mechanisms for highly skilled personnel in Tibetan areas, and to optimize specialized knowledge structures among college students. Speedup and improve grass-roots professional technical education in Tibetan areas, and using the method of joint work and study as used in schools in the eastern provinces, allow Tibetan students to set out and increase the degree of training in schools’ high-tech content and training in practical production in Tibetan areas, in order to train up skilled workers and eliminate all barriers for encouraging varied Tibetan employment and entrepreneurship. Particular attention should be paid in school education on extending and developing appropriate content on Tibetan history and culture, and increasing the civic awareness content of the training. Education and training must be regarded as the most important long-term resolution to the question of Tibetan areas.

5 Fully respect and protect the Tibetan people’s freedom of religious belief, resuming and supporting normal religious lives and activities. Fully recognize the important significance of religion and a religious life to Tibetan areas and to the Tibetan people. In the area of culture and religion, make best use of the situation and pay close attention to the role of religious authority. Respect and resume normal religious activities such as dharma events, the practice of traveling to study, receiving teachings, and the monastic examination hierarchy. Pay close attention to protecting the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism. Fully protect and respect the Tibetan people’s religious sentiment in propaganda activities.

6 When resolving problems in Tibetan areas, thinking must be transformed; adopt appropriate measures and thinking which is more positive and wise. With the guiding thought of facilitation, understanding and integration, reduce inter-ethnic prejudice, ignorance and injury. When handling sudden incidents, change the overly-strong attitude of “from top to bottom,” and wisely mobilize positive forces in Tibetan areas (such as religious forces) to solve them.

7 Promote rule of law in governance processes in Tibetan areas. Urge the introduction of laws and regulations as repre-
sented by ordinances in the Tibet Autonomous Region and other autonomous areas, to change the current status quo of a lack of lower laws since the promulgation of the regional ethnic autonomy law. Regulate the ownership rights and disposal rights of key natural resources. Encourage positive expert participation in advising and discussing all aspects of policy in Tibetan areas.

8 When upholding and propagandizing construction to the state of ethnic unity, propagandize the successes of reform and opening up in Tibetan areas instead of depicting the past system of serfdom. At the same time as manifesting the vitality of development, admit to the social problems facing Tibet. Be vigilant against the dark racist waves of secession and ethnic revenge.

9 When handling crisis situations, it must first be discerned whether there is a social problem, an economic problem, or a religious problem, with different problems having different means of being handled. The central government should be in the position of “arbiter,” and maintain a distinction to the best of their ability from local officials’ in appropriate conduct. Sensitive incidents should be “de-sensitized” to the greatest degree.

[1][10] U-Tsang, sometimes rendered as central Tibet, is the Tibetan region roughly equivalent to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which was established as a provincial-level administration in 1964; Amdo is the name of another Tibetan region mainly comprising modern-day Qinghai, as well as being the name a prefecture within the TAR. Throughout this report, the terms Tibet (Xizang), Tibetan areas (zangqu), and Tibetan regions (diyu), etc., have been used inconsistently and interchangeably, but it would appear that generally, the report broadly refers to Tibet as covering the various Tibetan Autonomous jurisdictions as demarcated by the Chinese state.

[2][11] “3.14” refers to March 14, 2008, the date when peaceful protests over several previous days in Lhasa turned violent.

[4][13] The ‘two basicallys’ (liangji) is a centrally-led policy to ‘basically’ universalize nine-year compulsory education, and ‘basically’ eliminate adult illiteracy.

[5][14] The term menlu using the characters for door and road implies an advantage gained by nepotism or favor, and is very similar in meaning to the more commonly heard term Guanxi literally meaning connection or Houmen meaning back door.


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The Art of War by Sun Tzu
Question: Your Holiness Dalai Lama, how are you? I want to ask you about the religious leadership of Tibet in the future. What is your view on the possibility of “two successors”, as happened in the case of the 11th Panchen Lama?

His Holiness: In 1969 I had officially stated that the Tibetan people will decide whether the institution of the Dalai Lama needs to continue or not. Similarly, in 1992, I had issued an official statement in which I had stated that when the time comes for the Tibetans in Tibet and in exile to be reunited, I would not assume any position. The people who are currently assuming responsibilities in Tibet would have to shoulder that responsibility.

Then, since 2001, if we look at the exile leadership, a system has been established to elect (in a five-year term) the leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration and this is being practiced now.

Therefore, I do not place much importance on the issue of the Dalai Lama. I will do whatever I can while I am alive. I do not have any other consideration or responsibility.

It looks like the Chinese Communist Party seems to be more concerned about the institution of the Dalai Lama than I. Thus, the situation could become like that of the two Panchen Lamas. It will be an additional problem without any benefit.

Question: What is your view of the 11th Panchen Lama that the Chinese government has appointed?
His Holiness: From what I have heard he has sharp intellect and is greatly interested in religious matters. But many people have much suspicion about him. Therefore, it depends on him. It should be good if he turns out to be someone who embodies both the knowledge of the scripture and the realization based on it, and upholds the teaching and practice of the Buddha’s doctrine.

