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# TIBET 2020: A YEAR IN REVIEW



བོ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་ལྷན་ཁག་གི་འཛིན་པ།  
TIBET POLICY INSTITUTE

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## Forward

I am pleased that the Tibet Policy Institute is able to bring out the first issue of the annual review for the year 2020.

The year 2020 has been extremely disruptive across the world, caused primarily by the pandemic. In the case of Tibet, apart from disruptions caused by the pandemic, China initiated implementation of policies that are directly linked to its integrationist objectives.

This is seen in China's 14<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan, where it has outlined infrastructure development, particularly along the Indo-Tibet border. China also implemented a new "ethnic unity" regulation in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. This imposes further restrictions on Tibet and is an attempt to use laws to steer Tibetans towards towing Communist Party of China's line. More crucially, the 7th Tibet work forum was convened in Beijing. The forum has signalled renewed emphasis on "patriotic education" and sinicization of Tibetan culture.

In the same year, border disputes along Indo-Tibet border erupted between India and China. The escalation of this border dispute reflects China's strategic interest in the Himalayas. At the same time, it exposed China's illegal occupation of Tibet. These are some of the key issues analysed and documented in this issue.

Freedom House has listed Tibet for six successive years as the second least free regions in the world. Under such an environment, credible information coming out of Tibet has remained a real challenge. Despite facing such difficulties, I commend my colleagues at the Tibet Policy Institute for working on this annual flagship issue. I hope the readers will find it useful and this issue will serve as an important documentation for posterity.

Dawa Tsering  
Director  
Tibet Policy Institute

## Preface

We are delighted to bring forth the maiden issue of the annual review for the year 2020.

During the process of putting together this issue, we squared up with few methodological stumbling blocks. Having considered forgoing appropriation of extra editorial pages, I felt it necessary to outline them and perhaps it will spark ideas to further fine-tune methodological challenges on researching contemporary Tibet.

Since 2017, when the Freedom House started to categorize Tibet as a territory in their annual reports, Tibet has been listed as the second least free regions in the world, faring marginally better than Syria.

Conclusions from these reports, corroborated by other independent research findings put Tibet-watchers and researchers in an unenviable position. Where information gathering and collection of data from Tibet hemmed by the mighty Himalayas has become increasingly challenging. Himalayas in this context is a metaphor for People's Republic of China's reinforcement of securitization and further criminalization of Tibetans within Tibet for communicating with their compatriots in exile.

Overwhelming intellectual output based on empirical research on economy, development and education in contemporary Tibet are generated through close and critical reading of Party-sanctioned periodicals. Apart from a discernible body of ethnographic studies outside of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, there is still a dearth of comprehensive research on these fields.

Obvious and primary reason for such poverty of knowledge on contemporary Tibet is the heavy restrictions imposed on researchers and journalists to visit Tibet and conduct on-field independent studies. Here at the margins of empirical methodology, reading official documents against their grain provides limited yet useful insights into the structure and practices involved in PRC's rule over Tibet.

Much of what is already been written about contemporary Tibet will have to be rewritten with new evidences coming to light. As with the case with modern Tibetan history, histories of the period since China's invasion of Tibet had been hugely reliant on the archaeology of memories. Commitment to memory serves as a crucial vector through which historical truth is transmitted. This leads us to a question worth asking, when will the archive of suppression see the light?

The wave of decoloniality is sweeping across disciplinary lines and the field of Tibetan studies is equally exposed to this current which is shaping discourses. Voices calling for decolonization within the field of Tibetan studies is starting to gain traction. However, such praxis must be preceded by recognition of a structure of governance that is currently operating in Tibet. And this is in essence, a challenge in researching and documenting on contemporary Tibet.

For instance, China since its invasion of Tibet, it has imposed an administrative structure in Tibet. Through cartographic innovation, Tibetan territory or let's say Tibet's geobody was sliced and clubbed with other Chinese provinces, thereby provincializing Tibet. This is not limited to territory and administrative structure, but also with the categorization of peoples. This categorization of peoples has reduced diversity within its assumed borders into a neat 56 "ethnic groups." For any grandiose discussions around decolonizing Tibet, it must come with the acknowledgment that these forms of knowledge production are alien and were imposed on Tibetans following the invasion of Tibet.

With these random thoughts, I must extend my deep appreciation and gratitude to the members of the editorial team: Tenzin Lhadon, Palden Sonam and Tenzin Tsultrim. They have been instrumental in shaping this issue. And also, to our colleague Ngawang Choekyi for her skilful typesetting. We reserve our thanks to our former Director, Tenzin Lekshay for tabling the idea and to our current Director, Dawa Tsering for seeing through this project. Most significantly, to our colleagues at the Tibet Policy Institute, we thank you for contrubuting to this issue.

To conclude, we disclaim that all conclusions drawn in the pieces published here are that of the respective contributors.

Tenzin Desal  
Dharamshala



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## POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT INSIDE TIBET

### 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan of China: Securing Political Stability in Tibet\*

China's Five-Year Plan is an important component for its planned economy and is observed closely by China watchers, investors and policy analysts. Starting from 1953, under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong, China has embarked on a plan to develop its economy through its first Five-Year Plan (FYP). The first Five-Year Plan was largely based on the Soviet economic model. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), this is the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan. The 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan is its latest plan to develop its economy and secure China's place in the world. The plan was drafted during the fifth plenum of the 19<sup>th</sup> Central Committee held from 26 to 29 October 2020. This was held amidst the backdrop of COVID-19 pandemic and its dented image in the world because of its poor handling of pandemic and contestation over the origins and extent of COVID-19 pandemic within China.<sup>1</sup> The plan was adopted on 11 March, 2021 by the National People's Congress (NPC). From the official website of NPC and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), it seems clear that the General Secretary Xi Jinping has the last word in deciding the fate of China. The website reported that, "Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, led the proposals' formulation himself. He undertook field research and hosted seven symposiums from July to September in 2020, taking account of people's suggestions from all walks of life."<sup>2</sup>

The plan consists of 19 sections (篇), 65 chapters (章), and 175 sub-sections (节). The largest number is dedicated to strengthening China's domestic socio-economic foundations (14%), and to supporting technology and innovation.<sup>3</sup> Hence, one may expect a huge investment by the Chinese government in developing surveillance-oriented software and technologies. According to the report published by Mercator Institute for China Studies, it says:

The party state under Xi Jinping is geared towards stability and security more than ever. In its attempt to streamline and control China's heterogenous population under a CCP-defined vision of society, it is disenfranchising political, ethnic and other minorities, and risks to deepen existing rifts in society. In pursuit of this control, it is deploying its favoured power tools, centralization, mobilization and control. The sustainability of this type of authoritarianism

is unclear. Despite Beijing's narrative of China's superior model of governance, it invests vast and growing amounts of resources into a ballooning security apparatus –desperately trying to extinguish any threat to stability.<sup>4</sup>

From the above report it is clear that in order to secure security and stability, Beijing is willing to invest heavily in strengthening its surveillance technologies. In doing so, the Tibetan people and other suppressed groups will be further marginalised and suppressed in the name of securing the so-called "social stability."

#### **Social Stability through Surveillance, Digitalization and Centralization of Information**

In the 14th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government has emphasised the weakness in the social governance and more specifically the Chinese government has planned to strengthen the social

+ By Tenzin Tsultrim, Palden Sonam and Dechen Palmo

\*The English translation of the text by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) on the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan is being referenced and cited.

governance at the grassroots level. It says:

New gains will be made in the effectiveness of national governance. Socialist democracy and socialist rule of law will be made more robust, and social fairness and justice will be further manifested; the national administrative system will be further refined, the government will play its role better, and its administrative efficiency and credibility will be increased significantly; and the level of social governance, especially at the grassroots level, will be significantly improved.

It is clear that in order to achieve Party's objectives, the Chinese government is planning to instrumentalise law by making it "more robust" for social governance. In 2011, the Chinese government deployed around 21,000 Chinese officials to villages across Tibet. The officials have carried out intrusive surveillance of Tibetans in villages, including questioning them about their political and religious views, subjecting thousands to political indoctrination, establishing party security units to monitor behaviours, and collecting information that could lead to detention or other punishment.<sup>5</sup> Hence, from the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, one may conclude that the party-state is planning to restrengthen their grip on most of the invaded-countries, including Tibet. Preserving social stability has been given the highest priority for the Chinese government in its 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan. In the plan, the party-state declared that:

We will correctly handle contradictions among the people (人民内部矛盾) under the new situation, strengthen social safety (社会治安) [incident] prevention and control, and weave a comprehensive, three-dimensional, and intelligentized social safety net.<sup>6</sup>

By this, Beijing plans to strengthen the digitalisation and centralization of information all over China. However, the intensity of surveillance will be tighter in Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia. For instance, in 2018, the Chinese officials

introduced the big data system which keeps real-time surveillance by tracking tourists and the Tibetan people. The big data centre was jointly built by Tibet University's Information and Technology School and a Beijing-based Wiseweb Technology Company, one of China's leading companies that provide big data smart software and services. It was officially launched in early September 2018. Wang Sheng, deputy manager of Wiseweb was quoted in the Global Times saying, "The real time monitoring could give a warning to the government on negative social events."<sup>7</sup> In the plan too, they have professed about the developing digital society and digital government for a better governance and monitoring. The 14<sup>th</sup> FYP says:

We will welcome the digital age, activate the potential of data factors of production, promote the construction of a cyber powerhouse (网络强国), accelerate the construction of a digital economy, digital society, and digital government, and leverage digital transformations to drive overall changes in production methods, lifestyles, and governance.

The Plan further emphasised their strict implementation and utilization of both professionals and the masses in the prevention of any incidents which has the potential to disrupt the law and order. It is similar to its earlier slogan used by the Chinese officials in Tibet in 2012, where it declared that "every village is a fortress and everyone is a watchman" (ཁྲོད་ཆོ་ཚང་མ་མཁའ་རྩོད་དང་མི་ཚང་མ་སྟོན་དམག). This particular operation requires every community and every resident in Tibet to be active participants in "stability maintenance" work. Through this, all residents must report any threats to stability, such as the arrival of outsiders or expressions of dissent, and must participate actively in security operations within their residential areas.<sup>8</sup> Following are the recent re-emergence of this similar operation in the China's 14th Five-Year Plan:

We will adhere to combining the efforts of both professionals and the masses in mass prevention and mass governance (群防群治), improve the level of three dimensionality, rule of law, professionalization, and intelligentization of social safety, form working mechanisms for the joint governance of problems, work linkage, and cocreation of safety, and improve the social safety [incident] prevention and control system.<sup>9</sup>

Not only this, the social management practice introduced by Mao Zedong called “Fengqiao experience,” an approach to governance that involves mobilization of masses, too gained more ground in the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan. Because in 2013, it was praised by Xi Jinping for its effectiveness in solving different problems from the source. And hence, the Plan promised that:

We will adhere to and develop the “Fengqiao experience” for the new era and build an integrated social conflict governance system with prevention at the source, arrangement and sorting, dispute resolution, and emergency handling.<sup>10</sup>

From its 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, China plans to achieve what Xi Jinping calls “dual circulation strategy” or “dual economy” and become a superpower. One of the main strategies to become a “superpower” was to strengthen its domestic base. Hence, in the years to come, one may expect a sudden surge in the centralization and digitalization of information and control through science and technology. Because, without political stability there is no economic stability.

### **Securing Security of China Through Enforced Stability in Tibet**

According to Professor Dawa Norbu, “China began to perceive Tibet as “the back-door” to China, as “the lips of the mouth.” If the backdoor was opened and occupied by a foreign power, China could not feel safe and secure.<sup>11</sup> Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was swift and strategic that soon after gaining power in China,

Tibet was invaded. For China, Tibet may have been its vulnerable underbelly, however because of its geostrategic position and its rich resources blessed by nature with minerals and water is another reason for the resurgent China to invade Tibet. In short, for China, Tibet has to be secured at any cost.

General Secretary Xi Jinping too re-emphasised the importance of Tibet for the security and stability in China. During the Sixth Work Forum on Tibet held from August 24 and 25, 2015, where Xi remarked that “governing border areas is the key for governing a country, and stabilizing Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”<sup>12</sup> Hence, the importance of Tibet and development of infrastructures across Tibet and its bordering areas in the form of multiple projects like, border villages, border towns and border airports. In a nutshell, the party-state plans to:

We will improve comprehensive transportation corridors, strengthen the construction of strategic backbone corridors out of Xinjiang and into Tibet, in the central and western regions, and along rivers, coasts, and borders, promote the upgrade and expansion of capacity-tight corridors in an orderly way, and strengthen interconnections with neighbouring countries.<sup>13</sup>

In short, the party-state has employed different strategies to control the so-called “social stability” in Tibet through different social engineering operations. For instance, through the grid-management, they have created a situation, where it is mandatory for the Tibetans to report on any ‘suspicious activities’ within their neighbourhood. Through their imposed development on Tibet and its complete failure to win the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people, the party-state is deploying thousands of Chinese officials and cadres to stay and “help” the Tibetan people in their daily chores. The main objective is to delve into the minds of the Tibetan people. Now the party-state has sharpened their strategies and declared that they intend to:

We will focus on forging a strong community consciousness of the Chinese nation (中华民族共同体意识), increase support for the development of ethnic minority regions, carry out comprehensive, in-depth, and lasting propaganda, education and creation of national unity and progress, and promote exchanges and integration among all ethnic groups.<sup>14</sup>

Through its 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, now the party-state has made it clear that they now intend to eliminate the source of social instability by eradicating the sense of Tibetan identity among the younger generations through intensive indoctrination and propaganda. In the years to come, the party-state may vigorously invest heavily and deploy the Chinese officials, cadres to the homes of Tibetan people along the Tibet-India border.

### **China's 14<sup>th</sup> FYP Indicates More Strategic Infrastructure Development in Tibet**

According to its 14<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (FYP 2021-2025), China is set to continue with its strategic development in Tibet. There are several factors in Beijing's insatiable desire to build more strategic infrastructures in Tibet—primarily driven by its colonial, resource management policies in Tibet and international geopolitics. To put aside its historical claim and ideological justification, it reaffirms the fact that China's occupation of Tibet was driven by its strategic interests in Tibet as a source of rich natural resources and a great strategic area for both expansion and security. The continuous investments in major strategic infrastructures in Tibet is to further integrate Tibet with China, exploit its resources and to solidify China's geostrategic position in Tibet and the Himalayan regions particularly *vis-a-vis* India. The current Five-Year Plan indicates China's intention in deepening and expanding its strategic footprints in Tibet with extension of roads, railways, airports and technology.

The 14th FYP shows China's interests in expanding connectivity between Tibet and East

Turkistan (Xinjiang) with railway lines in addition to highway links. It is mentioned in its current FYP that China will 'strengthen the construction of strategic backbone corridors out of Xinjiang and into Tibet' which includes upgradation and extension of the G219 (Xinjiang-Tibet) and G331 (Dadong to Altay) national highways as well as the G318 Sichuan-Tibet Highway.<sup>15</sup> Interestingly, all these strategic highways run parallel to one another along Tibet's border with India.

As a part of connections along and across borders, China also plans to connect Metok Dzong/མེ་རྟོག་རྫོང་། (Ch: Metog) in Lhoka/ལྷོ་ཁ། (Ch: Shannan) to the Yunnan-Tibet boundary via Dzayul/རྩ་ཡུལ། (Ch: Chayu) with highways.<sup>16</sup> In Tibet, the emphasis has been to improve strategic highways at the borders—particularly at the disputed areas. Beijing also makes it clear that it is going to 'accelerate the construction of highways along and to the borders' in its FYP.

The other important strategic infrastructure is the railway. Besides the highway connection, China wants to link Xinjiang and Tibet with a railway line. Under its strategic backbone channels, Beijing says it will construct the Sichuan-Tibet Railway from Yak-Nga/ཡག་ངག་རྟ། Ya'an to Nyingtri/ཉིང་ཁྱི། (Ch: Nyingchi/ Linzhi), Yining (Ghulja) to Aksu, Jiuquan to Ejina, Ruoqiang to Lop Nur in Xinjiang. It also plans to promote the preliminary work of the གཤིས་ཀྱི་རྩེ་/Shigatse-Jiji 1 and Hotan-Shigatse railways.<sup>17</sup>

This ambitious plan sets to connect all non-Chinese or 'minority regions' like Tibet, Southern Mongolia and East Turkistan with railway lines. In this context, the Hotan-Shigatse railway will be interesting as it is going to be the first direct railway connection between the two regions under Chinese occupation. China wants to develop Shigatse as a railway transportation hub where Tibet will be connected with railway lines to Xinjiang, Nepal and possibly with Pakistan too in the future if Beijing finds it strategically viable. It is also stated in the FYP that it will



‘support Tibet in building an important channel of opening up to South Asia.’ China’s interest in building highways and railway lines along and to borders in Xinjiang and Tibet is not just to connect the two regions but also to integrate them into its geopolitical gambit of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under the BRI project, China proposes to ‘increase investment in infrastructure in the western region’ which will likely be in strategic channels like highways, railway lines and also airports.

The 14<sup>th</sup> FYP also contains some major airport projects which include ‘regional airports, general airports, and cargo airports’ as well as about 20 general border airports. Among them, an airport at Lhuntse/ལུན་ཅེ་རྫོང་། (Ch: Longzi) in Lhoka is included. China also plans to build airports in Dhingri/དེང་རྒྱ། (Ch: Tingri) near the sacred Mount Kailash and Purang/པུར་རྒྱ། (Ch: Burang) in Ngari.<sup>18</sup>

As far as airports in border region in Tibet are concerned, China have already completed at least three airports; མལ་ལྷོ་རྫོང་།/ Mainling Airport in Nyingtri, Peace Airport in Shigatse and Gunsar/གུང་ས་ཁ། airport in Ngari. All these airports are next to Tibet’s international border; Shigatse next to Nepal, Ngari adjacent to Ladakh and Nyingtri next to Arunachal of India respectively –both areas are claimed and contested by China as parts of Tibet. A border port at Dram/འབྲུག་མ། (Ch: Zhangmu) in Nyalam county /གཤམ་ལམ་རྫོང་། is to be upgraded and it serves as a treaty port between Tibet and Nepal.

These border airports are products of China’s strategic development in Tibet to contain Tibetan resistance and also to consolidate China’s strategic height on and over the Himalayas. Therefore, all airports are dual-use airports—catering both civilian purposes in peace time and military logistics in war time. The same logic applies to the highways and railway lines as well.

In other Tibetan territories divided and ruled within Chinese provinces, some Chinese official sources reported number of projects being started under the FYP. For example, China has

begun the construction of Serchen Airport/གསེར་ཆེན་གནས་ཐང་། in Tsolho (Ch: Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous prefecture in Tso-ngo མཚོ་ལྷོ་རྫོང་། (Ch: Qinghai) Amdo.<sup>19</sup> It was also reported in Chinese official sources works on the extension of Yulshul Airport at Palthang/དཔལ་ཐང་། (Ch: Batang) in Kham (also in Qinghai) has begun.<sup>20</sup> The construction of new airports and extension of existing ones in Tibet have been touted by China for better governance, national unity, political stability and border security.

In addition to the strategic border infrastructures like highways, railways and airports, in its FYP, China included the promotion of prosperity and stability of the border and improving the work and living conditions in border areas as well as the system of cities and towns along the border which include the construction of border villages.<sup>21</sup> In the context of Tibet, China is to continue the construction of border villages close to the disputed areas in Lhoka and Ngari to increase population density at the border as civilian bulwarks in its contestation with India. It is reported in multiple media reports that it has constructed illegal military outposts and villages in Bhutanese and Indian territories and the trend is likely to continue in the future with completion of new railway lines to the border.<sup>22</sup>

Another critical infrastructure which is relevant in Tibet is the increasing application of technology in governance—particularly in surveillance. China is to strengthen its ‘R&D for key cybersecurity technologies, accelerate the innovation of Artificial Intelligence(AI), security technology, and enhance the comprehensive competitiveness of the cybersecurity industry.’ Beijing has already established one of the most sophisticated surveillance systems in Tibet powered with AI such as facial and voice recognition technology. In the future, it will work on more intrusive surveillance technologies to do predicting policing. China is also testing a technology in Xinjiang against the Uighurs which can detect and analyze people’s emotions.<sup>23</sup> More of such surveillance technologies will make way into the

private homes and public spaces in Tibet.

China has plans to develop ‘smart home’, which includes technical means such as sensor control, voice control, and remote control and smart home appliances like smart lighting and smart security monitoring.<sup>24</sup> In Xinjiang, Chinese authorities put QR codes outside the door of people’s homes which can detect who live in a particular house and also who visit there. Given the totalitarian nature of the Chinese system, these different home applications/appliances can be easy targets to snoop on people’s lives and collect personal information including people’s thoughts and beliefs which can be used against them by the authorities.

Indeed, the development of so-called smart home is a systematic attempt by a totalitarian regime to monitor and control people’s thoughts and activities even when they are in their dining and bed rooms with next generation technologies linked with AI. All these ‘smart’ applications/appliances can be different sources of data collection for the government. China already has an advanced computer system called ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ which stores people’s information data. With Huawei, it is (if not already) developing a technology for a One Person, One File system which can make the existing Social Credit System more targeted, systematic, sophisticated and efficient. The strategy is to develop what it calls as “Smart Identification System.”<sup>25</sup> For the one-party dictatorship, the data-driven governance is seen as efficient means to augment its existing control and surveillance system to beef up regime security.

#### **14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan: China’s Policies on Tibet’s Environment**

In most of the Chinese government’s official papers related to the environment, Beijing claims that they attach great importance to ecological improvement and environmental protection in Tibet. However, it appears to have eluded the Chinese authorities that the environmental sustainability of the Tibetan plateau is directly linked to the long-term economic sustainability of China.

Even in the 14<sup>th</sup> five-year plan, Beijing has highlighted that the Tibetan plateau plays an important role in “ecological civilization.” The protection of Tibet’s environment has been given due importance in their plan but there are many suspicions that the motivation is less about the protection of Tibet’s ecology than exploitation for their own economic benefits.

#### **National Park and Hydropower in the 14<sup>th</sup> FYP: Policies Related to Tibet**

##### **National Parks**

The 14<sup>th</sup> FYP stresses on building nature reserve systems with national parks as the main entities. Nature reserves are the foundation and various natural parks are supplements. The FYP calls for strict controls on “non-ecological” activities within natural reserves, with an orderly removal of residents, cultivated land, and mining rights in the core areas.