Question: I would like to ask Your Holiness about the meetings between the Tibetan government in exile and the Chinese Communists. Why are these meetings always fruitless? What exactly are the questions that have been so intractable over the decades?

His Holiness: The Chinese Government has been officially saying that there is no Tibetan issue to be discussed and that it is only the personal issue of the Dalai Lama. I do not have anything to ask for myself. It is the issue of the basic rights of the six million Tibetans, their religion, culture, and environment. These are issues that I am concerned about and need to be discussed. If and when the time comes when the Central Government acknowledges that there is a Tibetan problem, as they seem to be doing so in the case of Xinjiang, and make an effort to resolve it there is something to discuss. From my side, I will cooperate as I share the same objectives as the Chinese Government, namely the development of the country, stability, friendship. However, in terms of method, the Chinese Government seems to be adopting an approach of force to establish stability while we feel that stability should come from mental satisfaction and trust.

Question: Hello, your Holiness. Regardless of what political path China takes in the future, the gap between ordinary Tibetans and ordinary Han Chinese is getting bigger all the time. Many Tibetan people are simplistic in saying the problem is only Han rule of Tibet. In fact we Han people are also victims of the same dictatorial rule. How do you view this problem?

His Holiness: The Chinese-Tibetan relationship did not begin in 1949-50 but is over one thousand years old. During this period sometimes we had very cordial relationship while at other times not too cordial relationship. Currently we are in a period where we do not have cordial relationship. The cause for this is governmental policies that have caused the differences and not the people. Therefore, the people-to-people relationship is becoming important.
In free countries where there are Tibetans and Chinese, we have been making efforts to establish friendship associations between the two communities and these have been having impact. One main problem is that Deng Xiaoping’s Seeking Truth from Facts is not being implemented. Hu Yaobang had made efforts to understand the real situation. Recently, Wen Jiabao has talked about Hu Yaobang’s work attitude of not relying merely on official report but understanding the situation through contact with the people. There are many drawbacks in China because there is no investigating into the reality of the issue in a transparent manner. If there is transparency, it will help in reducing corruption.

Question: Another issue. Do you have any way of maintaining good relations between Hans and Tibetans?

His Holiness: I travel to many countries and have always been adopting the attitude that we are all same human beings. This has enabled me to have good relationship. The Tibetans and Chinese are not only same as human beings, but also have historical relationship. If we are clear and establish equal relationship, all problems will be resolved.

I have been meeting regularly with people who come from mainland China. They are sincere and I am able to establish close relationship. It becomes problematic when there are doubts and suspicions. This is not just with Chinese and Tibetans but throughout the world. This needs to be resolved.

Whenever I meet people, I tell them that we are the same human beings. The difference in religion, culture and languages are secondary. The most important thing is we are all same human beings.

In 1954-55, when I was in Beijing, at that time I had discussions on Marxism. I liked the idea of internationalism.

Question: “I would like to ask your Holiness about your “Memorandum on Achieving True Autonomy for All Tibetans,” in which you do not write about how to protect the rights of Han people who live in Tibet. Would you, after autonomy, recognize a right of Han people who currently reside in Tibetan areas to continue living there?”
His Holiness: Even in the past, before 1950, there were Chinese in Tibet. For example, in my birth area there were many Chinese, including Muslims. Therefore, in the future, too, the Chinese people will certainly be there. What is pertinent to keep in mind is that in the case of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture the Mongol population has become a small minority. If it becomes like that then the national autonomy’s characteristics are not present.

Secondly, in the case of Tibet, in certain towns, where there is a sizable Chinese population with fewer Tibetans, the natural outcome is a change and degeneration of the Tibetan language and Tibetan tradition. We need to consider this. Otherwise, there needs to be a situation where the Chinese friends can exist safely and in happiness. After all, we are same as human beings.

Question: I would like to ask the Great Teacher why your description of Tibet in the past—as a harmonious Buddhist society—differs so radically from the Chinese government’s description of an evil slave society. Many drawings and other visual materials document the cruelty and iniquity of a slave society. Can you explain why this discrepancy is so big?

His Holiness: It is true that the Tibet of the past, prior to 1950, was backward and in general, feudal. No Tibetan says the former old society was like heaven. Today, no Tibetan, in Tibet and outside, thinks or even dreams of reviving the former old society. On the other hand, the Chinese Government’s charge that the past old Tibetan society was like hell is an exaggeration.

In the past there were films made about Tibetan history (by the Chinese). Some people told me that when these films were being shot, onlookers were laughing because these were not conforming to facts. They said a very strange film was being shot.

During the Cultural Revolution it was being said that the Revolution was a great success. Subsequently, when they could not cover the reality the position changed.

Similarly, the Tiananmen issue is known all over the world but the Chinese Government seems to maintain that it virtually did not hap-
pen by saying it was just a few (people). What is important is that you all should undertake scientifically sound objective investigations.

I always even tell the Tibetans that they should not base (their decision) merely because I have said it, but that they should investigate. From a Buddhist practitioner’s perspective, we need to investigate even the Buddha’s teachings.