Although there were around 10 pilot national parks established in China and Tibet, Sanjiangyuan National Park is the largest pilot program under China’s national park system. Sanjiangyuan (གཙང་གསལ་འབྲུང་ཁུངས་རང་འབྲུང་སྤང་རྒྱུ་ཁུལ།) meaning the “source of three rivers,” is home to the headwaters of the Drichu (Yangtze River), Machu (Yellow River), and Zachu (Lancang River). This Sanjiangyuan pilot national park was first established in Qinghai in 2000. The pilot operation of this National Park began in 2016, and the official construction started in 2018. This was officially declared established in 2020.<sup>26</sup> It covers a total area of 123,100 square km, which includes two prefectures, four counties, and 53 villages, and is home to more than 70,000 herdsmen.<sup>27</sup>

Why China is showing much interest in nature reserves or national parks? Why such a big national park like Sanjiangyuan? And why on the Tibetan plateau? There’s no clear answer. However, the creation of the national park and nature reserves system in the Tibetan plateau results in the large-scale removal of Tibetan nomads from their

grassland habitat. The creation of national parks are directly linked to the land rights of Tibetan nomads. After declaring them as National Parks, China now have the legal wherewithal to resettle Tibetan nomads into urbanized ghettos.<sup>28</sup>

Dr. Peng Kui, a project officer with the Global Environment Institute, told China Dialogue that in his studies of trials of national parks in the Three Rivers Source area on the Tibetan plateau, he found that the core areas were largely pastures for herders, and their removal would incur heavy economic and social costs. “The loss of appropriate human intervention, of fertilisation by livestock, of management, means that removal of residents may actually harm the grasslands. Environmentally friendly businesses should be able to remain.” He also pointed out that excluding all people from the core areas of national parks would mean the loss of their scenic and educational value.<sup>29</sup>

Nature reserves are supposed to be highly protected areas where development projects like mining and tourism should be strictly prohibited. However, the local authorities mismanage a national-level reserve for their economic benefit.

For example, in August 2013, the provincial government adjusted the Sangjiangyuan National Nature Reserve to make a way for mining.<sup>30</sup> The local Tibetans protested against the mining company but were violently suppressed by Chinese armed forces. Tashi Samge, a Tibetan monk and environmentalist, is worried about the future development of the area. He said: “I do not know what our national park will be like in the future. One thing is certain as far as I am concerned: if there is no monastery and monks anymore in the region, and once the herders are also moved out, the valley will be dead, despite the increasing number of brown bears and snow leopards.”<sup>31</sup>

The local governments are more interested in generating revenue through exploiting the reserve than in their protection of its environment. Geographer Emily Yeh notes that,

“Many protected areas are ‘paper parks,’ with at least one-third lacking staff, management, and funding. The Nature Reserve Law of 1994 did nothing to remove control of the land under protection from the government that was managing it when it became a reserve. Moreover, except for national-level reserves, it failed to provide a guaranteed source of funding for reserve administration and staffing. This has led to a situation in which reserve managers’ primary goal has become revenue generation rather than biodiversity conservation.”<sup>32</sup>

## Hydropower Dam

With China having committed to carbon neutrality in global climate meeting, cutting down on carbon emission is prioritized in the 14<sup>th</sup> FYP. It reflects the leadership’s aim to shift the vast economy away from dependence on fossil fuels and heavy industry towards renewable energy and sustainable growth.

Yet, the plan also gives the green light to several major hydropower and infrastructure projects in Tibet especially on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo. To meet its renewable energy targets, China is already the world’s most prolific dam builder and will have to harness yet more energy through hydropower.

In November 2020, the Chinese official mouthpiece the Global Times broke the news of China’s plan to build a superdam on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo as a part of the 14<sup>th</sup> FYP.<sup>33</sup> The massive 60 GW project is planned to be undertaken in Metok County (Medog County), Nyingtri prefecture where the Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon is located. The Yarlung Tsangpo plunges from the staggering heights of the Tibetan Plateau by tracing active seismic fault lines and enters Arunachal Pradesh in India as the Siang or Dihang River. A specific 50-kilometer section of the bend will be utilized by making the water drop of 2,400 meters, thereby generating hydropower which is supposedly three times stronger than that of the Three Gorges Dam.<sup>34</sup>



## The FYP also Promotes Transfer of Electricity Generated in Tibet to China's Major Cities




Figure 1: Deployment schematic for large clean energy bases of the “14th Five-Year Plan” Source: People’s Publishing House

The 14<sup>th</sup> FYP proposes the construction of eight major “clean energy” bases across China. It also maps out a program to transfer clean energy from these bases to China’s major cities in the eastern area.

The figure shows the flow of electric energy generated in Tibet largely from hydropower dams and power transference to major Chinese provinces.

It is important to note that China is still facing acute power shortage to fulfil the vast energy demand for its growing economy, while simultaneously pushing towards lowering its carbon footprints. It has also emphasised on accelerating “construction of the Southwest Hydropower base.



## The Seventh Tibet Work Forum: An Assessment\*

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened the seventh Tibet Work Forum in Beijing for two days from August 28 to 29, 2020. As the number suggests six forums had been previously held since the beginning of reform era. However, this doesn't mean that no policy implementation organ of this sort has existed during the Party's earlier decades of administration in Tibet. During its initial years, the Party leadership has formed a working committee on Tibet where all the major policy decisions were formulated and put into implementation.



Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks during the Seventh Tibet Work Forum in Beijing, China, August 29, 2020. /Xinhua

The Tibet Work Forum (TWF) or is officially called the National Forum on Work in Tibet (ལྷན་དབྱང་བོད་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་སྒྲོར་གྱི་བཞུགས་མོལ་ཚོགས་འདུ།) has become the main policy forum for Tibet since it was first instituted in March 1980 under the leadership of Hu Yaobang, who was then the General Secretary of the CCP. The TWFs have been attended by the top leaders from the Party, Government and military organs. More precisely the TWFs have been chaired by the General Secretary of the CCP, which reflects the significance of these meetings.

One significant shift in China's Tibet policy since the fifth TWF was Beijing's decision to include all the Tibetan areas including regions that had been incorporated in other Chinese provinces within a larger framework of the TWF. This is a significant departure in terms of policy coordination and implementation. In other words, the policies formulated in the past four TWFs were confined to TAR solely. Such accommodation could serve as a cornerstone for His Holiness the Dalai Lama's demand for unification of all the Tibetan

areas as administered in China under a single political and administrative entity. However, the decision surrounding the policy shift could also be attributed to the widespread 2008 protests and the series of self-immolation since 2009.

### Laying the Groundwork for the Seventh TWF

It is interesting to note that, unlike the previous five forums, the sixth and seventh TWFs held under Xi Jinping were summoned right after the Beidaihe summits, a highly secretive and important annual gathering of China's top leaders including the party elders at a seaside resort in Hubei province.

At the same time, we cannot overlook the argument claiming that the seventh TWF was not solely intended for Tibet rather it was used as a pretext to highlight the strategic importance of Tibet in China's foreign policy *vis-à-vis* India. This makes sense given the visit of Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to the TAR, including a trip to the contentious border with India.<sup>1</sup> Although the name of the border area was not mentioned, a propaganda photo in which he was seen sitting with a Tibetan couple in traditional Lhoka attire conjecturally indicates that he has visited Tsona county in Lhoka prefecture which shares border with Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. His visit was seen as rare and unusual because Tibet related inspections and assessments are usually conducted by the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and UFWD, two parallel Party organs that manage ethnic and

\* This is an adapted version of an article authored by Tenzin Tseten which appeared in Tibet Policy Journal, Special Issue, 2020

religious issues. Wang's visit to the TAR strongly reflects Xi Jinping's strategic thinking of governance based on the importance of maintaining absolute stability in Tibet to achieve national security (ཐུལ་ཁབ་སྐྱོང་བར་སྡོན་ལ་མཐའ་མཆོམས་སྐྱོང་དགོས་པ་དང་། མཐའ་མཆོམས་སྐྱོང་བར་སྡོན་ལ་ངེས་པར་དུ་བོད་བརྟན་ལྷིང་དགོས་པ།).

Furthermore, Ding Yexian, Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee who oversees the stability maintenance in the TAR, was seen in Lhasa despite his official transfer announcement in early July. It has now become clear that Beijing withheld his transfer for a couple of reasons. First, Ding was needed in the TAR during Wang Yi's visit to formally show him how stability maintenance measures are being implemented. Ding was also seen accompanying Gyaltsen Norbu, China's handpicked 11<sup>th</sup> Panchen Lama, during the latter's visit to the TAR in July. Second and more importantly, the TAR Party leadership needed Ding's expertise in the field of stability maintenance and development to lay the groundwork for the seventh TWF.

In the same manner, one could argue that Wang Yang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Chairman of the CPPCC, visited the TAR in early July<sup>2</sup> compounded by the visit of the Politburo member and Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to the TAR in early August to assess the poverty alleviation program,<sup>3</sup> had largely paved the way for the Party leadership in laying the groundwork for the seventh TWF.

The latest forum laid down the “ten musts” that are designed for the Party's strategy in governing Tibet for the new era, at least for another five years.<sup>4</sup> However, some guidelines outlined in the “ten musts” need a deeper analysis given its far-reaching impact.

### Renewed Emphasis on Patriotic Education

In his speech at the seventh Forum, Xi said, “we must attach importance to strengthening ideological and political education in schools, put the spirit of patriotism throughout the entire process of school education at all levels

and types, sow the seeds of loving China in the depths of the hearts of every teenager.”<sup>5</sup> This could be seen as China's growing sense of insecurity concerning younger generation of Tibetans who are growing up under the Chinese government's education system. The Chinese authorities believe that the young Tibetans are being under the “negative” influence of religion and therefore need to undergo political education to correct their political thinking. This seems to be why Chinese government has been issuing a number of administrative diktats intended to punish parents who would allow their children to engage in “any superstitious or religious activity.”<sup>6</sup> A latest report suggests that patriotic education drive under Xi Jinping has started to be implemented in Tibetan schools and classes in Chinese cities “urging” students to feel the “benevolence of the Party and love the Party.”<sup>7</sup>

The patriotic education campaign has evolved over time since it was first launched in the TAR in May 1996. The campaign was initially aimed squarely at religious professionals in response to the pro-independence protests of late 1980s in Lhasa led by monks and nuns.<sup>8</sup> Under this campaign, monks and nuns were required to undergo intensive three months patriotic education designed to “thoroughly eradicate the Dalai splittist forces influences” and demand a written statement of their loyalty to the Party-state and denunciation of the Dalai Lama. These drives were carried out under the supervision of work teams based in the monasteries and nunneries.<sup>9</sup>

China's growing sense of insecurity can best be illustrated by a series of protests in the recent history of Sino-Tibetan relationship. The protests in the mid to late 1980s were largely confined to the TAR and those who took part in these protests mainly belonged to “conservative or traditionalist,” not having been influenced by Marxist ideology.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, the 2008 protests were much wider in scale in terms of geography and involved people from all sections of society, including students and intellectuals. It is stated

that more than fifty percent of the 2008 protests were dominated by lay people from rural areas in which 17 out of initially 95 reported incidents were staged by Tibetan students in Nationality Universities.<sup>11</sup>

Unlike the previous wave of protests where people called for independence, the slogans for 2008 protests and banners demanded among other things-the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, the most common slogan and testimonies of the self-immolation protests is the return of the Dalai Lama,<sup>13</sup> and strikingly 26 of them were at the age of eighteen or below.<sup>14</sup> Although the slogan of the return of the Dalai Lama can be put into different interpretations, what this clearly suggests is that the protests were not solely driven by socio-economic disparity rather it addresses the larger question surrounding Tibetan nationalism and identity.<sup>15</sup> In line with this, Tsering Topgyal argues that “the Chinese invasion and policies have made Tibetan national identity the principal locus of allegiance today. In fact, the greater the Chinese repression and efforts to undermine their identity, the stronger the Tibetan consciousness of that identity and determination to protect it will be.”<sup>16</sup>

### **Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism**

Sinicization as a concept caught the attention of Chinese leadership and put into use as an official discourse at the Central United Front Work Conference held in May 2015. The concept was later elaborated by Xi Jinping at the Central Conference on Religious Work held in April 2016.<sup>17</sup> Since then the sinicization has become the new guiding principle of China’s management of religions in the new era. At the same conference, Xi Jinping also called for the need to manage religions according to the rule of law.<sup>18</sup> Although the term sinicization appears to be a new slogan, but the rhetoric of the rule of law is in existence since the time of Jiang Zemin.<sup>19</sup> However, the rule of law in the PRC’s context is rule by law where the Party-state uses law as a political means to control and manipulate every aspect of

society, including religion that is perceived as a potential threat to the state’s security.

Since he took power, Xi issued a number of laws, including the National Security Law in 2015, the Counter Terrorism Law in 2016, the Foreign NGO Law in January in 2017 and the Cyber Security Law in 2017. These laws are linked to state security. For example, under the ambiguous 2016 counter terrorism law, elements such as ‘distorted religious teachings’ are deemed as the ‘ideological basis’ for terrorism or extremism.<sup>20</sup>

Under the pretext of these laws, the Party tightens its control measures in monasteries and religious institutions. For instance, in 2016 the Chinese authorities carried out mass demolition and evictions of monks and nuns from two major Buddhist institutions situated in Tibetan areas that are now administered under Sichuan province,<sup>21</sup> making it effectively under party’s control. This was followed by complete change in the “Management Committee” of Larung Gar Buddhist Institute. The Party appointed six party cadres in the Institute’s key management positions, including the director, a position previously held by Ani Mumtso, niece of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok, who was the founder of the Institute.<sup>22</sup> The decision was apparently made at the sixth TWF in 2015 and the second National Work Conference on Religion in 2016 to strengthen and expand the Party control in day-to-day management of the Institute. The Party also created a supervisor position to further expand and strengthen the existing control mechanisms intended to guide “religion to adapt to socialism.”<sup>23</sup> In the latest development, supervisors are required in monasteries and religious institutions to supervise the “Management Committees.” The emergence of supervisors appears to be the outcome of China’s revised regulations on religion adopted in 2017. It is in these sense that the 2016 religious conference is seen as the beginning of the CCP’s new campaign to tighten its grip on the religious community.<sup>24</sup>



The latest regulation titled “Measures for the Administration of Religious Groups”<sup>25</sup> is designed to restrict the growing influence of religion and religious activities both inside China and overseas in accordance with the Chinese laws. Although there is no clear evidence to suggest that the closure of Bodhi Institute of Compassion and Wisdom, an international center founded by Khenpo (abbot) Sodhargye of Larung Gar<sup>26</sup> was carried under the effects of the regulation, but his growing international prominence is certainly not to be overlooked. One might argue that this could be a new beginning of the CCP’s campaign against the overseas religious institutions and activities. The regulation also allows the reeducation of religious groups deemed “illegal”<sup>27</sup> and extends its control over religious personnel, finance of religious institutions and monasteries. A similar regulation was issued in the TAR in 2018 that requires religious professionals to unswervingly uphold “four must”, a set of rules intended to secure allegiance from monks and nuns to guide them to “become vanguard of ethnic unity.”<sup>28</sup>

The agendas outlined in the 2016 conference<sup>29</sup> are reasserted at the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress held in October 2017, making them guiding principles on religion under Xi. Zhang Yijiong, an executive deputy head of the Central UFWD, reiterated the Party line about the Dalai Lama being “a leader of a separatist group that is engaging in separatist activities” and briefly touched on Tibetan Buddhism during a press briefing on October 21 on the sidelines of the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress.<sup>30</sup> Zhang said Tibetan Buddhism was a special religion “born in our ancient China” and has “Chinese orientation.” Bhuchung K Tsering argues, Zhang by giving this statement “he might be saying this to lay the ground for legitimizing the Chinese Government’s interference in Tibetan Buddhism” and “his utterance that Tibetan Buddhism has Chinese-orientation lays bare China’s political agenda of wanting to Sinicize Tibetan Buddhism and make it Chinese.”<sup>31</sup>

The UFWD has gained enormous importance

under Xi Jinping. Zhang’s statement on religion obliquely illustrates its growing importance in the Party’s management of religious work. During his first term, Xi elevated the UFWD to a new height by setting up a leading small group on the UFWD.<sup>32</sup> In his second term, which is supposed to end in 2022, but abolition of presidential term limit and no clear line of succession laid bare his intention to stay in power for at least another five years.<sup>33</sup> Xi has reorganized the department by creating three new bureaus over the existing nine.<sup>34</sup> Two out of the three new bureaus (Eleventh and Twelfth Bureaus) are assigned for religious affairs work given the gravity of religious issue. Xi reiterated the importance of the United Front Work as a “magic weapon” clearly reflecting its increasing importance and relevance in China’s “new era of rejuvenation” and primacy. The increasing importance was seen in 2018 when the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) was absorbed into the UFWD as its internal bureau,<sup>35</sup> ostensibly to ensure tighter Party control over religious work. The absorption as Jérôme Doyon describes it “has actually deprives religious actors of a key broker, especially at the local level.”<sup>36</sup>

The CCP’s founding ideology on religion is premised on Marxist secularization theory, in which strong emphasis has been placed on the idea that believers of religion will gradually shun their beliefs and religion will inevitably disappear under the socialist paradise, has remain unchanged.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the Party couldn’t outright abandon its Marxist ideology. Sinicization of religions, let alone Tibetan Buddhism, therefore is an ideological replacement in this fast-evolving religious policy.

## Conclusion

As it is discussed, China’s policies in Tibet over the course of four decades has been shaped by the twin policies, which emphasizes on top-down economic growth through state subsidies and investments along with virulent public denunciation of the Dalai Lama, while

maintaining a tight control over the religious practice and teaching, a cornerstone of Tibetan cultural identity. Robert Barnett has succinctly said on Chinese state's approach towards "religious professionals," most notably the Dalai Lama which they see as antagonistic and threat to social stability in Tibet. In response to this threat perception, Beijing changed its approach in dealing with Tibet problem from "conciliatory approach" to "regulatory approach." Since the fifth Forum, which was held two years after the

2008 protests, Beijing has upgraded security and surveillance mechanisms in Tibet compounded by existing social control and propaganda measures such as patriotic education. This has been further intensified under Xi Jinping with the institution of quixotic laws and regulations. But what is seemingly clear from the last over seventy years of Chinese rule is that China has not only failed to win the hearts and minds of Tibetans, but their policies backfired.

Although the Tibet Work Forum serves as the main policy platform for Tibet, the participation of Tibetan leaders in the forum meetings are minimal. For example, Beijing does not feel the need to exhibit a semblance of Tibetan participation, not even their chosen 11<sup>th</sup> Panchen Lama, Gyaltzen Norbu was invited to attend the seventh Forum. But for the sake of representation, Pema Thinley, Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress who has previously served in various important party and government positions in the TAR, including as the Deputy Party Secretary was apparently the only Tibetan who attended the forum.



## Tracing the Genesis of New “Ethnic Unity” Regulations in “TAR”

On January 1, 2020, the Eleventh People’s Congress of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) adopted a new regulation to establish “model area for national unity and progress” in the TAR formally known as the “Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region” (བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་མཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་སྔོན་ཁྲིམས་). This regulation consists of eight sections with 48 articles which took effect from May 1, 2020. It requires “all levels of government, companies, community organizations, villages, schools, military groups and religious activity centers [to] be responsible for work on ethnic unity.” According to an analyst Bhuchung K Tsering, this regulation “officially depart from preferential ethnic policies and threaten Tibetan culture and violate international human rights norms.”<sup>1</sup> The recent arrest of four monks from Tengdro monastery by Lhasa police<sup>2</sup> clearly bears the brunt of this regulation. One of the reasons for their arrest was believed to have been linked with the possession of photographs or literature related to the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese government considers a “separatist.” The fourth point of the article 46 of this regulation requires “any organization or individual” to make a clear stand on the “anti-separatism struggle,” failing to abide by this will lead to “public security management penalties in accordance with law.”

A similar regulation was introduced in Xinjiang in 2016, but no details were provided. Prior to this, the People’s Congress of “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” adopted regulations on “Ethnic Unity Education” on December 29, 2009.<sup>3</sup> This regulation consists of 41 articles which came into force on February 1, 2010. These kinds of regulations will provide China an additional legal tool to justify its crackdown on Uyghur resistance on the pretext of safeguarding national security against “extremism”, “separatism” and “terrorism” in Xinjiang, which the Uyghurs called East Turkestan. Since the regulation was passed in Xinjiang, where rights groups have estimated that over a million if not thousands of Uyghurs who were reportedly arrested and detained in unspecified reeducation camps, which the Chinese government calls vocational centers.

The new regulation on ethnic unity in TAR needs a little background analysis. This appears to have come to light after debates surrounding China’s ethnic policy. China’s approach to what it sees as “ethnic policy” received serious attention after recent surge in protests by Tibetans and Uyghurs, two significant national minorities in the People’s Republic of China. This led to the amplification

of academic debates surrounding China’s ethnic policies that played significant role in shaping the current ethnic policies. Such an open and public debate once deemed sensitive is unprecedented and in fact is first of its kind since the reform era.

In Sino-Tibetan context, the emergence of two conflicting claims over identity insecurity has remained a source of tension for decades. On one hand, a growing threat to Tibetan insecurity about its identity, generated by China’s policies of Chinese immigration and cultural influences which overwhelmed Tibet in recent decades. On the other hand, the Chinese party-state insecurity over a fear that Tibetan resistance might undermine its nation building project in which ethnic unity is considered indispensable. In line with this, Tsering Topgyal argues:

Beijing and the Tibetans harden their positions in order to counter their respective insecurities, the outcome is greater insecurity for both sides, plunging them into unremitting cycles of state-hardening on the part of China and fortifying resistance on the Tibetan side.<sup>4</sup>

Turning briefly to the academic debate, two

\*By Tenzin Tseten

distinct views formed the basis of the entire debate: reform vs status quo. A group that held the first view, including Ma Rong of Peking University, who is a leading scholar on China's ethnic issue and Hu Angang, an influential policy adviser from Tsinghua University, put forward reform measures. Akin to Sun Yat-sen's assimilation strategy, Ma advocates "de-politicization" of ethnic issues in order to forge a shared national identity/consciousness. Ma's reform measures such as this undermines the 'distinctiveness' of minority nationality's language, culture and religion which forms the cornerstone of their identity. For Ma, failing to reform China's policies inspired by Soviet's nationality policies that politicize ethnicity would generate further division between Chinese and other minority nationalities, possibly leading to more social tension and conflict. Similarly, Hu calls for a so-called second generation of ethnic policy "that would attenuate ethnic identity and strengthen a single shared national/racial identity." The second view is an antithesis of the first and basically rejected the reform measures such as "melting pot" and "second-generation of ethnic policy" suggested by Ma and Hu respectively. In other words, a group that holds the second view, including a highly respected and influential Mongolian scholar Hao Shiyuan, who is believed to be instrumental in shaping China's ethnic policy discourse, defended the status quo and believes in occasional perfecting of the existing policies rather than a complete overhaul.<sup>5</sup>

The idea of complete overhaul of ethnic autonomy system has been downplayed by Chinese president Xi Jinping at the Central Ethnic Work Conference held in September 2014. The conference emphasized that "the party's ethnic theories and policies have been correct" and "our national work is successful."<sup>6</sup> In other words, China's system of ethnic autonomy has remained broadly unchanged and continues to follow the theoretical framework of Soviet's nationality policies.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government is rolling back on some of the preferential policies for

minorities in the field of educational and tax exemption, while a campaign to strive for national identity over minority identity is being expanded. According to South China Morning Post, the Chinese government has already set a deadline for Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to end the system of giving additional points for students of Hui ethnic background on their college entrance exam.<sup>7</sup>

It seems that the Chinese government is quietly incorporating some of the policy proposals put forward by these reform-minded scholars. In June 2014, Chen Quanguo, the then party secretary of "TAR" promoted incentive-based ethnic intermarriage at the "Ethnic Intermarriage Family Forum" held in Lhasa. Chen stressed at the Forum that "to promote fraternal ethnic intermarriage as an important starting point to promote the great unity of all ethnic groups in Tibet." Chen even used a proverb "love each other like tea and salt" to portray intermarriage between Chinese and Tibetan as a natural integration. What happens if you add salt to tea? The tea tastes a little salty, but you don't sea salt anymore. The salt dissolves in the tea. This apparently is an act of Tibetans "fusion" and mingling" into Chinese, the idea Hu Angang and his colleague at Tsinghua University, Hu Lianhe, believe will help China overcome the possible threat of ethnic separatism.

However, China's lack of interest for complete change in the system of ethnic autonomy, the core of its minority policy is inconclusively connected to the deeply entrenched vested interest of millions of officials associated with "anti-separatism" bureaucracy such as the United Front Work Department, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the State Administration for Religious Affairs. In one of his letters to President Hu Jintao dated 29 October, 2004, Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, a veteran Tibetan communist who founded the Tibetan Communist Party and had served as the key player in the Sino-Tibetan diplomacy in the 1950s, wrote, "These people live on anti-separatism, are promoted due to



anti-separatism, and they hit the jackpot by anti-separatism.” He further wrote, “The longer the Dalai Lama keeps on staying abroad, and the bigger his influence, the more long-lasting the period of high ranks and great wealth for those anti-separatist groups; on the contrary, when the Dalai Lama restores relations with the Central Government, these people will be terrified, tense and lose their jobs.”<sup>8</sup>

On the contrary, Ma Rong acknowledges that vested interest of these officials will be on stake if changes are made, but he argues that reform should be carefully made considering the sentiments and interests of individuals or groups who benefit from present system. Furthermore, paramount importance should be placed on discussions among scholars and government officers who are associated with ethnic institutions that will be helpful to reach consensus for policy adjustment.<sup>9</sup>

Another resistance might come from a powerful “faction” in the TAR known as aid-Tibet cadres. This relatively new faction came into existence since 1994, is made up of party cadres who hold significant positions in the TAR-level party and government departments. This faction apparently enjoys tremendous clout over infrastructure development in TAR which involves large amount of money invested by assisting Chinese provinces, central ministries and state-owned enterprises.<sup>10</sup> By imposing radical change would certainly threaten their privilege, thereby resistance to change from these officials might seem plausible.

It is no surprising to find similar regulations in Tibetan areas outside of TAR. The “Regulations on National Unity and Progress of the Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” adopted by the Eleventh People’s Congress of the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (GTAP) on January 15, 2016 and approved at the 25<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth Sichuan Provincial People’s Congress on June 1, 2016.<sup>11</sup> The regulation consists of seven

sections and 42 articles which became effective from August 1, 2016. Although no clear pattern has been found to comprehend its genesis, it seems the regulation on ethnic unity in GTAP serves as an antecedent of the TARs’ given their similarities in content and length. For instance, the TAR regulation designated September as the month for activities to promote ethnic unity in the TAR. Similarly, the GTAP regulations designated September 16 as the “prefecture ethnic unity and progress day.” Analysts however argue that the regulations adopted in the TAR might become null and void if it proves ineffective.



Intensification of propaganda on "national unity" carried out in Amdo Ngawa. Photo: Unknown

Recently, the office of the leading group for national unity and progress in Aba (Ngaba) Prefecture carried out the “Practice of Innovating and Promoting the Work of National Unity and Progress” in Ngaba.<sup>12</sup> It is stated that people from all walks of life including party members, cadres, workers, farmers, nomads, and 18,000 religious figures have established a support mechanism to deepen the relationship between cadres and the masses in order to promote national unity. Government agencies, enterprises, schools, towns, villages, religious activity centers, military camps are required to vigorously carry out the establishment of national unity and progress. In 2019, the Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture was named the “National Model Prefecture for National Unity and Progress” by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission.



A logo declaring the formation of "Aba prefecture national unity and progress." Photo: Unknown

Similar regulations were introduced in other regions of Tibet. For instance, a special emphasis has been made to ensure the success of "Golden Seed" project which stressed on propaganda and education of "Love China" and "the Chinese nation as a family" among children to lay a strong foundation of national unity in Gansu.<sup>13</sup> This resembles the salient feature of patriotic education where it focuses on the importance of Chinese culture to build ethnic unity and harmony. At the same time, employment generation in ethnic areas have been expanded, while it claims that 90 employment demonstration bases have been established, 57,600 poor laborers have been trained in skills, and 35,000 have been transferred. And more than 110,000 new jobs have been created in Tibet-related cities (Tibetan areas) and towns across Qinghai since 2015, all bearing the importance of forging ethnic unity and harmony.<sup>14</sup>

Since the 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, the Chinese government stressed on the importance of strengthening ethnic unity by integrating "five identities" and "eight persistences" into the entire process of national education, cadre education, social education and media.<sup>15</sup> Amid the growing concern for future direction of China's ethnic policy, it is worth reminding that genuine autonomy proposal from the Dalai Lama intended to resolve the long-standing Sino-Tibet conflict will lose its legal ground if the direction of China's ethnic policy completely shifted towards what Ma Rong and other reformers have proposed.



## The Underlying Politics of Poverty Alleviation in Tibet

In late 2020, Chinese authorities declared a “major victory” in poverty alleviation in Tibet—lifting 74 county-level areas out of poverty.\* China’s White Paper on poverty alleviation 2021 also claimed that it has achieved the eradication of extreme poverty and elimination of poverty from all the regions which includes Tibet—the so called Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan territories divided and ruled within neighboring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan. However, when it comes to Chinese statistics—especially those pertaining to Tibet, they must be read with a pinch of salt as they are often simply made up or manipulated in order to fit with its political propaganda.

It attempts to look beyond the official Chinese rhetoric to understand and assess the underlying politics of poverty alleviation in Tibet and argues that there are political and security objectives behind this seemingly benign program. As a result, the likely long-term consequences do not look optimistic.

Reading the official Chinese statements and statistics as they are, it is imperative to assess how the anti-poverty campaign has been carried out in Tibet, in view of the reports of Xinjiang-like coercive labor training and forced relocation being carried out in the region.<sup>1</sup> It is also important to note that, unlike other Chinese provinces, Tibet as a colony under Beijing’s rule, it demands to look beyond the official rhetoric—so as to see where the poverty alleviation campaign is likely to go and its potential consequences—both in the short and mostly in the long term.

In the name of fighting against poverty, Chinese authorities devised several policies and strategies, some of which have nothing to do with poverty alleviation per se like ideological indoctrination and neighborhood policing while others can be unsustainable in the long run such as displacement of Tibetan nomads and farmers from their ancestral lands to Chinese state housing camps and establishment of cooperatives under the party’s supervision.

+By Palden Sonam.

\*China is using the official poverty line (\$ 2.25 per day in 2011) of the poorest countries in the world as its benchmark even though it is about to become a high-income economy. See Indermit Gill, “Deep-sinking poverty in China,” Brookings, January 25, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/01/25/deep-sinking-poverty-in-china/>. (Accessed on July 21, 2021)




Figure 1 Number of Rural Residents in Poverty (2012-2020)




Figure 2 Number of Impoverished Counties (2012-2020)

Rapid progression of poverty eradication, interestingly note the starting year 2012 when Xi Jinping became the Party chief. It points to a statistical exercise to shore up Xi’s image. Source: State Council’s White Paper on Poverty Alleviation, 2021.

### Training as Disciplining and Transfer as Displacement

One of the most visible poverty alleviation strategies Beijing has launched is the so called “labor training and transfer” program in Tibet, mainly targeting Tibetan nomads and farmers.

According to Chinese authorities, the labor training like ones in Xinjiang (though appear to be less aggressive), will help Tibetan herders and farmers to learn new skills such as cooking, mining, construction and others to earn money and get rich.<sup>2</sup> According to Chinese sources, at least 543,000 Tibetan nomads and farmers have been trained in different vocational skills in 2020.<sup>3</sup> Out of them, 5,000 have been transferred outside of TAR to other provinces, most likely to so called aid-Tibet provinces and cities in China, while 55,000 people got jobs in the cities within the TAR region.<sup>4</sup> However, even by looking at the official data, it is clear that majority of those who have been recruited into the labor training remain to be unemployed by at least July of 2020. Of the 543,000 Tibetan farmers and nomads who were recruited into the labor training and transfer programs, only 60,000 got jobs and the remaining 483,000 were unemployed in the same year. This indicates that 90.5% of those recruited into labor

Even if Chinese statistics and statements are accepted at their face value, there are certain issues with this seemingly benign policy in terms of how it is being carried out and the likely long-term negative consequences for the Tibetans as anti-poverty measures like the resettlement are not only highly top-down but coercive and disruptive in nature. Nevertheless, Beijing presents the whole process including the relocation as voluntary and the result—progressive and uplifting.

However, like China's occupation of Tibet in the name of liberation, this poverty alleviation campaign is not just about poverty as a matter of social and economic issue, rather it reflects its political and security calculations in Tibet as parts of its colonial project. As evident in ways in which Chinese authorities make and implement policies and strategies on anti-poverty campaign; it is clear that measures for social and political engineering override the measures for social

Place	No. of labors transferred outside of TAR	No. of labors who secured jobs in cities within TAR
Lhasa	1,000	5,000
Shigatse	1,400	20,000
Lhoka	800	16,000
Nyingtri	500	3,000
Nagchu	400	4,000
Ngari	100	800
Chamdo	800	6,200
Total	5,000	55,000
Grand Total	5,000+55,000	6,0000

The first row shows number of Tibetan labors transferred from TAR to other provinces as administered in PRC. The second row indicates number of Tibetan farmers and nomads who got jobs in cities within the TAR in 2020. (Source: The Tibetan Human Resources and Social Security Department of TAR)

training and transfer program did not get jobs.<sup>5</sup> This naturally leads to question the validity of Chinese official assertions including in its White Paper on poverty alleviation that all counties in the so-called TAR have eradicated poverty.

and economic upliftment. In other words, the supposedly anti-poverty policies and strategies have overwhelming political and security contours like ideological re-educations which include China's religious and ethnic policies, patriotic



re-education and Xi Jinping's thought, as well as stability maintenance and anti-separatism.

### Sinicization as a Modern-day 'Civilizing Mission'

One of the primary objectives of labor training begins with thought education, which Beijing claims, is necessary to remove what it calls the "negative influence of religion" and rectify 'backward' Tibetan's thoughts.<sup>6</sup> Among other things, this entails disregarding Tibetan way of life and spiritual civilization in exchange for a money-is-everything-culture. It is openly mentioned in the official sources that the Chinese authorities help the poor Tibetans to 'educate and guide' in order for them to remove the 'roots of poverty from the depth of their thinking.'<sup>7</sup> What this implies is that, in the eyes of Chinese colonial authorities, the Tibetans are seen so backward in their mental aptitude that they are not only incapable of governing themselves, they are even incompetent to earn bread and butter for themselves without a 'fatherly' Chinese state—guiding them and making decisions on their behalf for them which will have consequential impacts on their life and culture. However, what is evident here is that Beijing's unsolicited 'guardianship' for Tibetans usurps their right to make choices not only as individuals but also as a nation. The inherent Tibetan 'backwardness' is used by China as a pretext to deny Tibetan people the agency in all matters crucial for their survival as a distinct people and a civilization.



A hoarding at Mt. Kailash. The Tibetan translation reads: Bearing the flag of Xi Jinping's thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics high and striving to be a guardian of the precious national border and maker of a comfortable home. Photo: Unknown

However, on the Chinese part, there is almost an urgency to rectify the alleged Tibetan inaptitude to earn a better living—and the need for a new ideological transformation on making money and getting rich. The "mass education" to get rich goes along with the campaign to study Xi Jinping's thoughts with a program called "big study, big publicity, big discussion" which primarily targets Tibetan nomads.<sup>8</sup> Chinese authorities claimed to have organized 3,119 such events reaching to 160,000 Tibetan nomads in Jangtang.

Apart from the Chinese authorities' eagerness if not over-zealousness to make the Tibetans prosperous, the high number of events for ideological re-education can also be an indicative of some degree of reluctance if not resistance from the Tibetan nomads to these Chinese policies. By making Xi Jinping thoughts as a part of the ideological re-education related to poverty alleviation, it creates a political situation where opposing or resisting a policy in whole or part could be liable to retribution as questioning or doubting the wisdom and intent of the CCP and its core leader—Xi Jinping. This would make it very difficult for the Tibetans not to acquiesce to the Chinese policies even if they do not understand or agree to them as the personal and political risks are too high. In the past, there have been cases in Tibet where Chinese authorities have jailed Tibetan nomads who resisted China's forced resettlement in Amdo (North East)<sup>9</sup> and Kham (East) Tibet.<sup>10</sup> In addition to the political dangers, there is also the risk of social welfare schemes being denied if they resist official policies.

The political frenzy to make money appears to be so intensive that to get 'Rich' today is almost likened to becoming 'Red' in the Maoist era. For Chinese authorities, Tibetan way of life and outlook are seen as obstacles to the state's modernization project based on Chinese culture and tastes. The campaign called "mass education" is launched to teach Tibetans about the importance of 'labor, civilization and adopting a new lifestyle.'<sup>11</sup> The underlying presumption reeks of racist prejudices against Tibetans, who

are seen and/or portrayed as lazy and backward in need of a push to the path of civilization and progress in order to live a new lifestyle—which is the Chinese style. The premise is that Tibetans are poor because their culture is primitive and backward, and in order for them to advance materially, they have to embrace a supposedly advanced Chinese culture and system.



A propaganda billboard reads: Unless you fail to get rid of the hat of poverty, you'll find it difficult to find an attractive bride. Photo: Unknown

In the name of eliminating poverty, a toxic form of materialism is also preached through the speeches and slogans of Chinese leaders and other propagandas publicized through different mediums—hoardings, newspapers, TVs, pamphlets and social media platforms. This typical colonial civilizing mission is being carried out by an army of Communist Party cadres and security agents, including the People's Liberation Army (PLA).



Source: Chamdo Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School, motor cycle repairing class for Tibetan farmers/nomads in military uniform.<sup>12</sup>

The official logic for military-style training for the Tibetan farmers and nomads is to enhance their discipline and instill patriotism among the masses and change their backward thought on employment and market. This is done under the supervision of the local PLA garrisons and the People's Armed Police.<sup>13</sup> However, the armed force, being the symbol as well as the instrument of a state's ultimate coercive power, more than playing disciplinary and patriotic roles, their presence and participation in the labor training process is to nullify any resistance or reluctance on the part of Tibetans—physical or even psychological to the colonial state project. Moreover, the involvement of security agencies in the labor training indicates that the political aspects of the program override the economic or social dimensions. In a Foucauldian sense, the goal is to create disciplined or docile productive workers and/or loyal colonial subjects.

### Displacement and Disruption Caused by Resettlement

Another strategy of the campaign has been to remove predominantly Tibetan nomads and also farmers from their ancestral lands and put them in relocation sites—ostensibly to resettle them in better living conditions. According to China, about 266,000 nomads and farmers have been transferred into 960 new relocation areas in Damshung,<sup>14</sup> areas on outskirts of Lhasa such as Chushul, Medro Gangkar and also in the border areas like Lhoka next to Arunachal Pradesh and Ngari on the other side of Ladakh in India respectively. Over 4,058 Tibetan nomads from Nagchu have been relocated to Lhoka as China has been undertaking what it calls as well-off border villages to develop more physical infrastructures and increase population at the border areas as a form of defense.<sup>15</sup> There is a clear geopolitical dimension to the relocation of Tibetans to the border areas in the name of poverty alleviation as the ongoing territorial disputes between India and China has turned more acrimonious in recent times with the potentiality of a peaceful resolution fading from the horizon.



A relocation camp at Tsachutang Village in Dhamshung.  
Source: Xinhua

In addition to being an anti-poverty measures, the relocation program is also touted by Chinese authorities as protecting the environment—sometimes calling it ‘ecological relocation’. As bizarre as it sounds, the official reason is that Tibetan nomads keep too many yaks which leads to overgrazing and land degradation. But there is a contradiction in this logic; on the one hand Tibetan nomads are living in inhospitable land and stuck in abject poverty and on other hand, they have too many yaks. As for the nomads, if they have many yaks, then they won’t be poor and if they are destitute, they would definitely have not enough yaks to overgraze. According to Chinese source, Chinese authorities in the TAR have the plan to relocate 130,000 people, mostly Tibetan nomads by 2025.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the Tibetan nomads and farmers who have been relocated into these camps have to leave behind not only their lands but also their livelihood and way of life and start a new but uncertain life. In some parts of Tibet like Yulshul (Qinghai), there are reports that Chinese authorities have forcefully evicted Tibetan nomads from several relocation camps in 2017 despite the fact that, in the first, it’s the Chinese authorities who have removed them from their ancestral lands into the relocation camps.<sup>17</sup> But now the Tibetan nomads’ resettlements are demolished to build tourist

resorts while the Tibetan evictees are living in desolate tents and some even have resorted to beggary for survival.<sup>18</sup>

Besides, they have to operate in a system under unfamiliar conditions. Their survival skills as Tibetan nomads or farmers will not help them in a market whose norms and practices including laws and language, are dominated by Chinese preponderances and preferences. As farmers tilling their own lands and nomads keeping their livestock; they have a certain degree of agency in deciding how they live and eat, the state drive to put them in these relocation camps can limit their life choices as a distinct people with different culture and value system and be restrictive in many ways. This is because these relocation bases are more than just concrete structures to put the displaced farmers and nomads but also sites for political re-education and social engineering.

### Relocation and Re-education

Once they are transferred into different relocation sites, they are subjected to different political indoctrination and surveillances. All the relocation sites have CCP party cells called residential work teams, who carry out political re-education programs which include Beijing’s policies on religion and ethnicity, anti-separatism, and gratitude education with the ostensible aim of improving the ability of the masses to “appreciate the Party’s favor, listen to the party, and follow the party.”<sup>19</sup> The residential work teams give ideological education to large groups as well small target groups emphasizing on the ideological education of “four stresses and four loves.”\* For instance, just in one relocation camp in Toklong Dechen district near Lhasa, Chinese sources reported that the work teams carried out 2,213 sessions on general political education and 1,063 anti-separatism sessions in 2018 for the Tibetans to know that ‘unity and stability are blessing and separatism is a disaster’ for them.<sup>20</sup>

\*It is an ideological campaign launched in 2017, the Four Loves are love for CCP’s core interests, motherland, one’s hometown and livelihood and Four Stresses include gratitude to the party, unity, service and education and economic prosperity.



It explicitly mentions in Chinese official sources that the village residential work teams have to make the maintenance of social harmony and stability as their “overriding task” and implement all the stability maintenance measures in the cities and districts to down to the grass-root organizations without failure.<sup>21</sup> The stress on stability maintenance in the relocation camps indicate Tibetan discontentment and Chinese insecurity. Paralleling the ideological re-education is a sophisticated surveillance system to monitor people’s thoughts and behavior.

### **Relocation Sites and its Panoptic Design**

The new relocation sites housing the displaced nomads and farmers are panoptic in design and purpose, with a systemic surveillance apparatus. After their relocation, all the households are organized into grid and double household management model in which 10 to 15 families are put under each grid where they are to watch on each other for security threats as well as poverty alleviation and report on each other, including their problems as well as views, to a CCP official who is in charge of the grid segment.<sup>22</sup> The main function of the party cells set up at the relocation camps is to extend the party’s control to the remotest areas by ‘building a strong fortress of grassroots party organizations’ and also to carry out ideological indoctrination activities for the farmers and herdsman.<sup>23</sup> This collective neighborhood policing is further bolstered by high-tech surveillance systems with AI-powered facial recognition cameras.

Though the Chinese authorities claimed that the Tibetan farmers and nomads have enthusiastically joined in the state-led programs such labor training and relocation, however, the reality is more complicated than the official narrative. In fact, even the local authorities do not have much choice as the central government assigned them with fixed quotas with a policy to get incentives for fulfilling their quotas or face punishment.<sup>24</sup> This system of incentive and punishment for local authorities to meet their respective quotas is meant

to make the process not only coercive but also rigid with little or no room for local adjustment. So, the priority of the local authorities is to fulfil their quota and earn incentives rather than looking after the basic needs and aspiration of the Tibetan nomads and farmers.

In fact, the large number of ideological ‘mass education’ campaigns targeting Tibetan farmers and nomads starting from the beginning to their displacement and/or resettlement in the state relocation sites point to a less of public enthusiasm and more of political intimidation if not outright force. If these Tibetans are happy and willing to move into these relocation camps, then what is the need of all these anti-separatism, patriotic re-education and surveillance like neighborhood collective policing. Given the strict control of the state over every section of the society, it’s relatively easy to coerce people into submission as the Chinese authorities have many tools at their disposal to impose their policies regardless of how unpopular they are.

As a result, these relocation camps are more controlled than comfortable; they are more automatic than autonomous. More than solving the problem of poverty, they are anchored toward the problem of political instability and control. Likewise, the displacement of nomads and farmers from their ancestral lands to be trained in low-skilled jobs is more than simply educating them, it is meant to Sinicize them—and therefore the end result is less than empowering. It renders them more vulnerable to different contingencies, including different forms of exploitation and deprivation.



## POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP

### Tibet and Provincial-level Leadership Transfer: An Analysis\*

In the run-up to the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress expected to be convened in late 2022, the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas witnessed a high-level leadership transfer/promotion.

Yan Jin Hai (b.1962) has been transferred to TAR from Qinghai province<sup>1</sup> and Ding Ye Xian has been transferred to Qinghai province from TAR. While it is not completely clear yet, it very much looks like Yan and Ding simply have exchanged positions with each other (lateral transfers).