**Question:** If the Chinese Government were to allow you to return to Tibet, and were to grant self-rule to Tibet, what kind of political system would you like to see in Tibet?

**His Holiness:** That needs to be decided by majority preference by Tibetans in Tibet, particularly intellectuals, through seeking truth from facts. In exile, in the past 50 years our Administration is run along democratic lines.

**Question:** I would like to ask the Dalai Lama a sharp question. The fiercest criticism that Chinese government officials level against you is that you demand there be no troops in Tibet. This, they say, is evidence that you are asking for independence in disguise. Are you maintaining your demand of no troops in Tibet?

**His Holiness:** I have always been making it clear that under the autonomy Foreign Relations and Defence will be undertaken by the Central Government. In the past, I had expressed my dream of making Tibet a Zone of Peace in the future through friendship and trust with neighboring India and Nepal and others. This is not just limited to Tibet but I have always been saying that the entire world needs to be demilitarized. There is no need to be concerned over this point.

**Question:** In view of how things stand at present, the chances of a peaceful resolution of the problem of Tibet during the Dalai Lama’s lifetime seems almost zero. May I ask how His Holiness views the current prospects for Tibet?

**His Holiness:** I divide the period since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China into four eras: Mao Zedong era, Deng Xiaoping era, Jiang Zemin era, and Hu Jintao era. These have seen much changes based on the reality of the situation. Therefore, I feel there will be a change to the nationality policy, and it needs to happen. I do not believe that it is not impossible for a mutually benefi-
cial solution on the Tibetan issue to come about. Secondly, I do not think this will take that many years.

Some Party members who have worked in Tibet in the past and who are now retired, as also many Chinese scholars, have been saying that the present nationality policy is not appropriate and have suggested that it needs to be reviewed. Therefore, I believe that there will be a change and a decision in the not too distant future.


1558 Chinese people submitted 317 questions to His Holiness the Dalai Lama through the renowned Chinese writer, Wang Lixiong. 11705 Chinese netizens voted for the following 10 most important questions, to which Holiness the Dalai Lama responded from his residence in Dharamsala on 16 July 2010.

The responses were released on the Chinese-language website of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on 19 July 2010.

**Question One:** Looking at the current situation, it seems difficult that a reconciliation with the Chinese government will come about in your lifetime. After your passing away, you will have no control over the Tibetan youth organisation which holds on firmly to their ideology [of seeking Tibetan independence]. Is it not possible that they will engage in large-scale terrorist activities then? Are there ways by which they can be prevented from taking such a course?

**Answer:** On the whole, I believe that even after my death the Tibetan exile set-up will continue to make progress, particularly in the field of education. More importantly there are a growing number of young Lamas between the ages of 20 and 30 who are currently pursuing studies in the various religious schools of our community who are capable of taking up greater leadership roles in the spiritual field. In the political field, for the last more than 10 years I have been in a state of semi-retirement. All the important political decisions are being taken by the elected political leadership and this will continue to do so in the future as well. There are forces within our community such as the Tibetan
Youth Congress who criticise our Middle-Way policy and demand complete independence [for Tibet]. It seems their voices are growing stronger [these days]. We cannot blame them for this, since our successive efforts to bring about a mutually-beneficial solution [to the issue of Tibet] have failed to produce any positive results and under such a situation, their viewpoint is gaining momentum [in our society]. However, it is very evident that 99% of the Tibetan people have complete faith in the non-violent path [that we have chosen] and so you should not worry [about their ever resorting to violence].

**Question Two:** Your Holiness, how do you plan to resolve the problem of those areas which form a part of your notion of ‘Greater Tibet’ but are incorporated into the Chinese provinces as far as the current administrative divisions of these provinces are concerned? Will the autonomous government of your ‘Greater Tibet’ exercise control over the other ethnic groups living within those areas? If so, how would you safeguard the aspirations of these ethnic groups?