Yan Jin Hai and Ding Ye Xian

Yan is a Tibetan born in Tsoshar Kamalog in Tsongon (མཚོ་ལྷོ་མཚོ་ཤར་བཀའ་མ་ལོག།). He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1983. He has built his career in Qinghai province in the span of over 30 years. Prior to his transfer to the TAR party committee as a deputy secretary, Yan held important positions in Qinghai province. He was a standing committee member of Qinghai provincial party committee and a vice-governor of Qinghai provincial government. At the national level, Yan is one of the two Tibetan alternate members in the 19<sup>th</sup> central committee of the CCP. The other one is Norbu Dhondup (b.1960), who is currently a member of the standing committee of the TAR party committee and the party secretary of Chamdo prefectural city.

The inclusion of Yan in the TAR party committee has increased the number of Tibetans

in the TAR's apex body. There were only two Tibetans, Lobsang Gyaltsen (b.1957) and Che Dalha (b.1958), among five people in the TAR party committee, including its party secretary Wu Yingjie. It is quite likely that Che Dalha, who is currently a full-member of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP and also the governor of TAR, would replace Lobsang Gyaltsen as the chairman of TAR's People's Congress in the next reshuffle. Considering age and party seniority (two important factors in the leadership transfer/promotion in China's political system), Lobsang Gyaltsen sits on top of the TAR promotion list to replace Pema Thinley as a member of the standing committee of the National People's Congress (NPC).

Similarly, Pema Thinley (b.1951), a veteran Tibetan party cadre in TAR with military background and one of the two Tibetan members of the standing committee of the NPC, remains the safest bet to replace Jampa Phuntsok (b.1947) as a vice chairman of the NPC. On the other hand, Jampa Phuntsok would join the group of retired Tibetan party elders like Ragdi, who still yields enormous influence in TAR. The other Tibetan member in the standing committee of the NPC is Jamyang Shepa Rinpoche, who is the head of Labrang Tashi Khyil monastery in northeastern Tibet (Amdo) in present day Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province. He holds several ceremonial positions namely, deputy director of the ethnicity committee of the NPC, chairman of the Buddhist Association of China and the president of China's Tibetan Language Buddhism Institution.

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Tseten which appeared in Tibet Policy Institute's website on July 28, 2020.

According to an unverified source, Jamyang Shepa Rinpoche appointed Jamyang Gyatso Tsang, one of the top Geshe from his monastery to become the principal tutor of Gyaltsen Norbu, China's handpicked 11th Panchen Lama.

It is still unclear about Yan's other roles in TAR apart from a deputy party secretary. Usually, the deputy party secretaries hold the chairmanship of several leading small groups in TAR. Leading small groups are where the TAR party committee formulates Tibet-specific policies. More importantly, Yan would likely become a full member of the central committee of the CCP at the next Party Congress. It is important to note that the number of Tibetan representations in the full and alternate categories in the 20<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the CCP may vary. This has been clearly seen from previous compositions of the Tibetan representation in the central committee of the CCP from both categories.

On the other hand, Ding Ye Xian has become a deputy party secretary of Qinghai provincial party committee and the acting governor of Qinghai provincial government. Sooner or later, he will take up the post of governor succeeding Liu Ning (Ch), who was transferred to Liaoning province.<sup>2</sup> Ding would most likely follow the path of Hao Peng, who was a TAR's vice governor before he was transferred to Qinghai and eventually promoted to the chairman and party committee secretary of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). While he was in Qinghai, Hao served as the provincial governor between 2013 and 2016 succeeding Luo Huining.

Another interesting transfer and promotion coming out of TAR is of a Tibetan party cadre Penpa Tashi (b.1964), who is from Lhodrag in Lhoka.<sup>3</sup> He has been transferred to Beijing to take up the post of deputy director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC). During his long stint in TAR, he held many significant positions such as party secretary of Nagchu prefectural city, TAR vice governor, member

of the standing committee of the TAR party committee and head of the TAR propaganda department. His early career was largely spent in Beijing working in the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and eventually heading its Tibet Bureau.

This begets an important question. Who would replace Penpa Tashi as a member of the standing committee of the TAR party committee? Considering the party tradition, the replacement has to be either come from TAR government or People's Congress.

The appointment of Penpa Tashi in the SEAC (མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་ཁྲུ་ཡོན་ལྷན་ཁང་།) as its deputy director could be speculated in a way that the party is grooming him to become the head of the Commission. In that case, he would become the first Tibetan to head the Commission since its inception in 1949. However, the importance and visibility of the SEAC and the State Administration for Religious Affairs (ཆོས་ལུགས་ལས་དོན་ཁྲུ་ཡོན་ལྷན་ཁང་།), the two key government agencies responsible for "ethnic" and religious affairs have been diminished substantially by virtually making them subordinate to the UFWD, where the SEAC reports to the UFWD, while the SARA and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) will be absorbed into the UFWD as two internal bureaus.

It remains to be seen a major reshuffle in TAR and other Tibetan areas ahead of the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, particularly in the TAR People's Political Consultative Conference.

## China Takes Railway Route to Tighten Grip on Tibet\*

Since China's occupation of Tibet in 1949, all major infrastructure development in this region has been driven by China's strategic calculations and security needs for consolidating its control over Tibet and secure its position on the long Himalayan borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan. From the construction of highways and bridges in the early years of its entry to Tibet, to bringing railway connections to the major cities of Tibet, including capital Lhasa, in 2006, Beijing's emphasis on building strategic infrastructure has been consistent and consequential. In addition to cementing its grip over Tibet, the long disputes over the border with India and to some extent with Bhutan add the extra strategic impetus in spurring a strategy-oriented infrastructural spree in Tibet.

It is in this context that prompted the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping to make statement with reference to Ya'an-Nyingtri section of Sichuan-Tibet Railway. Xi made three key points on why the new railway matters in governing Tibet as a means for "safeguarding national unity, promoting ethnic solidarity and consolidating stability in the border."<sup>1</sup> Hence, it is important to decode Xi's statement and analyse it in the broader political and strategic context of China's colonial project in Tibet as well as its contestation with India.

First, Xi's euphemism of 'safeguarding national unity' means to further integrate Tibet into the Chinese system and big infrastructures, like the railway lines, are often seen as powerful tools to project power to far periphery regions and govern them from the metropolis. From Beijing's perspective, the railway lines in Tibet not only strengthen the scale and speed of force deployment and movement of military assets in the case of a major political and security contingency in Tibet, but also its ability to exploit Tibet's vast natural resources, such as lithium, copper and chromite, which are abundant in the region where the new railway line crosses.<sup>2</sup>

Second, to strip its political coat, 'promoting ethnic solidarity' implies the assimilationist role of the railways in mingling and melting Tibetans into the Chinese way of life and culture, like language and values, which has increasingly been aggressive under Xi Jinping's rule. This is because

unlike the inconvenient road or expensive airway, the railway has the advantage of freighting a large number of people or goods to long distances at cheaper and faster rates. In the context of China's assimilationist policy, the new railway connection is to play a greater role in bringing more Chinese, from miners and migrant workers to businessmen, to work and settle in Tibet—preferably in the border areas like Nyingtri.

Xi's statement also indicates that China wants the Tibetans not only to see the railway lines as a positive development that they should welcome, but also mandates an expression of "solidarity" from a supposedly advanced big Chinese brother. Here, the railway being the gift of development, and therefore, the obligational need of Tibetans to feel and appreciate the 'Chinese generosity'. What is missing is the agency of Tibetans in choosing whether they really need a railway line and where they need it. The issue is that they not only have to accept it, but they also have to remain indebted for it.

Third, the idea that the railway as an instrument to 'consolidate stability' at the disputed border with India does not mean maintaining stability to restore *status quo ante* at the border. In fact, the expression is contradicting itself in that, if one party attempts to alter the status quo at the border, then the other will challenge it which will lead to further escalation. This will further play out in their bilateral relationships as well as at the multilateral levels. This has indeed been the case

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Palden Sonam which appeared in the Tribune on November 23, 2020.

with Doklam standoff in 2017 and even more so with Ladakh today. The term ‘stability’ has to be understood as stable due to domination at the border rather than stability as peace agreed upon by the two countries.

Therefore, from a realist perspective, strategic infrastructure like the railway as a tool for consolidating supremacy in the disputed territories implies both an offensive posture as well as a defence mechanism. Offensive because in the event of a border war with India, the new railway will significantly boost the maneuvering capability of Chinese troops and weapons to be moved within a short time on a larger scale than it was possible before. Strategic development and strategic connections to frontier areas are meant to enhance China’s strategic advantage vis-a-vis India in order to score a long-term tactical advantage over the latter as a resolution to the boundary dispute appears to be more

challenging, with leaders from both sides vowing to defend every inch of what they perceived to be their respective territories.

The defensive role comes with the huge capacity of the railway in transferring more Chinese people to work and settle in towns and villages at the border. China is constructing new towns and enlarging old ones to increase the population size at the border by forcibly relocating Tibetan nomads and farmers to Lhoka and Ngari,<sup>3</sup> which are respectively adjacent to Arunachal in the east and Ladakh in the west. With the development of more economic opportunities like tourism, mining and constructions in the border areas, it also encourages Chinese settlers to put their root there to defend the motherland. In the long term, the growth of Chinese settlements at the border regions can be used as a civilian bulwark to fortify Beijing’s position on what its military can annex/control territories at the border.

In a nutshell, regardless of some of the unintended positive side-effects of the new railway for the local Tibetans, the fundamental logic of the Chinese state, as Xi Jinping pointed out, is to integrate Tibet, assimilate its people and secure a dominant position in the boundary disputes with India.



## RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

### China's Regulation on Religious Groups: A Systematic "Sinicization" of Religions\*

The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued a regulation titled Measures for the Administration of Religious Groups on January 1, 2020.<sup>1</sup> The regulation consists of 41 articles under six chapters that came into effect on February 1, 2020. Although, the regulation is issued under the aegis of SARA, a government agency that oversees religious issues and execute religious policies, the United Front Work Department will now have a direct control and implementation.

The UFWD is a party apparatus under the command of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that looks after the non-Communist Party entities and oversees ethnic and religious issues. The department has gained enormous importance since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the CCP in fall of 2012. He elevated the UFWD to a new height. The first elevation was in 2015 when Xi set up a central leading group on the UFWD.<sup>2</sup>

In his second term due to formally end in 2022, but abolition of presidential term limit and no clear line of succession laid bare Xi's intention to stay in power for the foreseeable future. Xi has reorganized the department by creating three new bureaus<sup>3</sup> over the existing nine. Given the gravity of religious issue, two out of three new bureaus (Eleventh and Twelfth Bureaus) are assigned for religious affairs work. Xi re-emphasized the UFWD as "Magic Weapon" reflecting its growing importance and relevance in Xi Jinping's "new era of rejuvenation."

In addition, Xi held a National Conference on Religious Work in 2016. The conference revolved around two main agendas, "sinicization" of all religions and the need to manage religions according to the "rule of law".<sup>4</sup> The agendas outlined in the conference were reasserted at the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress held in October 2017 making them guiding principles on religion under Xi.

However, the Party's guiding ideology on religion has remained unchanged. In fact, the party can't afford to overhaul its religious policy founded on Marxist secularization theory meaning that religions will inevitably disappear under the "socialist paradise."

Given its utmost importance, Zhang Yijiong, executive deputy head of the UFWD echoed Xi's statement on religion during a press briefing at the sideline of the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. Zhang's statement obliquely illustrates the growing importance the UFWD in management of religions under Xi. At the same time, Zhang made an ahistorical statement that Tibetan Buddhism was originated in ancient China and has Chinese orientation.

Although "sinicization" appears to be a new catchphrase, but "rule of law" is in existence since the time of Jiang Zemin. However, the "rule of law" in PRC's context is "rule by law" where the party-state uses law as a political instrument to control and manipulate every aspect of society, including religion that is often perceived by the Party as a potential threat to its legitimacy.

The latest regulation is simply an extension of the revised Regulation on Religious Affairs (enacted on August 26, 2017) became effective on February 1, 2018. The regulations are solely designed to restrict the growing influence of religions and religious activities both in China

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Tseten which appeared in Tibet Policy Institute's website on May 19, 2020.

and overseas in accordance with Chinese law. For instance, the closure of Bodhi Institute of compassion and wisdom,<sup>5</sup> an international center founded by Khenpo (abbot) Sodhargye of Larung Gar, the largest Buddhist academy situated in eastern Tibet, is certainly linked to his growing international prominence.

Under the pretext of quixotic laws and regulations, Beijing carried out forced demolition of Larung Gar and expelled over fifty percent of its residents making it effectively easier to

control. This was followed by a change in the Monastic Management Committee(MMC) of the academy. The academy was previously under the control of MMC comprised of both party and government officials (mostly monks). It is now under the direct control of party cadres who are handpicked by the party authorities.<sup>6</sup> The Party also created a supervisory position to further strengthen the existing control mechanisms. The supervisor<sup>7</sup> sits above the MMC and is required to manage the overall control of monasteries and religious institutions.

The regulation on religious groups is designed primarily to cut down the number of religious groups deemed “illegal” under these so-called laws and regulations.<sup>8</sup> It also allows the party authorities to extend its control over religious personnel and financial matters of monasteries and religious institutions. At the same time, it demands loyalty from religious personnel and requires them to unswervingly follow Xi’s religious guidelines.<sup>9</sup>

In short, the regulation is intended to achieve the “sinicization” of religions in Xi’s “new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”





## The Chinese State's Paranoia Over Religious Beliefs\*

According to PB Potter, the relationship between religion and state power in China has long been contested because religion was a significant source of resistance against authorities in the Imperial period and perceived as a potential source of threat to the present regime in China.<sup>1</sup> The foreseeable threat that the Chinese leadership anticipates is not only because most of the 'ethnic minorities' in China are deeply devoted to their religions, but more importantly because their devotion and loyalty towards their religion unites and define them. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has issues with minorities and their religion because they do not prioritize their loyalty towards the Party over their faith in their religion.

As a result, with Xi Jinping's ascent to power in 2012, measures to control religious practices of Tibetan Buddhists and policies adopted to intervene in spiritual communities have massively increased as new measures of repression and control over the practice of Tibetan Buddhism have intensified.

Besides harsher punishments, cancelation of celebrations of Buddhist festivals and increasing surveillance in Tibetan monasteries, the Party has introduced new ways to influence and interfere in the selection of monks and nuns, a process and a practice that is a core religious tenet for many believers. There are state-sponsored events to highlight the importance of upholding party's national religious policies. For instance, on June 18, 2020 officials attended the opening ceremony of an Exhibition on Tibetan Buddhism by the United Front Work Department, Propaganda Department, Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee and research institutes. The purpose behind the exhibition as explained by Feng Zhi, Deputy Director and researcher of the Institute of History, China Tibetology Research Center, was to enable people to understand the reincarnation system of Tibetan Buddhism in a more "comprehensive, three-dimensional, and true way."<sup>2</sup>

A similar exhibition was launched in Shannan city (Lhoka) on May 8. Evidently, the official head of the United Front Work Department sought

to explain the rationale behind celebrating the opening of the exhibition. He stated that it was aimed to promote the party's national religious policy such as the Religious Affairs Regulations and Tibet Buddhist Living Buddha Reincarnation Management Measures. He also mentioned that the exhibitions' purpose was to enhance and adapt Tibetan Buddhism with "socialism and cultivate patriotism, constantly strengthen the ideological importance and contribute to long-term peace and stability."

The Seventh Tibet Work Forum, which was convened in Beijing from August 28 to 29, 2020 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), called for the action with regards to national unity and securing China's borders.

These measures are designed by the government to govern Tibet under the Xi Jinping era who issued a similar guideline in 2018 that demanded religious personnel in Tibet to uphold the "Four Standards" to make them patriotic, party loving, law-abiding and influential. The 'Four Standards' policy was introduced in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2018 where Tibetan monks and nuns are required to act as propagandists for the government and the CCP.<sup>3</sup>

From Deng Xiaoping to the present leadership under Xi Jinping, religion in China has been treated as part of a nation-building project that should contribute to the Party's policy and China's

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Lhadon, it was published in the newsvibesofindia on October 1, 2020.

economic growth rather than treating religious freedom as an individual freedom of choice. In fact, Tibet is among the most heavily securitized region in China where people are deeply religious and devotees of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama is a spiritual leader, revered by Tibetans inside Tibet and outside who have often been labelled as a “separatist” by the Chinese government.

According to *Tibet Daily*, a new regulation was passed by the TAR’s People’s Congress in February 2020, requiring all levels of government, companies, community organisations, villages, schools, military groups and religious activity centres be responsible for work on ethnic unity, similar law was introduced in Xinjiang four years earlier.<sup>4</sup> The *Global Times* stated that it was the common responsibility for the people of all ethnic groups to “safeguard national reunification, strengthen ethnic unity and take a clear-cut stand against separatism.”<sup>5</sup> The Chinese government’s obsession over national unity and social stability especially in the “ethnic minority” areas is quite evident in this new regulation.

In a recent turn of events, Tibetan students are barred from participating in any form of religious activity during their winter break. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) noted that on December 31, 2019, a directive was issued by Lhasa Chengguan Haicheng Elementary School containing guidelines on winter break school tasks and projects, healthcare and forbidden behavior, including restrictions on religious activities.<sup>6</sup> This is clearly a violation against the principle of religious freedom stipulated in the constitution of PRC.

However, the constitution also states that the religious freedom stipulated in the constitution entails certain obligations and prohibit acts such as engaging in activities endangering national security, disturbing public order and any kind of crimes in the name of religion. The constitution, the new initiatives and the policies are directed towards the regulation of religion, which are enforced through law,

and administrative regulations. The Politburo Standing Committee member, the Politburo member in charge of propaganda, the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFW), the State’s Council’s Religious Affairs Bureau, Public Security departments have all been given the responsibility to enforce regulations controlling religious activities or supervise over religious ceremonies.

Under policies aimed at ‘sinicizing’ religion, the Chinese government has compelled the monks and nuns to demonstrate “political reliability, moral integrity capable of impressing the public, and willingness to play an active role at critical moments” apart from demonstrating competence in Buddhist studies.<sup>7</sup>

It was also reported that in recent years, the TAR has adopted a policy that incentivizes behaviors to conform to Party’s directives. Most of the state social benefits the monks and nuns in the region enjoyed such as medical insurance, old-age insurance, personal accident insurance, minimum living guarantee and free medical examination are premised on their support to the Party Central Committee, sharing the same ideology and adherence to directives issued by the Party and the government. The ultimate purpose behind these measures remains the maintenance of what the Party deems as “national unity, and to actively guide religion to adapt to ‘Chinese Socialist Society.’

Human Rights Watch states that all of these measures are an attempt to forestall or stop any protest against the state policy. Intrusive official presence in monasteries, pervasive surveillance, routine reeducation campaigns, limits on travel and communications, and regulations discouraging religiosity among government employees and university students affect most monastics and many lay believers. The Chinese Communist Party uses these policies under the guise of public safety and interest to increase religious repression and control.



## Education and Language Policy in Tibet\*

Like empires of the past, China is using its language policy to ensure its hegemony in Tibet. Transportation has played several different roles in the rise of civilizations and also in national defense. For instance, the efficient utilization of roads<sup>1</sup> helped the Roman Empire rule the ancient world.

The good network of roads served two purposes<sup>2</sup> for the Romans: During wars with neighboring kingdoms, it served for quick deployment of soldiers. On the other hand, the well-connected roads helped them send quick reinforcements and to crush rebellions in their conquered colonies.

Like the Romans, China has given utmost priority to infrastructure development. Almost immediately after the conquest of Tibet in 1950s, PRC began constructing highways that would link Tibet with China for the first time in history.<sup>3</sup> Thus, with this step, all roads from Tibet led to Beijing.

The Chamdo-Lhasa Highway (called by the Chinese the Sichuan-Tibet Highway) and Tsongon-Lhasa Highway (Qinghai-Tibet Highway) constructed from 1954–1955<sup>4</sup> were two major routes connecting Tibet with rest of China, which later became the China's modes of transportation and exploitation of everything for its own interests and not for those of Tibet and the Tibetan people.<sup>5</sup>

According to Dawa Norbu in his seminal work on Sino-Tibet relations, he writes: “By 1975 China had completed 91 highways totaling 15,800 kilometers, with 300 permanent bridges in Outer Tibet alone, by which 97% of the region's counties were connected by road.”<sup>6</sup>

Claude Arpi, historian and a prolific commentator on India-Tibet-China affairs, says that the infrastructure development by China in Tibet has served a dual purpose.<sup>7</sup> It helps the Party to control Tibet effectively and also facilitates the People's Liberation Army's militarization of Tibet's borders. But beyond that, these roads

and railways were also engineered for the mass migration of Chinese people in search of work and pleasure in Tibet.

In an interview to the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) based in Dharamshala, India, Tsering Dorjee, a native of Jomolangma (Mt. Everest) basin who fled from Tibet and settled abroad, in his observation for a year from 2005-06. He said, “the number of Chinese settlers had mushroomed dramatically since he left.”

For instance, the Tsongon-Lhasa Railway (Qinghai-Tibet Railway) brought around 1.5 million passengers into Tibet during its first year of operation, ending on 30 June, 2007.<sup>8</sup> In its 13 years of operation, much has changed in the socio-economic and the cultural landscape of Tibet.

The peaceful uprisings of 2008 were direct results of continued undermining of economic, social, cultural and religious rights of the Tibetan people.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, also in the veiled garb of development, China is committing what Rinzin Dorjee, a Research Fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute based in Dharamshala, calls “urbancide.”<sup>10</sup> By this he means the extinguishing of Tibetan culture and identity through an influx of millions of Chinese migrants to Tibet. This policy is still being implemented.

Because of the increasing Chinese population in Tibet, most of the services and facilities now cater to them. For instance, Jampa Xiangbalacuo (Tib: Jampa Latso), in a paper titled “Empowering Women Health Workers in Rural Tibet” (2017) submitted to the SIT (School for International

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Karma Tenzin which appeared in Asia Times on February 22, 2021.

Training) Graduate Institute in the US state of Vermont, highlighted the language barriers faced by female Tibetan patients at a government hospital in Garze (Ganzi), in Tibet's Kham region.

She writes, "The county towns are far, inconvenient and expensive, and women face language barriers in communicating with Chinese male doctors." Recently too, during the Covid-19 pandemic, such indifference toward Tibetan people became even more apparent.

According to a tweet on February 10 from @Lhatseri,<sup>11</sup> the Twitter handle of Tibetan historian and Professor Tsering Shakya, about the lack of interpreters for Tibetan patients in hospitals, "Many Tibetans are refusing to go to hospitals because there are no interpreters, [despite] a new campaign telling people that interpreters will be provided."

Such institutional biases are extensive throughout Tibet. One stark example is the introduction of bilingual education in Tibet. In reality, this policy was implemented to suppress the learning and teaching of Tibetan language.<sup>12</sup>

In East Turkistan too, China has politicized language policy. Because of frequent changes of official script, different generations of Uighurs and other students of Turkic origin were exposed to different written forms of their language. The deliberate discontinuity of the traditional Arabic script has resulted in severe interruptions to the culture, heritage, traditions, and identity of the Uighur and other Turkic populations in East Turkistan. Like East Turkistan, Tibet faced a similar language dilemma created by China. Because of continued discriminatory language policies,<sup>13</sup> ordinary Tibetans have expressed widespread concern about the increasing loss of fluency in Tibetan among the younger generations.<sup>14</sup>

For decades, scholars, rights groups and researchers around the world have expressed concerns over the deteriorating status of Tibetan language in Tibet. Despite numerous protests

and petitions, the marginalization of Tibetan language has now reached an extreme level under the current authoritarian party-state headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping.

### Why Tibetan Language is Still Repressed?

Rita Mae Brown, an American novelist, poet and activist, has lucidly captured the importance of language in two sentences. She writes, "Language is the roadmap of a culture. It tells you where its people come from and where they are going." Hence language is like a soul of the body; without it, the body is lifeless.

It appears that China wants Tibetan people to forget their own history and also wants Tibetan identity to disappear. In short, through the systematic marginalization of Tibetan language, China wants to erase the identity of the Tibetan people.

Tsering Shakya, in his book *Dragon in the Land of Snows: The History of Tibet Since 1948*, clearly captured the situation during the Cultural Revolution. He writes, "On the surface it seemed that Chinese had succeeded in assimilating the Tibetans: All expressions of Tibetan identity and culture was forbidden with the exception of the language, now the only marker of Tibet's separateness from China."<sup>15</sup>

Hence there is no doubt that whatever China has been doing in Tibet is not accidental or unintentional but is systematically planned and premeditated. Countries sharing borders with Tibet and China must have realized that by now.

The Soviet Union to a large extent influenced the policies implemented by China in Tibet. In order to consolidate and maintain his power and to keep the empire together, Nikita Khrushchev had to adopt more restrictive language policies than his two predecessors, Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Soviet linguists and ethnographers insisted that changing a person's language was a requirement for any change in ethnic identity.

Hence, Khrushchev focused on language policy

as the best hope to counter rising nationalism and ethnic uprisings that threatened the political unity of the USSR.<sup>16</sup> Taking a leaf out of Stalin and Khrushchev's playbooks, Mao Zedong understood the importance of destroying an identity lies in destroying its language. During Mao's authoritarian rule, the Cultural Revolution took an enormous toll on Tibetan culture. And now China under Xi is pursuing a similar policy. Another reason for replacing the Tibetan language with Chinese language as the medium of instruction could be a significant development during the brief period of liberalization when Tibetan students were instructed in their own language. Many scientific studies have proved the advantage of having one's mother tongue as the medium of instruction in students' learning abilities in the later stages of academic development. Among Tibetan students in exile as well, there is remarkable growth of overall academic achievement after the introduction of Tibetan as the medium of instruction in most of the Tibetan schools in India.

And China would have many reasons not to be interested in academic development of Tibetan students in Tibet. In short, after completely connecting Tibet with China and entrenching its authoritarian rule under the garb of the infrastructure development in Tibet, China started unleashing plans of exploitation of Tibet's natural resources. And most importantly, the roads and railways became the modes of acceleration of the influx of Chinese people to Tibet.

Hence, along with infrastructure development, China also implemented enforced cultural assimilation, economic marginalization and environmental destruction in Tibet. In fact, the list is endless.

Currently, China is trying to revive stalled projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. To date, more than 60 countries—accounting for two-thirds of the world population—have signed to the project or indicated an interest in doing so. Now it is

imperative to assess what happened in Tibet and the Tibetan people. What happened in Tibet could happen again anywhere, and now because of the BRI, it has become faster, cheaper and easier.

The year 2020 will be remembered as one of the most disruptive times in our collective living memory. The Covid-19 virus that had its origin in the Wuhan region of China has devastated lives, crippled economies, and brought the world to a screeching standstill.

In December 2019 the news emerged of the first human infection with this coronavirus, with the World Health Organization basing its claims of the origin and spread of the virus on Beijing's narrative on the same.

The Chinese regime under President Xi Jinping came under intense global scrutiny for its actions during this pandemic, ranging from covering up key information about the virus to suppressing citizens who dared to speak about the pandemic, right up to threatening governments in Europe and Australia that sought an independent inquiry into the origins and spread of the virus.

The relationship between Tibet and Beijing has been defined by the latter's hardline policies. China's disastrous implementation of "Democratic Reforms" in Tibet the Cultural Revolution was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Tibetans and the destruction of countless monasteries in Tibet. The Communist Party led regime has not only suppressed hard on the people of Tibet but has sought to change Tibet into "China's Tibet."

Tibet remains one of the least free countries in the world due to China's hardline policy.<sup>17</sup> In particular, education and preservation of the Tibetan language have suffered under those policies.

China is not on the same page as the rest of the world when it comes to educating younger generations. The Communist Party of China's education policy has two doors that have led to two different realities. The first reality has

been the education of Chinese youth, which has significantly contributed to the economic development of the country as a whole. The second reality, which is a grim one, has been for the “ethnic minorities,” Tibetan youth in particular, as the education system that they are pushed into by the government serves as an effective propaganda tool to mold their opinions while tearing away the fabric of their own culture and language.

As the world came to focus on dealing with the pandemic, China continued its oppressive policies on the Tibetan people. In April, the local government in Amdo Ngawa (in Chinese Aba), Sichuan province, announced a new policy that mandated Mandarin as the medium of instruction in all schools except while teaching Tibetan language.<sup>18</sup> This contravenes the Chinese constitution itself, which includes articles protecting minority languages. However, the rule of law has always given way to rule by law in China.

This policy has precedence in past state directives. For example, a similar law was announced in Rebkong (aka Tenrong, Qinghao) in 2010, leading to thousands of students marching in the streets in protest against the government.<sup>19</sup> Although the population in Tibet continues to rise but the reason is attributed largely to the movement of a large number of Chinese into the region, due to the encouragement of Beijing including tourists and migrants seeking employment. Furthermore, many of these people later are able to receive permanent residence in Tibet, the cumulative effect of this mass movement being that Tibetans are under threat of becoming minorities in their own land while their language and culture come under increasing pressure of assimilation. In the Tibet Autonomous Region alone, 20 million to 25 million inland tourist visits have been recorded annually, putting immense pressure on the Tibetan population to speak a language that is not their own and thereby further marginalizing the use of their native tongue.<sup>20</sup>

Despite such tremendous pressure from local and state governments, the Tibetan people have resisted. The large-scale protests in 2008<sup>21</sup> during the Beijing Olympics remain a vivid testimony of their resistance, while the 2010 student protests in Tibet reveal the dissatisfaction of Tibetans across generations with the Chinese policies aimed at marginalizing and assimilating their unique language and culture. These incidents show that the policies implemented in Tibet are not being accepted by the younger or elder generations who have lived through the discriminating education policies of China. It is high time to implement the education policies that cater to the genuine needs of the Tibetans, a policy that benefits them, their future, and their cultural heritage.

### **Politics of Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet**

Education exists for holistic human development. The formulation of education policy of a country should give importance to the comprehensive development of its society by considering the welfare and aspiration of its people at its core. However, the education policy introduced by the Chinese government in Tibet bears striking similarities to the colonial education policies in the 19th and 20th centuries aimed at psychological and cultural transformation of colonized ‘native’ people.

Bilingual Education Policy is essentially a part of China’s colonial project. As with colonial practices of the past, this was done for two reasons: to disorient the local people and to provide administrative convenience to the colonizers.

China uses education to indoctrinate people politically in order to win their loyalty. Considering the huge Chinese population, Mao Zedong focused more on quantity rather than quality when it came to education. This is because “the quantity strategy prioritizes ideological, revolutionary training,” while “the quality strategy emphasizes academic and technical education.”<sup>22</sup>



The “quantity education” policy was initially introduced in Tibet to educate the masses on socialism and communism. However, this policy was replaced by “quality education” when Deng Xiaoping became leader of the PRC in the late 1970s.<sup>23</sup>

Although “quality education” has brought tremendous economic benefit to China, it has been culturally detrimental to the Tibetans. Bilingual education was forced on Tibetans with preference given to the Chinese language. Tibetans were also discouraged from preserving their own language even though Article 4 of the PRC constitution provides language rights to the so-called minority areas, including Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang.

The education policy in the minority areas has a different priority than other areas of China. Catriona Bass writes: “While Han Chinese were to be educated to provide technical personnel for economic development, the overriding goal of education for ‘minority’ nationalities was to encourage political allegiance towards China and enhance stability in border areas.”<sup>24</sup>

Bilingual education policy in China is also different from that of the minority areas. Chinese students in China are educated to keep up with modern scientific and economic developments. On the other hand, minorities are educated to gain loyalty and induce Chinese nationalism. Textbooks in minority schools focus on creating a sense of “one China” and propagate communist ideology. Literature available to the minority students mainly consists of direct translations from Chinese sources, which are often about political ideology.

In Bilingual Education, two models of education system were introduced in schools in Tibet. In the first model, all major subjects are taught in the Tibetan language and not Chinese. When this model was introduced in Sichuan province, attendance at the primary level was high. But the numbers dropped considerably at the middle-school level for practical reasons such

as employment opportunities requiring good command over Chinese language.

In the second model, all subjects are taught in the Chinese language and not Tibetan. In this case, 95% of study and reading materials are in Chinese and just 5% are in Tibetan. The shortage of literature in Tibetan is a clear sign of discriminatory policy of the PRC toward the Tibetans.

### **Tibetan Language in Daily Life**

The prevalence of Chinese language makes it more useful than Tibetan as most government offices use Chinese language. Tibetan students are taught in Tibetan as required by Article 4 of the PRC constitution, but they find it difficult to pursue higher studies, as these institutions require competency in Mandarin.

Even after graduation, many young Tibetans remain unemployed as recruitment examinations in Tibet require a good command of the Chinese language. Over the years, a large number of Chinese teachers had been encouraged to work in Tibet with no training to teach in Tibetan language.<sup>25</sup>

Without command over Chinese language, Tibetans find it difficult to find work in their own country. Travel tickets and bank transactions in Tibet are printed in Chinese. Even though transportation facilities have improved over the last few decades, Tibetans who lack proper knowledge of Chinese have difficulties traveling even within Tibet. Even the postal-service system in Tibet uses the Chinese language. Tibetans who don't know Chinese are not able to use this service. This makes it difficult to preserve and propagate the Tibetan language.

### **Resistance to Discriminatory Language Policy**

The Chinese government has strove to assimilate Tibetans with increasing number of Chinese people who settle in Tibet. Tibetan resistance to these actions has grown stronger over the years. Many popular Tibetan singers have composed



songs that urge the Tibetans to preserve and promote their own language. Individual initiatives, such as informal Tibetan-language instruction outside the school system, have also been started, especially by the Tibetan monasteries.

Over the years, Tibetan graduates have protested many times over the language policy. Consequently, many of these language activists have faced imprisonment for alleged crime of “separatism” and threatening “national security.”

Tashi Wangchuk, a Tibetan businessman, is one of the language activists. He was sentenced to five years in prison for campaigning to preserve the Tibetan language from the increasing dominance of Chinese language.<sup>26</sup> He was interviewed by The New York Times in May 2015 for his language advocacy. A video clip of the interview

appeared later in public domain and he was, subsequently, charged with the alleged crime of “inciting separatism.”

Tsering Woesser, a Tibetan poet and blogger, writes that because of the corrosion of the Tibetan language, many of the Tibetans who have self-immolated demanding for the protection of the Tibetan language. There has been 155 reported cases of self-immolations in Tibet since 2009.<sup>27</sup>

China’s latest onslaught is also on the Tibetan language as well. Adrian Zenz, in a report titled “Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet,” he writes, “In the context of Beijing’s increasingly assimilatory ethnic-minority policy, it is likely that these policies will promote a long-term loss of linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.”

Hence, due to mass tourism it further leads to commercialization and exploitation of Tibetan culture. In order to cater to the needs and demands of the growing Chinese tourists, Tibetans are given training in low-skill jobs in the hospitality sector and also given Chinese language classes. Already in 2020, according to a study of Chinese official documents, over half a million Tibetans were trained in military-style coercive training across Tibet. Despite the Covid-19 Pandemic, in 2020 around 35 million tourists flooded into Tibet and most of them were Chinese tourists from China. With China’s change in its approach towards Tibetans and other “minority regions,” Tibetan language and education will face further marginalization.



## SURVEILLANCE AND CYBERSECURITY

### CCP's Troll Soldiers Attempt to Hijack Virtual Geneva Forum 2020\*

The Chinese government has one of the most comprehensive propaganda networks in the world, aggressively working to disseminate misinformation and influence how it is viewed from outside and within its borders. The state-sponsored troll machinery, notoriously known as the '50 cent army,' worked overtime earlier this month to disrupt the Central Tibetan Administration organized Geneva Forum 2020.

The annual Geneva Forum this year was held virtually from 9 to 13 November, 2020 with live streaming on social media network. The Forum deliberated on this year's central theme "China's Policy on Freedom of Religion: Global Impact" with sessions on deteriorating freedom of religion in regions under China leading to persecution of various religious groups including Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners.

Throughout the five-day Forum, China rigorously pushed its propaganda and incessantly disseminated misinformation aimed at disrupting the organisers who were trying to collect questions from viewers in the comments section of the live stream.

The government-employed troll army proficient in multiple languages, reportedly numbering from five hundred thousand to two million, worked to post comments on the internet, praising the image and integrity of the CCP and attack its critics with the intention of fabricating facts as well as removing content deemed as unfavourable.<sup>1</sup> They are specifically employed across multiple government propaganda departments, private corporations, and news outlets. According to a report in the Washington Post in 2016, these state-sponsored employees have been generating about 448 million comments annually since 2012.<sup>2</sup>

During the pandemic lockdown and subsequent increase in online and virtual activities all over

the world, it has been reported that the 50 Cent Army has been given a pay rise to 70 cent per word that they write or delete.<sup>3</sup> Their primary purpose supposedly being to cover up any posts that run counter to the state narrative and bolster Xi Jinping's image as a saviour of the country. These paid commentators actively engage with global social media forums like Twitter, Instagram and Facebook by mobilizing disinformation and countering online criticisms against CCP within China and abroad.

< 收入详情

最新100条转发收入如下:

序号	时间	文章	收入
1	04-08 11:45	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
2	04-08 11:36	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
3	04-08 11:28	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
4	04-08 11:24	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
5	04-08 11:20	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
6	04-08 11:18	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70
7	04-08 11:15	今天, 美国宣告崩塌! 已无悬念!	¥0.70

Breakdown indicating increment in remuneration for sharing misleading information on the internet. Source: China News Center

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Dalha that appeared in *Phayul* on December 1, 2020.

Thinlay Chukki, Special Appointee for Human Rights at the Tibet Bureau in Geneva and one of the organisers of the Forum said, “The Geneva Forum has been an important international platform to deliberate and report on human rights violations being carried out by the Chinese Communist Party regime. It is building up a strong network and a common converging space for human rights advocates, activists, diplomats, academicians, politicians and so on.”

Speaking about incessant trolling during the Forum, she noted, “the 50 Cent Army’s attack on the Facebook live broadcast of the event is a recognition of this fact and we take it as an appreciation for the important work we are doing through this forum. We hope to come back stronger and bring together a much diverse group in future.”

During the Geneva Forum live broadcast on Facebook, paid CCP commentators wrote offensive comments about the Forum, the participants, and human right activists. They plotted to create a false narrative on CCP’s development in Tibet and East Turkestan and tried to disrupt the proceedings of the Forum. During the course of the Forum, thousands of comments were posted pushing CCP’s propaganda and official narrative.

The screenshot photo (See fig no: 1) shows unambiguous first-hand evidence about the existence of the 50 Cent Army, predominantly commenting in three different languages - Tibetan, English and Mandarin. For instance, the Facebook profile by the name ‘AK Gazi’ actively participated during the entire Geneva Forum and posted assertions about the CCP’s alleged development in Tibet and East Turkistan in multiple languages.

Similarly, another (see fig no: 2) fake Facebook ID user, ‘MD Mosarep’ commented both in English and Tibetan languages during the Forum. While commenting in English, the user identified himself as a person of colour and tried to divert the discussions to Black Rights Movement. On the other hand, while posting in Tibetan language, the same Facebook ID identified himself as a Tibetan and tried to spin the narrative to capitalism vs communism.

Analysing the flow of comments during the Forum, it is evident that the trolls typically avoid arguments or direct discussions, which is indicative of their lack of knowledge and information on the issues being discussed. Instead, they focus on posting CCP’s deceptive narratives in multiple languages filled with propaganda or baseless allegations.

Studying the usage of Tibetan language in the comments, it could be assumed that the troll army also employs Tibetans from Tibet or Chinese netizens well versed in Tibetan language.

Dr Tenzin Tsultrim, Visiting Research Fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute, and one of the panelists while reacting to the orchestrated online activities noted, “From the barrage of comments during Geneva Tibet Forum 2020 Facebook live streaming, one may conclude with certainty about the CCP’s relentless attempts in disrupting anything going against their state-approved narrative even beyond their territorial regime. This incident also highlights CCP’s insecurities about their alleged legitimacy beyond its geographical territory.”



Figure 1: A screengrab of the virtual conference



Figure 2: A screengrab of the virtual conference

Online trolling and posting of divisive comments using fake IDs by the 50 Cent Army is not a new phenomenon within the Tibetan community. The President of the Central Tibetan Administration, Dr Lobsang Sangay has urged Tibetans to be cautious about the increasing number of fake IDs, and expressed concerns over their involvement in spreading misinformation especially in light of the upcoming Tibetan general elections.


Based on China's troll army's nefarious online activities during the Geneva Forum and the ongoing Covid-19 information war, it can be safely concluded that the CCP has invested heavily in its cyberspace propaganda machinery to make it more subtle and sophisticated than before. The large deployment and reported pay rise of its 50 Cent Army is a clear sign of CCP's growing insecurities over its failed policies inside Tibet and the violation of basic human rights of Tibetans. The world must realise that CCP's propaganda machinery and troll army are spewing lies, misinformation, and censorship. These are clear threats in the era of digital revolution and weakens the core foundations of a free and fair flow and access to information.



## Mass Surveillance and 5G in Tibet: Oppression and Espionage\*

China is widely expanding its surveillance network to strengthen and maintain vigilance of its entire population by tracking peoples' movements through cell phones and monitoring contents of telephonic conversations and personal social media accounts. And the way the government attempts to transform the internet into a system of surveillance and censorship poses a fundamental threat to freedom of expression and movement. This is further intensified amidst Covid 19 pandemic that was first reported in China in 2019.<sup>1</sup> The rise of surveillance technology in China has further widened its scope and business models.

Cities in China are under the heaviest CCTV surveillance in the world, according to a new analysis by Comparitech,<sup>2</sup> which provides information for research and comparative analysis of tech services. It has been widely reported that China today has about 200 million CCTV cameras in use, a figure predicted to rise by 213% in 2022 to 626 million. China is projected to have one public CCTV camera for every two people. However, the Comparitech report<sup>3</sup> suggests the number could be far higher.



Data on most surveilled cities in the world.  
Source: Statista

Ever since Xi Jinping<sup>4</sup> tightened his power grip on technology and surveillance, many new intensive strategies to suppress the freedom of expression have been implemented. This includes introduction of New Cybersecurity Law,

the launch of Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and the initiation of a Social Credit System<sup>5</sup>—a score-based system relying on the adoption of desired behaviour based on social merits. This system both punishes and rewards key behaviours through a range of measures such as public shaming, travel bans, limited or extended business opportunities, and favourable or devalued credit ratings. The ultimate goal is to hammer into citizens the idea that “keeping trust is glorious and breaking trust is disgraceful.”

The point system incentivises lawfulness, integrity and trustworthiness with real-time impacts on what citizens can and cannot do. Perks for good behaviour could lead to privileges of faster internet services, travel ticket booking convenience in flights and trains, and even concessions on advance deposits for renting cars and booking hotels. Having a low social credit score could mean restrictions on travel, refusal to issuance of passport, difficulty in getting employment and being publicly shamed among others.<sup>6</sup> In 2020, according to a recent arrival from Tibet, has informed anonymously that “the Social Credit System is now implemented in the Tibet Autonomous Region.”

### Surveillance and Propaganda

Amidst fears of the coronavirus sending billions of people into lockdown around the world, China is widely expanding its mass surveillance network.<sup>7</sup> It is true that such measures have proven more effective during the pandemic by tracking

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Dalha which appeared in Bitter Winter on August 7, 2021



people's movements through cell phones, and have provided services through robots delivering food to hospitals, facial recognition cameras tracking people's temperature, and mechanical drones enforcing lockdown for quarantines. However, Chinese authorities are now putting considerable pressure on private companies to hand over sensitive data collected for anti-epidemic purposes,<sup>8</sup> and some experts fear the surveillance measures implemented during the pandemic could become permanent.

The Chinese government has one of the most comprehensive propaganda networks in the world, aggressively working to disseminate misinformation and influence how it is viewed outside and within its borders. In 2020, even in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, Beijing has moved from mask diplomacy to influencing the WHO to peddling conspiracy theories stating that Europe is the site of origin for the virus. Similarly, a year ago, the Spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Lijian Zhao actively sought to push forward the unverified claim that the US military has actually brought the virus to Wuhan city. Ironically, even if Twitter is banned inside China, its foreign diplomats have been actively using it as a platform to multiply official narratives, painting it in a positive light while deflecting criticism levelled against it as a "Western-driven propaganda." China's widespread and intensive practises of mass-surveillance and censorship have served as a perfect foil to continue human rights violations with impunity in Tibet.

Similarly, China's state-controlled media networks such as Global Times, Xinhua, etc. have been persistently attempting to change public opinion in favour of the state policies and actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hence, China's propaganda targets both its domestic as well as international audiences to achieve its purpose. Beijing employs the use of a vast network of surveillance technology to stifle any criticism for its policies as well as control

over its vast population.

Over the years, China's surveillance system in Tibet has been growing and evolving at an unprecedented scale and speed. The abundance of manned and unmanned checkpoints, AI, CCTV camera networks and re-education centres under the garb of national security have added another layer of control to an already extremely controlled and oppressed<sup>9</sup> environment in Tibet.

### **Huawei and 5G in Tibet**

Tibetans are continuously controlled through camera networks and artificial intelligence. Now, Huawei's highest 5G base station on Mount Everest will also favour international cyber-espionage. The earliest signs of China's construction of three 5G stations in Tibet were reported in January 2019 after the establishment of Huawei's building at the Lhasa Post, Telecommunications school and the office of Tibet Post groups in Lhasa.<sup>10</sup> Dhoundup (name changed on request) from Lhasa said in an interview with this publication, "Chinese government ensures streaming quality with the capabilities of optimization for introduction of 5G, but in reality there is no much network speed difference between 5G and 4G at present."