**Answer:** We have not used the term ‘Greater Tibet’. It is [actually] a term employed by the United Front Work Department of the Chinese government [to refer to our demand]. What we say is that all those Tibetans who speak and write the same language of Tibet should have equal right to preserve and promote their religion and culture as well as to work for their collective economic development. Now this is, in principle, agreed upon by the Chinese government. In the Fifth Work Forum on Tibet, the Chinese central government has recommended a uniform policy for overseeing all Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan autonomous areas under the four Chinese provinces. Premier Wen Jiabao has, particularly, mentioned this in his work report to the National People’s Congress. This, I believe, is really in keeping with the actual prevailing situation. Otherwise, when the word “Xizang” is mentioned, it is taken to be as referring only to the Tibet Autonomous Region. This is not right. There are only a little over two million Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the remaining approximately four million Tibetans live in the neighbouring four Chinese provinces. As such, we are saying that all of these Tibetan people should be given the same rights. For example, I do not belong to the Tibet Autonomous Region; I hail from Tso-n gon [Ch: Qinghai] province. Likewise should you care to look at Tibetan history, you will
see that many of the highly-realised Lamas/Tulkus have come from these four provinces. Even today, most of the [respected] teachers teaching in the monastic institutions of all the religious traditions of our community have come from these provinces; very few of them belong to the Tibet Autonomous Region. Therefore, we are saying that a uniform policy should be adopted for all of these areas since they share the same religion and culture. It is altogether a different matter if we are seeking separation or independence but we are not. We are simply saying that we be granted the freedom to preserve our own religion, culture and language within the larger framework of the People’s Republic of China. If, in due course of time, we get an opportunity to discuss about it in detail, then the Tibetans inside Tibet should take the main responsibility. Once they are able to engage in extensive discussions [with the Chinese government] without any fear in their minds, I do not think we will face any problems [in resolving the issue of Tibet]. In the case of the Tibet Autonomous Region, a few Chinese lived there prior to the 1950s. [The number grew later.] A considerable number of Chinese, however, have been living in Kham and Amdo regions, particularly in the area of my birth [Xining], since early times. Tibetans are not saying, and will never say, that Tibet should be occupied by exclusively Tibetans to the exclusion of all other nationalities, which includes [even] the Han Chinese. What is important is that since it carries the name ‘Tibetan Autonomous Region’ or ‘Tibetan Autonomous Areas’, the natives of these very places should constitute the majority and the rest of the nationalities the minority of the total population. It is for this very purpose that the name has been given. If, otherwise, the number of Chinese or other minority nationalities living in these places is more than the Tibetans, then there is no way such names as mentioned above could be given. We are hoping that we are able to establish a big family of friendship between the Chinese and Tibetan peoples based on over thousand years of relations with each other. We also hope and even pray that the People’s Republic of China flourishes with all its nationalities enjoying equality in a spirit of one big family.

**Question Three:** Last year, a television channel in France broadcast a documentary titled The Dalai Lama’s Demons, in which Shugden-worshipping Tibetan monks were shown to be thrown out of the Tibetan settlements in India. The situation has come to such a pass for these monks that they could not even visit shops
and hospitals as well as enter their monasteries at the time. In the documentary, you were also shown to be issuing a strict order that these Shugden-propitiating monks must be expelled from their monasteries. Moreover, one of the monks interviewed said: ‘On the one hand the Dalai Lama talks about the freedom of religious belief and compassion, but on the other hand he restricts our religious freedom and shows us out of our monasteries.’ What do you have to say about it?

**Answer:** GyalpoShugden came into existence during the time of the Great Fifth Dalai Lama. The Fifth Dalai Lama saw DorjeeShugden as ‘a vow-breaking demon/evil spirit born into such a state as a result of his wrong aspiration/negative prayer”. This is mentioned in the Collected Works of the Great Fifth, Volume K, an earlier edition block-printed in Tibet. So ‘wrong aspiration/negative prayer’ is what caused DorjeeShugden whose nature is but a ‘vow-breaking demon/evil spirit’ and whose actions are to ‘harm the Dharma and humanity’. This is admitted by the Dolgyal himself in his autobiography. Earlier I too propitiated Shugden. Later on as I studied the words of the Great Fifth, I came across the document cited above. I have, from my side also, conducted a series of investigations about it and found that it is not good to worship the spirit. Consequently I gave up the propitiation completely but did not, at that point of time, place any restrictions on the section of the Tibetan community who were practising it. Then the problem surfaced at the Jangtse College of the Gaden Monastery. Through my examinations, it became very clear to me that the problem at the Jangtse College was caused by its new initiative of propitiating GyalpoShugden. I communicated this to the concerned. When the issue became more public later on, some people began to spread the rumour that I was trying to curry favour with the Nyingma Tradition [of Tibetan Buddhism] and that I had not actually imposed any restrictions but simply pretended to do so. Under these circumstances, I had to come out in the open to express my strong objections to, and make things clear about, the worshipping of this evil spirit. No children of the Dolgyal followers have been expelled from the schools. If in the monasteries the worshippers and non-worshippers of Dolgyal assemble together, it does not go very well with the sanctity of the spiritual bond [that is so very essential in matters of spirituality]. Those who do not worship Dolgyal have all received spiritual teachings from me and those who
worship it are the ones who have some problem or disagreement with the Lama from whom they receive teachings. Therefore we are saying that we feel very uncomfortable to be associated with the Dolgyal followers. Apart from that, we have done nothing to throw them out of the Tibetan settlements. I urge all of you to come to India and visit the Tibetan settlements in South India to see for yourselves what the reality is. The Dolgyal followers have established their own separate monastery there and lead their lives like any other Tibetan. Nobody is creating problems for them. In short, what I am saying is that it is one’s freedom, in general, to practise or not to practise any religion. How one chooses to practise one’s religion is also one’s freedom. Therefore, whichever deity or demon one may worship, one may decide as one pleases. To say that the practice of the spirit in question is disadvantageous and it has no advantages whatsoever is my duty. Therefore, I have highlighted the negatives. Now it is up to the people to think over or decide for themselves whether they want to listen or not. A Chinese friend has raised this question. If you are interested in the subject, it is [really] your freedom [to worship or not to worship the spirit]. But you must carry out a proper investigation [before plunging into it]. Usually, our religious practitioners say that ‘one must develop a pure perception of one’s teacher and investigate [thoroughly] the religion one practises’. So religion must be subjected to investigation. For instance, Nagarjuna and other scholars [of the ancient Nalanda University] have shown through their example that even if they were the words of the Lord Buddha, they must be subjected to investigation for ascertaining their truthfulness. [The Buddhist concept of ‘Four Reliances’ says, among other things, that] one must ‘rely on the doctrine than on individuals’. So it is very important for all of you to investigate.

**Question Four:** During the 2008 Tibet incident, why did many monks and lay Tibetans raise their hands against the ordinary Chinese citizens? We must understand that it is the Chinese government which you are against [and not the ordinary Chinese citizens].

**Answer:** As far as I know, the first protest of 2008 in Tibet occurred in the afternoon of 10 March. This was then followed by more protest demonstrations on 11, 12 and 13 March of that year. The Chinese security people, from the very beginning, learned about these demonstrations as a result of which they blocked the road of the
monk protestors arriving from Drepung Monastery. On the morning of 14 March, the incident of setting shops on fire, hurling stones and destroying properties occurred. One foreign journalist, who had been an eye-witness to this incident, came to meet me [at Dharamsala] and told me: ‘Apart from video-taping the entire happening, the Chinese security personnel at the scene did nothing to stop them.’ The Chinese government’s propaganda about the 3-14 incident disregards the fact that the first protest broke out on 10 March. Moreover, according to reports they deliberately hired some mischievous people on the morning of 14 March to indulge in rioting, which they video-shot for later use in shifting the blame of the entire incident on the Tibetans. Tibetans arriving from Tibet after the March incident informed us that ‘Tibetans’ whom they had never seen earlier had been brought to Lhasa at that time. They further said that ‘these people were the main culprits who created the disturbances’. [I believe] this [unfortunate] incident should actually be investigated independently. This is one thing I want to say. [Another thing I want to say is that] in the monasteries of the Kham and Amdo regions, there is an ancient custom of keeping old swords, spears and rifles in the shrines of the guardian deities. I was informed that these weapons were forcefully taken out in order to blame the monasteries for using weapons to stir violence [in the country]. It is, in a way, very probable that a few people in their fits of anger may have unwittingly caused some inconveniences to the Chinese people [during that time]. If such a thing really happened, then I stand ready to apologise [on their behalf]. It is very likely indeed that some enraged Tibetans may have caused such a situation because at that time, the Chinese government tried [its level best] to create the false impression of the Tibetans as being anti-Chinese. Majority of the Tibetans would never do such a thing. Tibetans cannot be blamed for airing their grievances against the Chinese government policies. The Chinese government strikes hard upon the Tibetan people for the [only] reason that they are loyal to their religion and culture as well as their spiritual leader. This creates a feeling of hurt in the minds of the Tibetan people. This is also the reason why Tibetans are strongly critical of the Chinese government policies. You should not, however, take this as a form of Tibetan people’s animosity to the Chinese people. If what I have heard is indeed true, then Tibetans visiting the Chinese cities and towns seem to be facing a lot of problems after the 2008 March incident. This is because the Chinese hoteliers, shopkeepers
and restaurateurs in these places show a cold attitude to the Tibetan customers. Moreover, we have heard that a lone Tibetan member of a Chinese government delegation was stopped at the airport for interrogation. All these developments are a cause of disappointment for the Tibetan people.

**Question Five:** Was the ‘liberation of Tibet’ a deception from the beginning or did it change later?

**Answer:** It is difficult to say. When the People’s Liberation Army arrived in Chamdo, they fought with the Tibetan army and killed about seven to eight thousand Tibetan soldiers. KhenchungThuptenDhonyoe, who was a staff of the Governor General of Eastern Tibet at that time, told me that Wang Qiming, the PLA general (who ‘liberated’ Chamdo) said to him with tears in his eyes: ‘We, fraternal nationalities, have killed each other.’ I feel that some of them may have been genuine. Likewise, when the road from Kham to Central Tibet and Amdo to Central Tibet were being built, some people used their bodies to block water when floods took place. They worked hard. Those things, I feel, were genuine. For others I cannot say what their intentions were from the beginning. The best thing would be for historians to thoroughly study classified government documents, which will make things clear. That is the most important thing. In terms of overall policies, in 1954, I went to China and spent about five to six months in Beijing. At that time I met most of the Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, who I had met many times. I especially went to visit many Chinese provinces, during which I met many Chinese leaders, who were members of the Communist Party and had real revolutionary outlook and were genuinely working to serve the working class and the country. I saw many who had no desire for personal gain and were working for the common good. They impressed me. Mao, for instance, made many promises to me. However, from 1956-57 onwards, I felt that things were moving towards ultra-leftism.

**Question Six:** If in the future China will have a genuine democratic system, what would Tibet’s relations be with that government? What is your opinion?