In 2020, Huawei, a Chinese multinational telecommunication giant, teamed up with China Telecom, the Chinese state-owned telecommunication company, to set up in Tibet the world's highest 5G<sup>11</sup> base station at an altitude of 6,500 meters. 5G is the fifth generation of wireless communication technologies, enabling a new wave of innovation and offering greater bandwidth network capacity. 5G is also the next generation of cellular technology, with download speeds 10 to 100 times faster than 4G LTE networks.<sup>12</sup> Lhundup (name changed on request) from Yushu (Kham) mentioned that, "There is always slow network connection in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet, Shigatse, etc. as compared to the rest of Chinese cities. The speed of internet always gets slowed down if political protests occur within the prefecture." Experts believe

that 5G, which can support the internet far more effectively than its predecessors can serve a wide range of military purposes, including monitoring mountainous borders and assisting in the deployment of weapons.

### Why 5G on Mount Everest?

The setup of 5G network on the Mount Everest has great potential for changing the world, particularly in powering the precise monitoring using Artificial Intelligence. The ability to harness these technologies expand the scale and scope of threat by making it easier to deploy sensors and quickly transmit high volumes of data for real-time analysis. Mountainous regions that do not require such efficient communication systems are now equipped with such systems to surveil against tourists as well as residents of these bordering areas.



Chinese engineers built the world highest 5G base station on the Mouth Everest. Source: South China Morning Post

With the introduction of 5G networks, it opens avenues for cyber-espionage, international data theft, and domestic spying within global digital networks. China installed 350,000 5G network relays—about ten times more than the United States—for enhanced geolocation. Each of these relays, equipped with an expensive network of surveillance cameras backed with facial recognition technology, has enabled authorities to track and monitor the movement of Tibetans. Security experts, lawmakers, and intelligence officials have consistently warned

about the security loopholes, and the system could be exploited by the Chinese government for espionage thereby presenting a potentially grave border security risk.

There needs to be concern over China's intention to launch Huawei's 5G networks in Tibet. It would make it easier to deploy sensors and enable quick transfer of high volumes of data for real-time analysis. Companies facilitating digital surveillance in Tibet include Alibaba, search provider Baidu, chat app operator Tencent holdings, voice recognition company iFlyTek and facial recognition system Sense Time. State subsidies and freehand to use Tibet as an open laboratory make Tibet an enticing proposition for these businesses to invest and perfect their latest technologies. Companies operating in Tibet enjoy a highly reduced tax rate of 9% compared to the standard corporate tax rate of 25% for the rest of China.<sup>13</sup>

The widespread implementation of surveillance, leading to the intrusion of privacy, may become a cause for further unrest in restricted regions. The absence of freedom and opportunities for people to express their grievances will most likely increase their resentment leading to even more collective anger and dissent among Tibetans.

### China's 5G Installation Along the Indo-Tibet Border

China today is one of the biggest spenders on research and development (R&D) in the world. In 2020, China's spending on R&D increased by 10.3 percent to 2.44 trillion renminbi (\$378 billion), accounting for 2.4 percent of its GDP. In March 2021, during the annual session of the National People's Congress, Premier Li Keqiang announced that Beijing will aim to increase the nationwide R&D spending by more than 7 percent annually.<sup>14</sup>

One of objectives of China's R&D push is the latest fifth generation, or 5G, wireless technology. The advent of 5G is expected to boost wireless connectivity and communications, thus enabling

a new wave of innovations and offering greater bandwidth network capacity. 5G technology is also expected<sup>15</sup> to be a step-change in mobile networking, promising exponentially faster download speeds and data-sharing in real time and reduced network latency. Li set a goal for China to get 56 percent of the country on 5G networks this year, and China is aiming to complete the installation of 5G network infrastructure as outlined in the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan.

According to public data from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), by the end of 2020,<sup>16</sup> China has built the largest 5G network in the world, with over 718,000 5G base stations throughout the country and 5G coverage for all prefecture-level cities, as well as over 200 million 5G terminal connections. This is at least 10 times the 5G network in the United States, and far outstrips 5G networks in other countries.<sup>17</sup>

Analysts attribute China's lead in the rollout and adoption of 5G in large part to policy directions from Beijing, which has set aggressive targets for 5G connectivity for the country's state-run telecom operators.

Among its many other benefits, the Chinese government will likely take advantage of 5G to advance the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for its centralized surveillance. In future, where a variety of activities will revolve around AI, analysts believe that 5G represents a huge opportunity for the government to collect ever-more data, allowing it to further monitor critics and stifle opposition.

China has invested billions of dollars in the upkeep and improvement of its surveillance capabilities for social control. Moreover, the intensity of this mass surveillance system is far more intrusive in regions where China alleges to face threats to its "security," such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.<sup>18</sup>

In Tibet, China claims that more than 98 percent of villages have been linked with

4G networks, optical fibers, and broadband internet services since 2019. From 2020, China began strengthening the overall development of 5G network infrastructure in Tibet. At the third session of the Eleventh Tibetan People's Congress, the chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Che Dalha, said that the region expects all seats in its cities and prefectures to be covered with 5G networks by the end of 2020.<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile, the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been working with private enterprises to build advanced high-speed network and connection infrastructure for its border troops.

Kampala (Ch: Ganbala) in Nagartse County of Lhoka (Ch: Shannan) prefecture is known for having the highest manually operated radar stations in the world, at an elevation of 5,374 meters above sea level. According to a military news portal sponsored by the PLA, the radar station is outfitted with a 5G base station and has already begun full-fledged operations.<sup>20</sup> The radar station has reportedly given a significant boost to China's surveillance and AI capabilities, while bolstering its power projection in the region. The 5G station will enhance military communications and support a sprawling network for the rapid deployment of army and weapons. Unsurprisingly, the setup of the 5G base station at the radar station overlooking the sensitive border region has drawn considerable concerns from neighbouring countries.

This development has led to a more complicated and dynamic threat to the cyber security landscape. With the advent of the 5G wireless networks, security threat vectors will be bigger than ever before, with greater concern for privacy. Therefore, it is crucial to highlight the security challenges due to the wireless nature of mobile networks, as well as the threat posed by the misuse of potential technologies developed and aided by 5G. It is expected to create an unprecedented opportunity for innovation and progress in data-driven technologies like artificial intelligence, advance manufacturing, and mass

surveillance. The PLA has tried to brush aside the furore over the 5G installations near the Tibetan border, saying that the operations will “bridge the communication gap between soldiers

and their families and friends.” A PLA soldier can now “video chat and witness the growth of his child,” the official discourse pointed out.

However, experts argue that through such rhetoric the PLA is trying to trivialize the installation of the world’s top communications technology in a remote and sensitive border region. Communication technology serves a wide range of military purposes, including enhancing China’s ability to monitor the mountainous border regions and assisting the deployment of guided weapons. The 5G network and early warning capabilities are expected to be a game-changer in China’s favour, further raising tensions across the high Himalayas. China as a totalitarian regime engaging in misinformation, suppression of freedom of speech and movement; its advance in the state-of-art technologies is not a cause for celebration but great concerns. The misuse of technology is not a way forward for a country that wants to be a responsible super power.





## From the Public Space to Cyberspace: CCP's Increasing Repressions in Tibet\*

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made great strides in its overall economic development, but it continues to be an authoritarian party-state determined in asserting its complete dominance to curb freedom of expression, right to information, association and religion. The CCP censors the internet and maintains intensive surveillance apparatus in the form of facial recognition technology<sup>1</sup> and Global Positioning System (GPS)<sup>2</sup> coordination in its occupied territories including Tibet, East Turkistan (Ch. Xinjiang), and Southern Mongolian (Inner Mongolia).

With China's state-sponsored media lacking plurality and disseminations of one-sided narrative on incidents that may tarnish the CCP's image, Chinese leadership in the past and present use both electronic and print media as the mouthpiece of the party for propaganda. An army of bot accounts linked to the Chinese government-backed propaganda campaign is spreading disinformation on social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, etc.<sup>3</sup> They have been used to promote contents attacking critics of the Chinese government and to spread conspiracy theories blaming the US for waging a biological war against China.<sup>4</sup>

### The CCP's Great Firewall and the Freedom of Expression

Over the last few decades of upsurge in the usage of internet, dramatic changes took place in China with the rise of social media. Social media allows a wider spread of information that has never previously been a phenomenon in China. The two major Chinese social media players are Sina Weibo and WeChat mobile messaging applications.

In less than a decade, both Weibo and WeChat have grown exponentially. By the middle of 2020, WeChat has over one billion monthly active users and is declared as the fifth most used social media app in the world. Recently, the Government of India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology banned 118 apps including WeChat for its espionage activities and thereby threatening India's national security.<sup>5</sup>

China is considered as having one of the most pervasive online censorship system in the world, the country's infamous "Great Firewall" blocks access and censors numerous websites.<sup>6</sup> The government continues to block websites run by human rights groups, foreign news outlets, the Google search engine, and social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, etc. This is done in order to gain total control over the digital ecosystem.

The rise of Chinese domestic social media has created a new platform for citizens to express their opinions challenging official narratives despite intense scrutiny and CCP's censorship. No matter how many attempts China made to curtail the freedom of cyberspace, Chinese and Tibetan people often managed to slip through the cracks. For instance, series of images and videos of 156 self-immolations inside Tibet were sent through social media.<sup>7</sup> During the Covid-19 pandemic, Chinese netizens shared information including personal accounts of life under lockdown and discussions with images and videos exposing high ranking officials of their mismanagement, lack of transparency and accountability. There are also veiled criticism of the Chinese government and the Party. This compelled regular publication of rumor-busting pieces, opinions and write ups in government-affiliated media such as Xinhua (English) and Global Times. They even mobilized the "50 cent army" (Wumao) to counter online criticism.

### Tibetan Resistance to China's Sinicizing Policy

Inside Tibet, because of CCP's onslaught on

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Dalha which appeared in Taiwan Times on December 2, 2020



Tibetan language, identity and culture, many Tibetans are actively voicing their concerns on social media. However, sharing of materials which CCP perceives as ‘politically sensitive information’ in the form of text, photo and video on social media platforms is construed as “state subversion” and “leaking state secret.” This could lead to arbitrary detention, arrest, and imprisonment of many Tibetans.<sup>8</sup>

This year, Chinese authorities have arrested 10 Tibetans in Lhasa for spreading ‘rumors’ about the coronavirus outbreak on 12 March on WeChat. According to Free Tibet website, in July, two Tibetan lyricists Khado Tsetan and singer Tsegao, were sentenced to seven years and three years in prison respectively by a Chinese court in North-Eastern Tibet without a trial.<sup>9</sup> They composed, sang and circulated a song praising Tibetan spiritual leader, H.H. the Dalai Lama. They have been charged for alleged involvement in “subversion of state law and leaking information to the outside world, which is considered as a “state security crime.” Along with them, an unidentified girl from the same region was also arrested for sharing the song on social media.

In Chinese prison, detainees face inadequate medical care, insufficient food supply and arduous physical labor. This is commonly practiced in CCP’s gulags across Tibet and East Turkistan (Xinjiang). If complaints were made and voices raised, they are liable to face further punishments.

After release from prison, political prisoners are put under strict surveillance where every move is constantly watched. Their movements are also curtailed. All political prisoners are denied access to subsidies, government jobs and restrictions are further extended to the members of their family. They are kept in a category of ‘black list’ by the local government. Tibetan political prisoners are rarely provided with a fair judicial hearing.

Tibetan language rights advocate Mr. Tashi Wangchuk, was sentenced to five years for

“inciting separatism” in a closed-door trial by Yushu Intermediate People’s Court for voicing concerns in his interview with the New York Times. Despite widespread international outcry, Chinese court rejected his appeal and he was also denied access to his lawyer.<sup>10</sup>

Human Rights Watch’s China director, Sophie Richardson said, “Tashi Wangchuk’s only ‘crime’ was to peacefully call for the right of minority peoples to use their own language.”

In the seventh Tibet Work Forum held for two days in Beijing from 28 to 29 August, President Xi Jinping urged and emphasized to intensify and Sinicize Tibetans and their culture through the “patriotic reeducation.”<sup>11</sup> He also emphasized against “anti-Dalai Lama Campaigns in Tibet” with the expansion of mass education to promote “socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Hence, those who refuse to renounce the Dalai Lama could face severe consequences.

China’s well-known critic Young Hu said in 2011, “When official lies outpace popular rumors the government and its information control mechanism constitutes the greatest obstruction of the truth.” Securitizing Tibet with advanced electronic surveillance, censorship and artificial intelligence will further isolate China from the rest of the world. CCP with the intent to create a network of misinformation and propaganda, suppression of freedom of expression, restriction to the movement of the people, and censorship of information is not a way forward for a country trying to step into prominence in the global limelight and to portray itself as a world leader.

## A Year of Propaganda and Repressive Surveillance Systems in Tibet\*

Since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), propaganda has been one of the most powerful tools. From Mao to Xi, propaganda has always been an integral part of their control of public opinion and one of the important apparatus to elevate their status to cult-like figures among the masses in China. In short, propaganda is central to the operation of the Chinese system of governance.<sup>1</sup> With the coming of Xi and his use of sophisticated technology, it has now become, what Patricia Thorton of Oxford University aptly described it as a ‘technocratic engineering of public opinion’.<sup>2</sup> However, other than peddling oneself, the CCP has also employed propaganda to justify and deny their acts of enforced assimilation and repression in the occupying states of Tibet, East Turkestan (Ch: Xinjiang), Southern Mongolia and their justification for the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law.

When Tibet was invaded by the CCP-controlled China, it was labelled as the “liberation” of Tibet, liberated by People’s Liberation Army (PLA), (PLA earlier called the Red Army). In fact, the CCP has mastered the art of using euphemism. Through their sugar-coated words, the CCP has managed to appease and convince the Tibetan authorities about their so-called missions about modernizing Tibet and leaving Tibet as soon as the Tibetan people were able to stand on their feet and rule by themselves. Professor Dawa Norbu writes, “What the Chinese team told the Sakya Lama and the local authorities in 1953 by way of explanation for their intrusion was the substance of official Chinese policy in Tibet for the next few years...”

Even the enforced agreement was made to appear like a mutual agreement between the two governments. Euphemistically it was called the 17-Point Agreement, when it was in fact signed without the willing agreement of the Tibetan Government and support of the Tibetan people. Later because of the increasing international criticisms over the human rights in Tibet, from 1990s onwards, the CCP has been on a propaganda offensive and since then it has been churning out White Papers on Tibet.<sup>3</sup>

In the first issue of 2020 of China’s Tibet magazine, it carried five pages depicting celebration of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the publication of China’s

Tibet Magazine and the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of China Tibet Online which was celebrated in Beijing on November 22, 2019. A symposium was organized for the occasion, attended by Jampa Phuntsog, vice-chairman of the standing committee of the 12<sup>th</sup> National People’s Congress, and Zhang Yijiong, executive deputy minister of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Zhang has earlier worked in Tibet from 2006-2010 as deputy Communist Party boss. He had earlier remarked that, “Buddhism was a special religion born in our ancient China” in 2017 at the sideline of the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress raising concerns among the Buddhist communities around the world.<sup>4</sup>

Zhang was quoted in the magazine saying that, “... China’s Tibet magazine and China Tibet Online are responsible for reporting on the political, economic, cultural, and social developments in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces, so as to objectively and comprehensively display the history and reality of Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in the surrounding provinces to the rest of the world...”

From remarks by Zhang quoted above in the symposium about the role of print media and internet in propagandizing about the alleged development in Tibet, it seems that the United

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tenzin Tsultrim which appeared in Asia Times on May 29, 2021.

Front Work department (UFWD) would be putting up a lot of money in the coming years to restrengthen their alleged claim over Tibet.

CCP's propaganda is however not limited to international audience alone. On 27 April 2020, the *Global Times*, a mouthpiece of the CCP, carried an article titled "Exiled Tibetans eye return to China for fear of virus" which claimed that some overseas Tibetans living in India and Nepal "...recognized the measures taken in the past months in Southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region and even expressed the wish to return to China..."<sup>5</sup>

The *Global Times* has shown China as successfully contained the spread of the virus while claiming that Tibetans living in Dharamshala and Nepal are longing to return to Tibet due to the inefficiency of the medical facilities in India and Nepal. It has even quoted Liu Yinghua, an associate research fellow at the Beijing Tibetan Hospital of China Tibetology Research Center, who claimed to have studied Tibetan medicine in Dharamshala, saying that, "Tibetan communities were spread at several locations in northern and southern India under India's arrangement. But the regions Tibetans gather are usually unstable and the local government often neglects the exiles..."

This shows that the CCP never leave any stone unturned and always try to politicise the situation and spin any story to their advantage.

2020 has been one of the busiest years for the Chinese foreign ministry, CCP-affiliated media, such as the *Global Times* and government-sponsored internet soldiers have been deployed to counter the major narratives which are against the CCP's interests.<sup>6</sup> The desperation of the CCP can be seen in the fact that their visibility is beyond China's cyberspace. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Twitter also became one of the platforms for their defensive and offensive propagandas. The languages used by the officials of the China's foreign ministry and their online behaviors were so aggressive in nature that it was dubbed as 'wolf warrior diplomacy'.<sup>7</sup> Because of

their intensities and insensitivities, starting with Twitter handles managed by Chinese officials and the media controlled by the CCP, Twitter decided to label their accounts.<sup>8</sup> Soon after this, the Twitter decided to label most of the accounts managed by five permanent members of the Security Council.

Recently, Hua Chunying, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson decided to share on her Twitter account an article penned by Cary Wu in the *Washington Post*, a Professor of Sociology at York University, Canada. The simple reason for Chunying's empathy is that the article happens to be lauding the achievements of the CCP in controlling the pandemic and also around 20,000 respondents showing thumbs up to the party's performances.<sup>9</sup> One may wonder how the results of 20,000 respondents from China could decide the verdicts of a country with 1.4 billion population. Despite the so-called promises to secure their identities, there is a great deal of Hawthorne effect in play on those respondents in the techno-dictatorial state of China. Remember, even billionaires like Jack Ma and Wang Xing in China are not spared for being outspoken about anything critical of the CCP. Already China has started screening propaganda films in theatres across China.<sup>10</sup>

The peddling of the Party's anniversary may be accompanied with Xi Jinping as a savior. Because the COVID-19 pandemic has dented the image of China under Xi to an irreparable state, one may expect Xi's speech with the plan to reinvigorate the 'Chinese Dream' and thereby entrenching his dream to remain in power for life. In the near future, there is also a possibility of releasing a full-fledged documentary or a movie in Chinese and English languages glorifying China's success story against the COVID-19 pandemic under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

The coming years will be busy for Huang Kunming, Director of CCP Central Propaganda department (Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee) and Yang Jiechi, Director

of Office of CCP Foreign Affairs Work Commission. They may need extra budget for their national and international campaign for the CCP and Xi Jinping. Similar to the situation faced by Chairman Mao, after the failure of ‘Great Leap Forward’, when Mao decided to relaunch himself. Hence, there is a great possibility for Xi to relaunch or rebrand himself as the savior of the Chinese people and of the world. In the near future, there is also a possibility to make a full-fledged movie on Tibet and East Turkestan on par with Hollywood standard.

In short, in the days to come, based on the intensity of the propaganda at home and abroad, one may conclude about the growing insecurities of the CCP and Xi Jinping.

### **China's Plan to Strengthen Surveillance and Impose Further Restrictions**

Xi Jinping's crackdown on Tibetan Buddhism and other faiths are particularly noteworthy. Sarah Cook, a senior research analyst at the Freedom House, has very succinctly highlighted the deteriorating state of seven different communities, totally consisting of 350 million believers in China, which also includes believers in Tibet and East Turkistan under the authoritarian rule of Xi. In her published work in 2017, titled, *The Battle for China's Spirit*, Cook has concluded that religious repression under Xi Jinping has intensified extensively and she writes, “Indeed, one of the main findings of this study is that religious persecution has increased overall, with four communities in particular experiencing a downturn conditions—Protestant Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and both Hui and Uighur Muslims.”

Bitter Winter (BW), an online magazine on religious liberty and human rights in China has covered extensively on the increasing crackdowns by the CCP on the above four communities. In addition to this, Bitter Winter has also highlighted the growing intensification of repression on followers of Buddhism in Inner Mongolia and in China. BW reported that the crackdown on

the publications and dissemination of Buddhist books has increased dramatically. If any shop owners are discovered of selling banned Buddhist books, they could be charged a hefty fine of 50,000 Renminbi (about \$ 7,100). It appears that Xi has unleashed an intensive crackdown on religions all over China.

From 2013, the security expenditure in Tibet skyrocketed. Hence, all these increasing security-related expenditures, particularly in Tibet validate the increasing repressive policies in the form of application of different extensive surveillance systems.

In the recent Seventh Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing on August 29-30, 2020, where Xi Jinping emphasised that, “Tibetan Buddhism be guided in adapting to the socialist society and should be developed in the Chinese context.” This has further given incentive to the CCP members to sinicize Tibetan Buddhism.

After the 2008 uprisings, patriotic re-education campaigns are reinforced. Beginning from 2011, over 21,000 cadres were reportedly sent to villages across Tibet. In addition to political monitoring and other tasks, they reportedly carried out “patriotic reeducation sessions at religious sites and among lay believers, where the monks and nuns are forced to condemn the portrait of the Dalai Lama”.<sup>11</sup> Even Tibetan officials, students, farmers and nomads were too subjected to these campaigns. These restrictions have even permeated in the life of young Tibetan children as well. Among other factors, patriotic re-education campaign is one of the main factors driving the monks and lay people to take extreme steps in Tibet like self-immolation.

The system of giving huge cash to any informants on tipping off information is practiced also in China. Giving cash rewards from 10,000 yuan (\$1,528) to 500,000 yuan were launched in 2017 for giving important clues that could lead to catching spies or foreign espionage.<sup>12</sup> In 2015, the hotline telephonic system (12339) was launched for public reporting suspicious activities.



In Tibet too, Tibet Autonomous Region Communications Administration has offered rewards up to 42,750 US dollars to citizen informers who report online or digital based activities that are considered to be illegal by the state.<sup>13</sup> This clearly indicates that with the arrival of Xi Jinping, most of the head of the provinces and large cities are implementing different measures to curb the freedom to practice religions and punish those who are critical of the CCP.

The surveillance systems in Tibet have been further tightened amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Phayul, a Tibetan media outlet reported that, the Chinese authorities have arrested 10 people in Lhasa for spreading “rumours” about coronavirus outbreak on March 12.