**Answer:** Right now many of the unwanted problems, whether it is PRC’s external relations or issues within the country, I think, are
created by suspicion and lack of mutual trust. For the last 51 years, I have lived outside Tibet. From my many friends in the US, Europe, Japan and in India, I know that China has the desire to build good relations. But its failure to build genuine relationships is due to the lack of mutual trust. This, in turn, is the result of lack of transparency in China which, though, it outwardly pretends to have so. Hence many problems arise. Whether it is the issue of Tibet or Xinjiang, there is clearly a huge difference between the external impression that China gives and the real feelings that the people in these regions harbour. Therefore, once a time comes when China will have transparent, honest and just policies, many of the problems will naturally be solved. Regarding the Tibetan issue, if there is transparency and sincerity on the part of the Chinese government, we on our part are not seeking separation. We have a long history, but I am not thinking about it. If we think about the future, materially Tibet is behind others and therefore if we stay within the PRC, it will be beneficial for Tibet's development. Because of this we are not seeking separation. The most important thing is that Tibet has a unique culture, language and religion. Amongst the Buddhist traditions, many of the world's scholars today say that Tibetan Buddhism is the most extensive and profound. Tibetan language has become the best medium to articulate/express this profound and extensive philosophy. The translations – both in terms of literal translation (dragyur) and contextual translation (don gyur) – of the texts from the Sanskrit language are of the highest standard. Therefore, if we are able to maintain this religion and culture, it will also benefit the overall culture of the PRC. Generally speaking, China is also a Buddhist country. As the number of Chinese Buddhists is increasing these days, we will surely be able to contribute in this field. I think this is of mutual benefit.

**Question Seven:** If Tibet achieves genuine autonomy or wins independence, do you have plans to transform the system of governance in Tibet into a democratic one? How will religion and politics be separated?

**Answer:** I do not think this question needs a special answer. If you are interested, you can come to India. You will then actually see how we have carried out democratisation during our stay in exile, how we have set up a political system during the last 51 years and our future
programmes. For me personally, since 1969, I have been saying that the people should decide whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not. I have no worry. The most important thing is that we need to preserve and maintain the unique Tibetan religion and culture. In terms of Tibet’s development, it is very important not to harm the natural environment. Tibet’s environment is fragile and susceptible to damage. Because of the high altitude and dry wind, it is said that once damage occurs, it will take a long period to restore the ecological balance. This is a special issue that you must pay attention to. The glaciers in the high Tibetan Plateau are the main source of many of the great rivers in Asia. That is why we should take special care of them.

Question Eight: What do you think will happen to Tibetan unity once you are no longer in the scene? Will the charisma of your successors be able to control the Tibetan nationalists to retain the non-violent and peaceful nature of your struggle?

Answer: It will make no difference. For over 30 years I have been saying that Tibetan religious and political leaders must take responsibility as if I am no longer with them. They have been doing it and that is how they acquire experience. There is a new leadership after every five years. There will be a new political leader next year directly elected by the people. In the religious field, there are heads of each Buddhist school to take responsibility. There is no difference whether I am with them or not.

Question Nine: You say that there should be a democratic system for Tibet. However, when you and your predecessors ruled Tibet did you rule democratically? If not, what confidence do you have to rule Tibet more democratically than Communist China?

Answer: The First to the Fourth Dalai Lamas did not take part in politics. The Fifth Dalai Lama became the temporal and religious leader of Tibet. At that time there were no such thing as democratic system in Tibet’s neighbours like China, India and Russia. They were all largely feudal societies. However Tibet had a strong Buddhist tradition and the principle of developing compassion for all sentient beings. That is why, in 1959, when the ‘landlords’ were put under struggle sessions following the ‘Democratic Reforms’, there were many ‘serfs’ who came forward to save the lives of their ‘landlords’.
Many of the ‘landlords’ were also able to escape into exile in India with the help of their ‘serfs’. Therefore, ‘serfs’ may be a common phenomenon in all these feudal countries, but the treatment of Tibetan ‘serfs’ was different. At the end of 1955, ‘Democratic Reforms’ were carried out in Tibet starting from Sichuan. As elsewhere in China, ‘Democratic Reforms’ were carried out in Tibet, which did not suit the Tibetan situation. Such things happened. It is important to investigate these things. You do not have to believe these things because I said them. If you have the freedom later to investigate it is important to do so thoroughly. In the later stages of his life, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama thought about introducing a democratic system in Tibet, but he was unable to carry it out. In 1952, when I was in Lhasa we formed the Reform Committee to make a number of changes to our taxation and loan systems. But we were only able to carry out some of them. Since I already had thoughts about carrying out reforms from the time I was in Tibet, we established a democratic system immediately after we came into exile in India. I have no intention of holding any post when Tibetans in and outside are reunited. I made this clear in 1992 that when there will be autonomy or a considerable degree of freedom for Tibet, we will return. However, I said, from that time onwards I will not take any responsibility and will hand over all my historical responsibility to the local government. Even now that is my thinking and I will never take any political roles.

**Question Ten:** What is your view on the Chinese who are settled in Tibet and the second-generation of Chinese living there? It is possible that your ‘High Level of Autonomy’ may end up marginalising them, which is the concern of those Chinese inside Tibet who are opposing you and the Tibetan administration in exile.

**Answer:** Tibet is an autonomous region. In that region Tibetans cannot become a minority. Otherwise, we will applaud however many Chinese brothers and sisters decide to stay there. Particularly, we will appreciate those Chinese brothers and sisters who are interested in Tibetan religion and culture. I normally say that Chinese brothers and sisters can cook us delicious food and we Tibetans can provide spiritual food to them through Buddhism. That is why there is absolutely no reason to worry. Then there are those Chinese who look down upon Tibetans by considering Tibetan Buddhism as bad and the Tibetans as dirty. For them, there is no
reason to live in such a filthy place; it is better for them to return to cleaner places. Tibet predominantly practises Buddhism and in Buddhism there is totally no reference to racial discrimination. Earlier in Tibet, many of the abbots in monasteries were Mongolians and there were Chinese studying Buddhist scriptures as well. We were of different races but there was no discrimination whatsoever. Likewise, if there are religious scholars amongst Chinese, they too can become abbots and Lamas in Tibet. There is no difference at all.

Note: This is translated from the Tibetan. If there is any discrepancy between this and the Tibetan version, please treat the latter as authoritative and final.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s response to questions from Mainland China during a video conference on 4 January 2011


Questions put forward to His Holiness the Dalai Lama by Chinese people from various cities in Mainland China.

1. Your Holiness, what is your view about Ngabo Ngawang Jigme? He was the representative delegated by you to negotiate with the People’s Republic of China and also the one who signed the 17-Point Agreement [in 1951]. Even if you had not granted him [plenipotentiary] powers [to sign the Agreement], you had later accepted that agreement. Eventually, most of the time, he stood against you and acted like the spokesperson of the Chinese government on the Tibet issue.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: I knew Ngabo even before 1950. People who knew Ngabo at that time viewed him as an honest person, someone of integrity. I also viewed Ngabo as progressive and trusted him. He was then one of the main people who had my trust and confidence. After the signing of the Agreement, when I met Ngabo in Lhasa, he told me that they were compelled to sign that Agreement because, had they refused to sign, it would have resulted in an ‘armed liberation’ of Tibet. Thus, he felt that a ‘peaceful liberation’ was better than an ‘armed liberation’. He, however, also said that when they signed the Agreement, even though they were carrying the Chamdo governor’s official seal, they did not use it. They instead had to use a forged seal provided by the Chinese government.

Similarly, in 1979, after Deng Xiaoping displayed significant flexibility, I dispatched fact-finding delegations to Tibet. At that time, when my delegates met Ngabo, he told them to be aware about the fact that whether in times of the Qing dynasty, or for that matter, the rule of Guomintang, places within the territory of GandenPhodrang [Government of Tibet] never paid taxes to them. Ngabo thus gave a clear indication of his patriotism.
Similarly, in 1989, during a session of Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress, Ngabo refuted as factually incorrect the official Chinese paper claiming that the Nanjing government (of Guomintang) made all the decisions regarding the enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, as well as on matters relating to the identification and recognition of the Dalai Lama. Ngabo said that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama was recognized by the regent of Tibet in accordance with religious tradition and that there was no foreign presider at the enthronement ceremony. The aforesaid claims, Ngabo said, were not true as asserted by the Guomintang officials. Even though I was a minor at the time of the enthronement, I still vividly remember that there were representatives of British India, China, Nepal and Bhutan uniformly seated in one row. Thus, in these matters, Ngabo had done his best in clarifying the actual facts. Following his demise, we organized a memorial service. In fact, some of our friends criticized our memorial service for him as inappropriate. We all know it is a fact that people under fear are forced to speak diplomatically according to the given circumstances. This is the reason why I always had complete trust in him. Even though he has now passed away, I always pray for him.

2. Your Holiness, are you losing control over the behaviour of a few Tibetans in exile? What do you think if that happens and how are you going to work on this?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: There are over 150,000 Tibetans living in exile, out of which perhaps 99 percent share common concern and sincerity on the issue of Tibet. Of course, there will be difference of opinions and it should exist since here we are following the path of democracy. I tell my people that they have the right to freedom of speech and freedom of thought, and they should express themselves freely. So there will be different opinions. Take the example of the Tibetan Youth Congress. They struggle for independence and criticize our Middle-Way policy. During my occasional meetings with them, I tell them ‘the Chinese government expects that I should arrest some of you’, but we cannot do such things here in a free country and I would never do such a thing.

3. My question to you, my teacher, is the struggle of non-violence and truth (non-cooperation) effective in confronting communist China? If yes, in what ways the Tibetan people are benefited by
non-violence and truth?

**His Holiness the Dalai Lama:** I always tell the same thing to Tibetans. And I want to mention here that even though our consistent stand of middle-way policy based on the foundation of non-violence has not yielded tangible result through dialogue with the Chinese government, it has helped us in getting strong support from the Chinese intellectuals, students and those who are interested in and aware of the reality. This is the result of my efforts.

It is difficult to deal with the Chinese government, but I think despite our inability to maintain extensive contacts with the Chinese intellectuals and public, our stand will win their support and it will continue to grow. It was some months after the Tiananmen event, I met some Chinese friends at Harvard University as I happened to be at that time in the US. After I explained to them our position, they said the entire Chinese people would support the stand of the Dalai Lama if they know about it.