According to Tibet Watch, “In Tsongon (Ch: Qinghai), Police officers and grid workers were mobilised on 4-5 March 2020 to digitally search the Wechat group chats in around 16 villages and 5 monasteries within Tharshul and Sumdo Townships, Mangra County, Tsolho Tibet Autonomous Prefecture.” It further added that, “authorities shut down 75 WeChat groups across the two townships.” Meanwhile 298 groups were registered by authorities and 223 were forced

to submit letters pledging they would follow regulations and would not spread ‘rumours.’

In 2013, a symposium commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Mao Zedong’s call to learn from the “Fengqiao experience” was held in Hangzhou, capital city of Zhejiang. In the symposium, Xi Jinping praises the importance of the Fengqiao experience and its functions in solving different problems within the village level and he even urged the Communist Party committees and governments at all levels to promote the “Fengqiao experience,” adhere to sound work styles, and keep innovating methods for dealing with the masses...”<sup>14</sup>

Fengqiao experience refers to social management practice introduced by Chairman Mao in 1960s before the Cultural Revolution in China. In January 2020, as part of the recently launched ‘Million Police entering 10 million homes’ in China, in Tibet too, the Tibet Entry-Exit Border Inspection Station focused on the overall deployment of the establishment of a “Maple Bridge-style” police station, focusing on “petitioning people’s situation, resolving people’s worries, reducing conflicts, preventing risks, investigating problems, and resolving chaos”.<sup>15</sup>

It was reported that this event will start from the beginning of January 2020 to the end of December 2020. However, this surveillance system in the name of building a good relationship between the Tibetan people and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) continued even after December 2020.<sup>16</sup>





## ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT

### Massive Floods in Eastern Tibet and a Super Dam in Western Tibet\*

The ecological situation in Tibet continues to degrade at a worrying rate and scale in recent years, particularly since 2015. In 2020, Tibet also witnessed similar floods, landslides, earthquakes as well as increased pace of building large dams. Two specific events—a massive flood in Rongdrak in south-eastern Tibet and construction of a super dam in Metok in south-western Tibet will be discussed in detail.

According to a Xinhua news report, China's national observatory issued a blue alert on June 26, 2020, for rainstorms.<sup>1</sup> The agency issued similar warning on the previous day as heavy downpour continued across large regions within China including Tibet. Chinese government has a four-tier color-coded weather warning system, with red representing the most severe, followed by orange, yellow and blue. The National Meteorological Center of China had warned of heavy rain and rainstorms in the regions of Jilin, Gansu, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Yunnan and Tibet. It also highlighted that some areas in Sichuan and the Tibet Autonomous Region will experience downpours with up to 60 mm of hourly rainfall.

On July 13, 2020, Xinhua described the ongoing floods across China due to torrential rainfall as unprecedented.<sup>2</sup> The Vice Minister of Emergency Management, Zheng Guoguang stated that since June, more than 38 million people across China had been affected by floods, the warning levels in 433 rivers had exceeded, and the average precipitation in the Yangtze River basin since June was highest since 1961. Global Times (September 23, 2020) reported that China experienced 21 large-scale floods in 2020, which was 1.6 times more than 2019 and highest since 1998.<sup>3</sup> In a statement issued by China's Ministry of Water Resources, the torrential rainfall resulted in flooding across six main river basins in China with a total of 833 rivers rising above

warning levels. That was 80 percent more than the previous year. The national average rainfall recorded 616 mm in China for the year 2020, which was the second highest since 1961.<sup>4</sup> It was reported that the emergency response was raised to level -IV. Heavy rain was reported in 27 of China's 31 provinces.

A scientific study published<sup>5</sup> by Science China Earth Science notes that all three of the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans contributed to the ongoing record-breaking rainfall over the Yangtze River Valley in June 2020.<sup>6</sup>

#### Torrential Rainfall in China Reaches Eastern Tibet and Flooded Rongdrak

The heavy rainfall along the Yangtze River valley also reached many parts of east and south-eastern regions of Tibet, particularly in Rongdrak valley in the south-eastern Kham. The torrential rainfall in the region resulted in a massive flood in the area on 17 June, 2020. The narrow forested valley of Rongdrak generally receives higher rainfall than other regions of Tibet, but there has been a drastic increase in precipitation in the region in the last few years. The flood caused landslides as rivers gushed through the region, destroying homes, schools and monasteries located in the river valley. Coincidentally, the region was hit by similar floods in 2017.

Rongdrak County is currently administered as part of the "Karze Tibetan Autonomous

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tempa Gyaltzen Zamlha that appeared in tibetpolicy.net on June 19, 2020

Prefecture.” The Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture was, in fact, formed and incorporated as part of the Sichuan Province in 1955 after the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

Recently, many parts of southern China have faced severe floods due to heavy downpour and it took about a week for the impact of the heavy rainfall to reach south-eastern areas of Tibet. According to Chinese official news reports, 20,000 people were displaced with the devastation spreading to ten separate areas within the county. It is also reported that the houses of two villages were completely destroyed by the flood. The flood has posed significant risk to the nearby county of Tsenglha Dzong in “Ngawa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” as well.

Unfortunately, Tibet has seen an unprecedented number of natural disasters occurring simultaneously across the region since 2016, primarily due to rising temperature and increased rainfall. Furthermore, the situation has been exacerbated by a number of other factors such as excessive construction activities, a destructive method of lithium mining, cascade of dams along the rivers and state-sanctioned large scale commercial logging in some areas of the valley.

A series of articles have been published by the Environment & Development Desk of the Tibet Policy Institute in the last five years that has both highlighted and forewarned the Chinese government and the Tibetan people of the increasing risk of repeated floods across Tibet.

The first article, ‘Natural Disasters in Tibet: Is it the New Normal’ published on August 8, 2016, clearly warned the Chinese government to the looming risk of floods across Tibet as the plateau enters into a new pattern of climatic condition.<sup>7</sup> The paper stated, “Despite the Tibetan Plateau facing the severest impact from climate change, there is an absolute lack of public education and awareness program on how to mitigate and adapt to climate change.”

In a separate article published in 2017, the

Chinese government was urged to take necessary measures to pro-actively mitigate the possible risk from increasing number of floods in the Tibetan areas.<sup>8</sup> The paper reads:

Increased number of natural disasters occurred in the last two years were primarily due to climate change, but it was also partly due to rampant mining, rapid urbanization and irresponsible development works. Necessary mechanism to deal with natural disasters should be put in place for quick response. A thorough post disaster assessment should be carried out to both understand the causes and to hold those responsible accountable.

As natural disasters continue to adversely impact lives in Tibet, the Environment & Development Desk published in 2018 another article titled ‘Devastating Natural Disasters in Tibet Continue into 2018’.<sup>9</sup> The paper criticized the Chinese government’s lack of comprehensive measures to address threats faced by Tibetans from increasing cases of natural disaster in recent years.

China seemingly has taken few necessary steps put forth in the successive articles. They started construction of river embankments for few rivers in some towns and villages. But Beijing continues to approve unregulated and excessive mining, damming and construction activities in Tibet. The increasing case of natural disaster due to rising temperature and increased precipitation is further exacerbated by construction of large dams across Tibet, particularly along the Yarlung Tsangpo river valley.

### **A Super Dam on Yarlung Tsangpo Could Further Exacerbate the Situation**

According to a report in the Global Times on November 29, 2020, the Power Construction Corp or POWERCHINA has put forth a proposal for formulation at China’s 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan (2021-25) to build a Super Hydropower Station on Yarlung Tsangpo in south-western Tibet.<sup>10</sup> Yan Zhiyong, Chairman of the Power Construction Corp of China said that the proposal was part

of a long-term goal through 2035 made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.<sup>11</sup>

As per the report, Yan further stated that it will be a historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry and that the project could serve to maintain water resources and domestic security. The report also stated that “Tibet has about 200 million kWh of water resources, accounting for 30 percent of the total in China.”<sup>12</sup> The mainstream of the Yarlung Tsangpo River has the richest water resources in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, about 80 million kilowatt hours (kWh), while the 50-kilometer section of the Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon has 70 million kWh that could be developed with a 2,000-meter drop, which equals more than three times the output of the “Three Gorges power stations.”

The report cites Yan claiming that the “hydropower exploitation of the Yarlung Tsangpo downstream is more than a hydropower project. It is also meaningful for the environment, national security, living standards, energy and international cooperation.” Yan further added that “the 60 million kWh hydropower exploitation at the downstream of the Yarlung Zangbo River could provide 300 billion kWh of clean, renewable and zero-carbon electricity annually. The project will play a significant role in realizing China’s goal of reaching a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2060.”

The Global Times also reported that the Power Construction Corp on October 16, 2020 met with Wu Yingjie, the regional party secretary and Che Dalha, the regional government Chairman of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region to sign agreement covering the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan.

### **The Socio-ecological Implications of the Dam**

The speculation for a mega dam on the lower reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo in south-western Tibet has been circulating for decades, and the report in the Global Times gives the long-

suspected project the official confirmation.

The report absurdly stated that the hydropower dam would be “meaningful for the environment, national security, living standards, energy and international cooperation.”

In reality, the ongoing excessive damming on the Yarlung Tsangpo is neither eco-friendly nor is it beneficial for the local community. It is in fact, part of a massive state-engineered, long-term preparation for a potential mass influx of Chinese migrants into the Kongpo region for permanent settlement. Such an eventuality could cause irreversible damage to the local ecology, would undermine Tibetan identity and will greatly destabilize the hydrological balance across north-eastern India.

Close reading of Chinese reports points to emphasis on “national security” as one of the prime objectives behind building these dams along the Yarlung Tsangpo. Now what does ‘National Security’ really mean here? And how could construction of cascade of mega dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River) serve China’s national security?

For China, the term ‘National Security’ here refers to more than just the energy security that the dams could possibly provide for China. It comprises of rapid infrastructure development to facilitate the creation of Chinese-populated cities in Kongpo region in Tibet. This is also for China to extensively carry out resource extraction and transfer of minerals from Tibet to China. As well as geostrategic advantage over India along the Indo-Tibet border, and eventually the assimilation of Tibetans in the region through mass-migration from China.

### **Impacts on Tibet's Ecology**

Unlike in the 1960s, the large hydropower dams are no longer considered eco-friendly and sustainable. According to a BBC report on November 5, 2018, more than 90% of dams which has been built since the 1930s around the

world were “more expensive than anticipated,” and that these dams have “damaged river ecology, displaced millions of people and have contributed to climate change by releasing greenhouse gases from the decomposition of flooded lands and forests.”<sup>13</sup>

The ecological and financial cost of large dams has been gradually realized in the developed countries as more and more mega dams in Europe and America are being dismantled in recent years. As per a report in *Nature* in April 2018, the demolition of Yacía de Yeltes Dam in western Spain was hailed by ecologists as a milestone for river-restoration efforts in Europe.<sup>14</sup>

According to another report in *Nature* on July 5, 2012, the removal of two hydroelectric dams from the Elwha River in the United States brought instant benefits for local wildlife within months.<sup>15</sup> A National Geographic report on August 27, 2014 highlighted that the United States removed 850 dams between 1994 and 2014 and hundreds were removed in 2012 and 2013.<sup>16</sup> In a detailed publication released by the American Rivers on February 6, 2020, the United States removed 90 dams in 2019 alone.<sup>17</sup>

However in Tibet, the Chinese government is on a dam-building spree along the 1,600 km stretch of Yarlung Tsangpo before it enters into India. The long stretch of the river both nourishes and replenishes much of south-western Tibet, including most of the counties in the Lhokha and Kongpo regions of Tibet. Kongpo is home to some of the oldest forests in the world, and historically a safe habitat for dozens of primates and other rare species. For example, a group of Chinese scientists in 2015, discovered an extremely rare, primate macaque monkey in the forest of Metok in Kongpo.<sup>18</sup> Zhao Chao, a researcher at Southwest Forestry University, who claimed to have seen the “special macaques” in Metok said that the “the forest is like an ancient museum of nature, home to many unique animals, and we have seen only a few of them.”

Guo Guangpu, a lecturer at the School of Life

Sciences and Technology, Tongji University in China warned that hydropower projects in the region could have negative impact on the local ecology in Kongpo and that the Chinese government must avoid flooding extensive areas of forest, “which could be home to the white-cheeked macaque and other unique creatures.”<sup>19</sup>

Unfortunately, China has long planned 11 hydro-dams on the river with Zangmu and Gyatsa already completed, Dagu and Jeixu under construction, Lengda received permission recently and more to begin soon as part of the 14<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan. Large dams inevitably inundate vast area of land around it for water storage, leading to massive loss of vegetation and wild life habitat, and also emitting huge greenhouse gas into the atmosphere. Dams also induce seismic activity, landslide and sudden change in local ecosystem.

### Sociological Impacts

The dam construction is only one part of a massive state-engineered, infrastructure development plan in the Kongpo region to facilitate eventual mass-migration from China to this scarcely populated region of Tibet. The region has seen extensive road construction, paving motorable roads as far as remote village of Yulmey near the Indo-Tibet border. The Chinese government carried a rapid upgrading and refurbishment of the 5,476 km long National Highway 318. It runs along the Indo-Tibet border connecting Chinese cities as far as Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing and Chengdu to Nyingtri, Lhokha, Lhasa and Dram in Tibet. The much-reported and currently under construction Chengdu-Nyingtri-Lhasa Railway line with length of 1,629 km also runs parallel to the highway. Once completed, the railway line would be a direct passage for mass migration into Tibet from China.

Similarly, there has been rapid expansion of mining projects in the region in recent years. According to a report published by the South China Morning Post on May 20, 2018, it stated that a rapidly expanding gold mine in Lhuntse Dzong, located close to Indo-Tibet border in



Southern Tibet, not only attracting massive influx of Chinese migrant workers into the region, but also facilitates growth of cluster of Chinese restaurants, karaoke bars and shops to feed and entertain the mine workers.<sup>20</sup>

The surge in Chinese migrants could easily outnumber Tibetan population. Ever since Chinese occupation of Tibet since 1950s, population transfer has been a primary tool to assimilate Tibetan population. Many Tibetan towns and cities in eastern Tibet are already outnumbered by Chinese migrants. Cities like Lhasa, Nagchu, Chamdo and Kyegudo in central and northwest Tibet are facing similar fate. Chinese migrants in northern and western Tibet have complained of harsh climate and lack of trees in those places as a reason for not settling permanently despite Beijing's generous incentives, making Kongpo in Tibet an ideal place for mass migration as the region has pleasant weather with extensive forest and vegetation cover. The Nyingtri city already has a dominant Chinese presence, and with the completion of infrastructure development projects, this could result in possible acceleration of influx of Chinese migrants. So, for Tibetans in the region, the ongoing infrastructure development is a colonial trap to marginalize Tibetans in their own land.

### Geopolitical Implications

Every infrastructure development along the Indo-Tibet border could add to a new degree of threat to India's border security. But the construction of a super dam in Metok (approximately 39.9 km distance to Arunachal) means, the threat expands all the way to Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. The weaponization of dams is another threat to India as dams were destroyed by enemy to inflict maximum damage with minimum effort during the Second World War. The proposed super dam in Metok is reported to be bigger than the Three Gorge Dam and any destruction of such a mammoth dam would have unimaginable impact to India. The close proximity of the dam location to Indian border means any sudden release of

water from the dam would quickly and forcefully reach India with very little time for evacuation and disaster preparation.

India could also face a twin disaster—water shortage in the winter as the super-dam would withhold much of the flow during dry season, and flash floods in the rainy season as excess water from the dam would be released during monsoon flood season.

Either a deliberate or accidental collapse of any of the dams along the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River) could bring an unimaginable scale of destruction to the people of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and beyond. A reminiscent of the horror of Banqiao and Shimanan Dam failure (in Henan province) in 1975, which killed 171,000 people and displaced 11 million people in China.

### Conclusion

Dams are known to alter the natural characteristics of a river system and disrupt traditional and local ways of life. Unfortunately, proposal for the super dam as highlighted by Global Times back in November 2020 was approved on 11 March, 2021 by the National People's Congress of PRC as a part of its 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan (FYP).<sup>21</sup>

Even though the Chinese government downplayed fear of hydrological crisis expressed by riparian states. Qizhala (Che Dalha,) the Chairman of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region wanted the construction of the dam to begin in 2021 itself. He firmly voiced for a quick approval of the project and its procedures. The construction of the dam, inevitably will exacerbates the ongoing cases of floods and landslides in Tibet.



## TIBET AND THE WORLD

### The Tibet Issue in Changing US-China Relations

The period post the end of the Second World War has seen the rise of International Relations as a field defined by strife, compromise, avarice, power but most important of all, by the inevitability of change. The issue of Tibet has undergone its own trajectories, from being a vital cog in the Great Game of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century to being a geopolitical node of contention between the US and Mao-led China followed by the human rights and environment discourses that sought to define the narrative on the global stage in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, today, between the two most important powers in the world, Tibet is once again being discussed as a matter of geopolitical significance between the US and China, as the former seeks to stem the rise and challenge of the latter for its position of global leadership.

This report seeks to highlight the various aspects of this geopolitical mesh that Tibet, US and China have been embroiled in for the better part of the last decade, from the Trump administration's hot and cold relations with Beijing to the surprising hawkish nature of the new Biden Government's foreign policy direction with regards to the strongest competitor. What is of importance is to understand that Tibet cannot be viewed in isolation to the larger strategic implications of a rising power seeking to supplant the established order. China today under Xi Jinping is very different from Deng Xiaoping's "lying low" era or the "harmonious society" period espoused by Hu Jintao. At every front, Beijing has sought to expand its influence beyond its borders, whether it be through ambitious projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Regional Economic Cooperation Framework, etc. or through subtle diplomacy measures including but not limited to the Confucius Institutes, the recent covid vaccine diplomacy, and the recent meetings with the Taliban in the background of US' departure from Afghanistan or the old fashioned "bully tactics" that have been seen in the case of Australia, Taiwan, Philippines, etc. The United States has laid cognizance to these developments and that has pushed them towards aggressively attempting to curb Beijing at every

front. This report seeks to contextualize the Tibet issue within these US-China relations and the geopolitical and strategic implications the latter can have on the former.

#### Changing US-China Relations

The US-China relationship was not born in a bed of roses, and it certainly did not end up amicable as the US anticipated, even after US-China rapprochement under President Richard Nixon. The gestures of friendship was reached with an optimism that, in time, Communist China would change and draw closer to the United States. The opening up of US and China relations was further pursued with deepening commercial, diplomatic and cultural ties with China, so as to induce change in the latter.<sup>1</sup> This has been a bedrock of US strategy since then, to mold China to the United States' liking, to which Kurt M Campbell, who formerly served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Obama administration and is now serving under the Biden administration as the US Indo-Pacific policy Chief, noted that 'neither carrots nor sticks have swayed China as predicted.'

For decades, the US has been accommodating China in its foreign policies, investing in the hope that China will gradually support a US-

\*By Tenzi Lhadon

led system. However, the US policies that were built on this expectation not only failed to change China as the US intended but has instead benefited China to advance its own Sino-centric model of governance and ended up challenging the existing international liberal order. In the following decades, Beijing not only doubled its military expenditure but also became the second largest economy in the world, anticipating replacing US as the world's largest economy in 2025. The growing interdependence between the US and Chinese economy after the 2008 global financial crisis and China's sheer market size that the US will benefit from, has for a long-time dominated US policymakers' priorities vis-à-vis its relations to China.

The US policy throughout has been based on appeasement and accommodation, with every new American leader ended up either mending the weak relations or easing tense US-China relations. In the process, Beijing accumulated all the resources needed for it to become a force by itself, seized the opportunity that was opened for them, and gradually marked its powerful global presence. Moreover, the consistent economic growth and the consensus from various countries for the Chinese Communist Party's state-led economic model has bolstered Chinese leaders' measures against America. Today, China openly and aggressively retaliates against US-backed issues that Beijing deems sensitive as its "core interest". A new China under President Xi Jinping has displayed signs of a belligerent power on rise that is anticipated to increase the conflict between the dominant US and the ascending China. Therefore, at the present moment, the US policy toward China now appears "animated by a judgment that the past trajectory of the bilateral relationship favored China and disadvantaged the United States in a long-run competition for global leadership."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the Trump administration adopted an increasingly unilateralist and a protectionist approach to its relations with China, leading scholars and observers to conclude that the Trump's administration had an attitude without a strategy.<sup>3</sup>

However, the one thing that Trump administration got right was to identify China as a "revisionist power" and a "rival" seeking to displace US by reordering the region in its favor.<sup>4</sup> This indicates a strong deviation in the US policy toward China from a constructive relationship to a confrontational approach, from appeasement to balancing China and cooperation to competition. The fundamental divergences between the two surfaced particularly during the Trump administration, with the relationship hitting the lowest point in the history of US-China relations. Since Donald Trump took office as US President in January 2017, the direction of US-China relations seems to be clearer. Trump's "America First" policy has resulted in the US withdrawal from global multilateral obligations, including the Paris Climate agreement to multilateral organizations such as Trans-Pacific Partnership to the UN Human Rights Council and left the American leadership discredited and less appealing. The implications of the US exit have led to the gradual ceding of its position as a global leader, one that China is now attempting to occupy, as it continues to increase its global influence, deepen its ties with European partners and take the leadership role in global climate forums. Similarly, after the US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it not only made it easier for China to integrate itself within international organizations, but actively seek to replace the US in these positions. The US departure from both the Human Rights Council and the TPP opened the door for China to expand its influence on areas where traditionally its influence was minimal. For instance, China was appointed as one of the members of the Consultative Group of the United Nations Human Rights Council, a decision that had rights group pointing out China's questionable human rights' violation record. Likewise, the US departure from the TPP that was originally conceived as a balancing act against China's extensive trade relations across the Pacific, has now been replaced by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP), the world's largest trade bloc, which is not only the first China-led multilateral trade deal, but it is also its first trade agreement with Japan and South Korea which are traditional allies of the US.

Amid rising tensions between the US and China, with their relations taking a steep downturn, especially after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US has intensified its criticism of China's handling of issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Beijing, in reaction, has repeatedly warned Washington against meddling in its internal affairs. The former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo earlier singled out China, together with Iran, as the worst place in the world for those belonging to a minority religion, and for treating its religious minorities as national security threats that warrant surveillance, imprisonment and sometimes death. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) also documented China's abuses against Christians, Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners and others in its 2019 Annual Report, calling upon the State Department to designate China as a country of 'particular concern' for its systematic violations of religious freedom since 1999. The US has also condemned the new national security law imposed in Hong Kong and shown concern over the escalating protests against the Chinese government.