4. Your Holiness, please explain how reforming the system of reincarnating lamas is permissible? Does such a reform contravene the Buddha's teachings?

**His Holiness the Dalai Lama:** From the outset, I want to ask the questioner to read a little of the Buddha’s teachings as contained in Kagyu (teachings of the Buddha) and Tengyur (Commentaries by Buddhist masters). The custom of recognizing reincarnate lamas did not develop in India. Similarly, the tradition of reincarnation of lamas did not develop in many Buddhist countries such as Thailand, Burma and China. There is a system of recognizing someone as a reincarnation of an enlightened being, but the system of recognizing someone as Tulku or Lama does not exist. In Tibet, the first ever reincarnation was recognized after a little child who clearly remembered his past life and which was proved to be true. Later on, this system slowly and gradually nearly became a class structure in society. Because of this I have made it well known that there is a difference between Tulku and Lama. A Lama need not be a Tulku and a Tulku need not be a Lama or one could be both Lama and Tulku. The one who is qualified as a result of one’s own study and practice is known as Lama. A Tulku, even without such a standard of education, enjoys status in society in the name of the former Lama. And there are many
who lack the Lama’s qualification and even bring disgrace. So I used to say since some forty years ago that there needs to be some system to regulate the recognition of Tulku. Otherwise it is not good to have many unqualified ones.

I consider my interest in the system of reincarnation as a service to the Buddha’s teachings. In the case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, the four hundred year old tradition of the Dalai Lama as both spiritual and temporal leader ended with the direct election of political leadership by the Tibetans in exile in 2001. In 1969, I made it well known in my official statement that whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not would be decided by the Tibetan people. In future, to decide whether to have the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation and if there is a need, it is not necessary to always follow the past precedence but we can act in accordance with the given circumstances. This conforms to the teachings of the Buddha and do not go against them. When I explain about the possibility of reincarnation of Lamas in general and that of the Dalai Lama in particular, some Tibetans from inside Tibet and as well as Chinese friends wonder if this is in line with our religious tradition.

5. At present there are a lot of people in China who have a deep-seated anger and animosity to you. What do you have to say to them?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: At one point the Dalai Lama was called a demon. On a few occasions I was asked what I thought on the Dalai Lama being called a demon and I told them in good humor, “I am a demon. I have horns on my head”.

This is understandable since the Chinese people have access only to one-sided and distorted information. For example during the Olympic torch relay, I especially requested the concerned people that the Olympic Games were a matter of pride for the 1.3 billion Chinese people and that we must never create any problem. Moreover, even before the right of hosting the Olympic Games was awarded to China, when I was visiting the US capital city of Washington, D.C., some journalists asked me about my viewpoint. I told them that China being the most populous country with a rich cultural heritage and history was worthy of hosting the Games. This is a factual account.
But still the Chinese government greatly publicized that we were creating obstacles for the Olympic Games. Because of such propaganda, the Chinese people are not aware of the entire situation and thus we cannot blame them.

While on the other side, there are many people around the world who respect me. Therefore, I want to urge my Chinese brothers and sisters to examine the minute details and thoroughly research the information you receive from all sources. When I meet Chinese students, I tell them that being in a free country they should fully utilize both eyes and ears.

6. As far as we know, the central government of the Republic of China participated in the selection process and enthronement ceremony of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. So, Your Holiness, do you recognize the Taiwan-based Republic of China and how much of an influence do you think the Taiwan government will again have in the reincarnation process?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: It is similar to my earlier account of Ngabo’s story. Generally, when I am in Taiwan, I have supported the call for ‘One China’. But eventually it is up to the people of mainland China and Taiwan to decide whether they want to be united in the future. What is more important is that Taiwan’s democracy, its robust economy and Taiwan’s good standard of education should be properly safeguarded. This is what I usually say.

Wang Lixiong: We have virtually seen the Dalai Lama, just that, as Your Holiness said we could not smell each other. Using the Internet in the 21st century, we consider this opportunity of interacting with Your Holiness as of fundamental importance. Thus, if interactions like these are deemed constructive for Sino-Tibetan relations and understanding each other further, then in the future I think and I hope that many Chinese scholars and concerned people will take part. TashiDelek.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: Very good. If it is convenient for you, I am always available and fully prepared to interact using modern technology and clear the doubts of Chinese friends. I always say,
“Han zang da tuanjie” (Friendly relations between Chinese and Tibetans).

If we get the opportunity of frequently holding similar meetings and interactions, it will help build genuine trust and understanding amongst us. We will not be able to build trust by standing far apart. The clearer we discuss our issues the more trust we will gain in each other. If there is trust then there will be cordial relations and with cordial relations, even if there is a problem, we can solve it.

Can you see my face clearly? Can see my grey eyebrows? See you later. Tashi Delek. Thank You.

**N.B.** Translated from the Tibetan original. In case of any discrepancy please consider the Tibetan as final and authoritative.