### **Tibet in US-China Relations under Trump**

The debate over the Tibet issue in US-China relations is on whether it is a liability or a leverage for the US against China. Tibet is essentially and traditionally discussed in the framework of human rights that receives bipartisan support in the U.S. The Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi is among several other US congressional lawmakers who continue to support Tibet's cause and pressure China to change its intransigence over human rights. Although Tibet has been traditionally discussed under the rubric of human rights violations, history notes that the American involvement in the Tibet question began with real geopolitical and ideological contentions with

China. The official US involvement in the Tibet question has gone through different stages, from maintaining a clandestine relations with Tibetan resistance group in the early 1960s to restrictions imposed on the Dalai Lama from visiting the US after his flight to exile, to publicly acknowledging the Tibet cause. However, under the intensifying nature of the US-China rivalry under President Trump, the Tibet issue emerged as a geopolitical and strategic issue between the two. The Tibet issue for years has remained a challenge for both governments, but it has recently been used as a leverage against the bellicose jingoism of China.

From 2010 to 2020, there have been 19 bills, resolutions and law sponsored by various stakeholders in US constituencies on Tibet with the latest bill (H.R. 6948), introduced by US Congressman Scott Perry, calling onto "authorize the President to recognize the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China as a separate, independent country." Most of the US legislative measures, including the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA) and the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act in 2018 that was signed by President Donald Trump into law, resonate United States' continuing interest in Tibet. The highlight of the Trump administration's support for Tibet is the passing of the Tibet Policy and Support Act (TPSA). This is an upgrade to US political and humanitarian support for Tibetans. The TPSA is an extension of the Tibet Policy Act of 2002 and has included some pertinent issues, from the selection of the future Dalai Lama to opening a new consulate in Lhasa to addressing water security and environmental issues in Tibet.

Although it is well known that America's support for Tibet is based on the grounds of human rights, it is also true that America's involvement in the issue can be believed to be based on real politik, especially during President Trump's administration. From passing of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act to condemning China's human rights violations in Tibet in various official reports to closing of the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in retaliation for closure of Chinese Consulate in

Houston; all these actions have been carried out as real politik contestation. The Tibet issue in US-China relations has traditionally been confined and limited within the normative framework.

However, the geopolitical relations between great powers are rarely defined by norms but rather by hard politics. Due to the nature of this relationship, the two nations, over the past years have been involved in a tit-for-tat engagement vis-a-vis their economic and political relationship. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 is one such measure while the statement by then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo highlights both the increasing curtailing of freedom of speech and press in China as well as the US' stand on the issue. In his statement, Mike Pompeo noted that the United States remained "committed to supporting meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, respect for their fundamental and unalienable human rights, and the preservation of their unique religious, cultural and linguistic identity."<sup>5</sup> He further stated that international access to Tibet was a matter of regional and environmental security. Calling the Tibetan region as being increasingly vital to regional stability resonates with US concerns that the geopolitical status quo in Asia is being challenged by China. China and US are increasingly competing for global and regional influence particularly with the former attempting to alter the current global governance system, which it perceives as being western centric. Therefore, recent developments such as the trade war, the visa ban on the Chinese officials, bandwagoning with the EU against 'China threat' etc. needs to be analysed in view of these developments. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act is similarly a measure on the part of the US to curtail China's influence as well as assert its position in Asia

### **Biden's Stand on China: The Hawk Takes Flight?**

2021 ushered in a new era in US diplomacy with the Biden administration taking charge after the rather turbulent period of Donald Trump's

presidency. Trump's 'America First' doctrine saw the US increasingly strain its relations with traditional allies, pulling out of various multilateral partnerships such as the TPP, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran Nuclear deal, the World Health Organization (WHO), etc. while adopting a hawkish-dove attitude towards China, from the increasingly hostile trade wars to the almost congratulatory overtures towards Beijing's handling of the pandemic during the early months of January and February 2020.

In March of 2021, during a press conference, President Biden made a startling statement, noting that his administration would not allow China "to become the leading country in the world, the wealthiest country in the world, and the most powerful country in the world."<sup>6</sup> Surprising many observers who have been following Biden since his tenure as Vice President and during his early campaign days, the shift from the previous cooperative and almost conciliatory attitude to one of an increasingly hawkish policy direction towards China has indeed defined the past seven months of the new government. Similarly, during the same press conference, Biden also reiterated his campaign promise to rebuild the US' alliance with its allies, particularly within the South and East Asian regions, and Quad (India, Australia, Japan, and the US) in order to hold China accountable for its activities.

Hence, although there isn't a doctrine as such that has been ascertained in order to define a rather nascent foreign policy direction vis-a-vis Beijing, the signs do point towards a rather aggressive balancing act against the latter's increasing presence in international affairs. From the ever-expanding BRI projects to the launching of the Regional Cooperation Partnership Agreement that seeks to replace the TPP to China's growing influence within various international organizations such as the WHO, the UN, etc., the White House seems to progressively grow wary of these developments and has actively sought to stem their progress. As a result, we have seen the US reenter the Paris Climate Agreement as one



of Biden's first major foreign policy decision. The vaccine distribution campaigns have bolstered US relationship with Asian countries, with Kurt Campbell, declaring in June 2021 that the US plans to distribute a billion vaccine doses in the region, in order to reduce the gap with China on the vaccine diplomacy front.<sup>7</sup> During the G7 summits and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue meetings, the US announced its initiative around infrastructure investment program that is meant to rival Beijing's much vaunted Belt and Road Initiative.<sup>8</sup>

Building upon Trump's trade sanctions, the White House has maintained and increased their scope from launching a Buy America campaign that seeks to cut out foreign companies from US lucrative markets to blocking China's investments and acquisitions inside the country. Perhaps the strongest assertion on this matter has the signing of an executive decree in June 2020 that bans Americans from investing in Chinese companies that are linked to the country's military or involved in the production of surveillance technology for the government.<sup>9</sup> The Endless Frontier Act that was passed in the US Senate, is one of the most ambitious Research and Development oriented policies in recent memory that seeks to build US competitiveness against China, particularly in the field of technology.<sup>10</sup>

The echoes of this emerging policy framework are reverberating within the actions of the White House on the various human rights issues that have plagued the People's Republic of China since its inception. Mike Pompeo first declared Beijing's actions in Xinjiang against the Uyghur Muslims as a genocide and the Biden administration has continued to define it as such in an Annual Human Rights report brought out in March.<sup>11</sup> In the same month, during the high level meetings between Blinken and Yang Jiechi, both sides harshly criticized each other in a shockingly surprising turn of events that observers earlier predicted would actually soothe over some of the rocky relationships left over from the Trump era.<sup>12</sup> In July, Biden also warned American companies

from having investments in the Xinjiang region over allegations of forced labor and human rights abuses while adding 14 Chinese companies to its blacklist over the same issue.<sup>13</sup>

Tibet has received similar attention during this period. During his presidential campaign, Biden reiterated his commitment to engage with Beijing on the issue of resuming the Tibet-Sino dialogue as well as the human rights' situation in the region. Furthermore, he promised to meet the Dalai Lama, resuming a tradition of US presidents that was abruptly during Trump's tenure.<sup>14</sup> In March 2021, the US State Department's spokesperson, Ned Price, stated unequivocally that the Government "believes the Chinese Government should have no role in the succession of the Dalai Lama."<sup>15</sup> This has irked Beijing in no uncertain terms as, with the passing of the State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No. 5 in 2007, it has claimed sole authority over the issue. The recent meeting of the Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, with representative of the Dalai Lama, Dhongchung Ngodup, represents the highest level of meeting between the US Government and the Tibetan leadership in exile since Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2016. It is not a matter of mere chance that the meeting did not take place as part of the scheduled meeting with a group of civil society representatives that included the Director of Tibet House but rather separately on its own terms, according it an almost diplomatic status, apart from an advocacy or societal commitment.

Similarly, the government has sanctioned several Chinese officers for their role in suppressing freedom in Hong Kong, while in July, it issued a business advisory advising American companies of the risk in investing in the territory since Beijing would not allow legal due process or the rule of law in conjunction to the passing of the National Security Law.<sup>16</sup> Over Taiwan, the White House has pushed forward a series of confidence building measures, from inviting the de facto ambassador of the island in Washington, Hsiao-Bi Khim to the presidential inauguration ceremony, sending



a US aircraft carrier group to the South China Sea during the same time as a counter to China's movements in the region to the first official visit of a US ambassador to Taiwan in forty years since 1979. Such decisive actions over such a short period of time highlights an assertiveness that is increasingly becoming a hallmark of Biden's foreign policy with regards to Beijing.

However, claims of a new Cold War that have emerged during this period are rather perfunctory at this point of time, since the US and China have a very different and inter-related relationship, particularly in trade and economy, as compared to the US and the Soviet Union. However, this has not stopped the Biden administration from drawing the line in opposition to Beijing in terms of US-led democratic countries versus China and other authoritarian regimes, reminiscent of the Washington–Kremlin diatribes of the previous century. In press conferences held in February and April, Biden noted that the “world was at an inflection, between countries that chose democracy or authoritarianism.”<sup>17</sup> Similarly, during an interview with the New York Times, he asserted that “We're kind of at a place where the rest of the world is beginning to look to China.”<sup>18</sup> The ideological differences that have been played up during this period was not prominent during the standoff between Trump and Beijing, and perhaps that is going to be one of the defining traits of Biden's foreign policy doctrine moving forward.

## Conclusion

Since Xi Jinping lies at the apex of the Chinese political system, his influence now permeates at every level. Many observers strongly agree that Xi is the most powerful and influential leader in China since Mao. The inherent nature of Chinese political system has manifested itself as Xi Jinping's thought and more so after it has been endorsed as part of the Chinese constitution. Xi has now become a personality on his own right, a source of political authority and one that has an absolute power over his leadership.

Elizabeth Economy noted that, “Xi has moved away from Deng's consensus-based decision-making and consolidated institutional power in his own hands.”<sup>19</sup> China under Xi has not only exerted greater global influence and dominance, but through which Xi, intends to establish a China-centric regional network structure. After his ascension to power in 2012, his approach to issues, both domestically and externally, has been aggressive. His efforts to Sinicize the so called ‘ethnic groups’ including Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang through means of sheer oppression and enforcement reflects the reality that these regions will remain a source of insecurity for Xi's consolidation of power. The new ethnic unity law in Tibet for instance, adopted in January 2020 by the third session of the 11<sup>th</sup> People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region to establish “model areas for national unity and progress” in TAR is another measure to enforce a China-centric way of life in Tibet.

Xi's ambitious infrastructure project in 2013 for instance, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also referred to as the New Silk Road that stretches from East Asia to Europe, significantly expands on China's economic and political influence. The BRI has now effectively become an instrument for asserting Chinese power and its ideals by providing an alternative for the prevailing western liberal order. This potentially put US predominant position in the current system at risk.


With the growing tensions between China and the US, Tibet is re-emerging not as a normative issue but an issue with a geopolitical implication for both. Although Tibet might not feature prominently in the American consideration of its core national interest, it nevertheless has begun to take a role of strong relevance in the course of US foreign policy direction vis-à-vis China. An Indian observer has noted that, retrospectively, US like India has capitalized on the utility of ‘Tibet card’ against balancing China and in this contest between China and the US, the Tibetans have paid the heaviest price.<sup>20</sup>

What is certain, however, is that with a rising and progressively assertive China in the near horizon, the US has sought to define its policies with regards to the former in terms of both a clash of governance systems, ideologies, and global power play. The consequences of such an engagement between the two largest players on the global stage will be felt by their allies and in particular, by advocacy movements within and against China, whether that be Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, or Tibetans. How each and all of them decide to play their cards will be instrumental in the directions their agendas fan out in the coming four years.



## The India-China Military Conflict Along the Indo-Tibet Border\*

Recent India-China military standoff in the Indo-Tibet border region in the Himalaya from early May 2020 to late January 2021 is regarded as the longest and deadliest military confrontation since 1962 between two countries. Chinese military aggressions across borders of India, Nepal and Bhutan create geopolitical instability in Tibet and South Asian regions of Himalaya. These military aggressions are strategically guided by Xi Jinping's Tibet strategy which is strictly dictated in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Tibet Work Forum. China is building massive infrastructure across the Indo-Tibet border regions for ensuring stability and securing the Chinese notion of national unity and progress in Tibet. By escalating Chinese expansionist policy towards Tibet and the Himalaya, militarization of Tibet is China's means to achieve its ends. This report is mainly focused on objectives for Chinese military aggressions and the nature of India-China conflict in the Indo-Tibet Border in the Himalaya.



Source: Image of Himalaya taken by NASA's Landsat 7 Satellite, <https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/images/63013/the-himalayas>, (accessed May 6, 2021).

### Nature of India-China Conflict in the Indo-Tibet Border

India and China became two largest neighboring countries in Asia after China's invasion of Tibet in 1949. Soon after the complete invasion of Tibet, China started cartographic aggression towards India and the Himalayan regions. The disappearance of Tibet as a strategic buffer between India and China posed geostrategic vulnerability in the South Asian regions of Himalaya.

Today, China shares its borders with 14 countries. Excluding India, Chinese diplomats have partially resolved most of its border disputes with its neighboring countries. With India, China has the


most enduring border dispute, lasting more than 70 years. Despite having 22 rounds of border talks between Special Representatives of India and China for resolving conflicts, the dispute over the Indo-Tibet border between them still remains unsettled.

Neville Maxwell, the author of India's China War, illustrated the nature of the Sino-Indian conflicts in these words: "The border dispute between India and China stands exactly where it did when it first emerged half a century ago. There have been no negotiations, just numerous rounds of 'fruitless talks.' Each side maintains claims of large tracts of the other's territory."<sup>1</sup>

The cartographic contestation and building of massive infrastructure along the Indo-Tibet border has set off a series of military standoffs between India and China. For instance, China's India War of 1962 was one of the outcomes. More recently, India-China military face-off in Galwan Valley on 15 June, 2020 is regarded the deadliest clash since the aftermath of India-China border war of 1962.

In the past few years, China's encroachment in Nepal and 2017 Doklam standoff between India and China, followed by the recent India-China military face-off in the eastern Ladakh and in North Sikkim demonstrate that China is expanding its expansionist policy for securing its sphere of

\*By Tsewang Dorji




Source: A 1962 news report, news18.com, <https://www.news18.com/news/india/a-1962-news-report-cautionary-tale-why-indian-army-is-cautious-of-chinas-current-disengagement-2704467.html> (accessed June 5, 2021)

influence in the Himalaya and South Asia. The present Chinese strategic behavior towards India and its neighboring Himalayan states has both short and long-term geostrategic ramifications.

Around six decades earlier, George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos aptly summed up the geostrategic importance of Tibet in the following words: “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalaya piedmont; he who dominates the Himalaya piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of South Asia within his reach and, with it, all of Asia.”<sup>2</sup>

By examining current Chinese strategic calculation and military preparedness in Tibet and the Himalaya, China is attempting to hold the geostrategic advantage in Asia as indicated by George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos. This stratagem is also a part of China’s larger palm and the five-fingers strategy, which was a strategic thinking for Tibet and neighboring Himalayan states.



Source: Adapted from google-earth by Tsewang Dorji

China is actively encroaching in the Himalayan borders of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh to further encircle India and to boost “China’s Strategy of Encirclement of India,” which aims to encircle India from different fronts to undermine India’s *sui generis* position in South Asia. Implementing China’s “Palm and the Five-fingers Strategy” in the form of military aggressions and infrastructure developments in the South Asian regions of Himalaya threaten the future security and stability of Asia.



Source: China’s String of Pearls Project to Encircle India, <https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/how-chinas-string-of-pearls-project-would-affect-indias-security-1500355710-1>, (accessed June 2, 2021)

The year 2020 was a watershed moment to recalibrate strategic importance of Tibet to both India and China for securing and stabilizing their respective sphere of influence in South Asia and particularly in the Himalaya. Therefore, it is critical to revisit the India-China conflict in the Indo-Tibet border within historical context.





Source: Claudearpi.blogspot.com (Sikkim Map), <http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2017/07/the-doka-la-confrontation.html>, (accessed June 9, 2021)


### Sikkim Sector

The Naku La scuffle on 9 May, 2020 and Chinese helicopter's violating the Indian air-space on April 11 and April 20 at Sumdo on the border of Himachal Pradesh are indications of China's "early harvest" strategic move in the new form of border incursion against India.

The Naku La is situated at the border of the Indian state of Sikkim and China-occupied Tibet in the Eastern Himalaya. Inhabitants of North Sikkim and Tibetans call it "Nak-po-la", which means "Black Pass". In Tibetan, "Nak-po" means black and "La" means mountain pass.

Topographically, Naku La is a no-man's land. Traditionally, Tibetan nomads grazed their sheep and yaks in Naku La, Muguthang and Lhonak during summer and return to Tibet when winter approaches. This traditional practices of cross-border migration ceased after China and India fought war in 1962.

India shares its 3488 km border with China-occupied Tibet which stretches from Ladakh to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Apart from that, Sikkim shares its 220 km border with



Faceoff at Naku La on May 9, 2020 (Sikkim-Tibet border). Source: <https://www.gunnersshot.com/2021/01/mapdescription-automatically-generated.html>, (accessed June 9, 2021)

Tibet, which was demarcated during the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 that was concluded without informing Tibet to participate in the Convention. The first article of Convention defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, which reads, "The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the water flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the water flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into the rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the above-mentioned water parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory."<sup>3</sup>

### Ladakh Sector

After China's violation of India's airspace in Himachal Pradesh in April 2020, the first confrontation between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place at the Pangong Tso area on 5 May, 2020. On 10 May, the second confrontation at the Pangong Tso caused injuries to several soldiers on both sides. According to Indian media, 72 Indian soldiers were injured after two days of violent clashes with their Chinese counterparts. It escalated military tension across the Indo-Tibet border in the Himalaya. This highly-intense situation at Tibet-Ladakh border was shortly brought under control through the diplomatic talks between the Indian foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and Sun Weidong, the Chinese ambassador to India.



As per Indian media reports, Chinese soldiers entered into the Galwan Valley on 21 May, 2020 to object India's road construction in the eastern Ladakh, which China claims as its territory. Another report on 24 May, 2020 confirmed that Chinese soldiers occupied several strategic heights which are located at the Line of Actual Control between India's union territory of Ladakh and Ngari region of the China-occupied Tibet. This military standoff instigated the Galwan Valley skirmish on 15 June, 2020, which caused the death of around 20 Indian soldiers and 40 Chinese troops. But China confirmed only one casualty and several injuries during the confrontation.



Source: claudearpi.blogspot.com, Chinese map showing Galwan Valley Area, <https://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2020/07/chinese-aggression-in-maps.html>, (accessed May 9, 2021)

After nine months of Sino-Indian military stalemates along the Indo-Tibet border, India and China agreed to disengage the military standoff from the Pangong Tso area. This disengagement agreement was reached during the 9<sup>th</sup> round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting on 24 January, 2021. Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, issued a written statement, in which he stated that: "The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake started synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10."<sup>4</sup>

Despite the agreement that was reached in January 2021 leading to military disengagement

in Pangong Tso area on 10 February, 2021, the official release of a Chinese video clip on 19 February relating to the deadly border clash with Indian troops in Galwan Valley shocked India and the international community. The video footage veered India's narrative of the Galwan Valley military clash. Later, China confirmed that "four Chinese soldiers were killed and one was seriously wounded in the deadliest conflict in the area in over 40 years."<sup>5</sup> This statement from Beijing refutes what Indian and international media had reported suggesting the death of 40 Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley.

In fact, a permanent solution to end the India-China military conflict along the Indo-Tibet border is yet to be reached. It is because China occupied Tibet and destroyed Tibet as a strategic buffer between India and China. Therefore, both China and India are continuously deploying hundreds of thousand troops in the Himalaya along with advanced weapons.

## Conclusion

Tibet remains central to resolve the long-standing border disputes between India and China. This could be achieved through demilitarization of Tibet. The Indian national leader, George Fernandes rightly justified the significance of making Tibet a zone of peace between India and China: "If Tibet becomes a zone of peace, free from Chinese troops and nuclear weapons, there will be no reason for India to maintain a large army on the Himalayan heights. This would immediately enable both India and China to reduce their military expenditure and use the money thus saved for economic development. The countries of Europe are reducing their troop, and in the process, their military expenditure. Why should not India and China follow a similar course?."<sup>6</sup>

## The Geostrategic Importance of Tibet: China's "Palm & Five-Fingers Strategy"\*

China warned India that it will open new fronts in the Himalaya soon after the violent face-off between Chinese and Indian soldiers in Ladakh, along the Indo-Tibetan border on 15 June, 2020. Clashes along these borders could lead to heavy losses for both India and China.

At the height of the global coronavirus crisis, the world's media has focused on China's military aggressions in Ladakh and Sikkim. But, the root cause of China's military incursions across the Indian Himalayan borders is barely known by the Indian public. This article aims to explore the geostrategic importance of Tibet in the protracted India-China dispute over the Indo-Tibetan border.

China's military aggressions in India, Bhutan and Nepal are strategically designed by the Chinese strategic perception that Tibet is the palm (of a hand) and the Himalayan regions are the five-fingers. China considers Tibet as the palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as the five-fingers.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, British India adopted its forward policy towards Tibet to expand its market options, and at the same time, the British desired to establish Tibet as a buffer against the Czarist Russia's threats towards British India. The British successfully made Tibet a buffer state between Russia, China and British India after British India's short invasion of Tibet in 1903.

Subsequently, Chinese nationalists viewed the British invasion of Tibet as a security threat to China in its own backyard. The centuries old, zone of peace between India and China disappeared after the British left India in 1947 and Tibet was soon invaded by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. After China's occupation of Tibet, the first ever Sino-Indian military face-off was seen at the world's highest border point—the Himalayas.

Since then, thousands of Chinese military

incursions have taken place across the Indian Himalayan borders. By invading Tibet, China used Tibet as a strategic asset to speed up its expansionist policies towards the Himalayan nations and beyond. In addition, China's militarization of Tibet triggered geopolitical tensions in South Asia.

China sees Tibet as a strategic passage to extend its geopolitical ambitions in South Asia. Mao Zedong, the founding father of the PRC, and a firm believer of Sun Tzu's strategic doctrine—"the Art of War", strategized Tibet as the palm of China to expand its sphere of influence in South Asia. China invaded and occupied Tibet in order to bring the "five-fingers" of the Himalayan regions under its supremacy.

The 2017, Doklam stand-off and China's recent occupation of a Nepali village called Rui Gaun in Gorkha district<sup>1</sup> are just the tip of the iceberg of China's military aggressions in the five-fingered Himalayan region. Today, China is actively encroaching in the Himalayan border regions of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh to further encircle India as a means of boosting "China's Strategy of Encirclement India."

Professor Ashok Kapur rightly illustrated "China's Strategy of Encirclement of India" in his book titled, "India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle," in which he writes:

The China-India war of 1962, created a military front in the Himalayan regions. The PRC-Pakistan strategic partnership has created a diplomatic with security and defence fronts against India. The encirclement of the Chinese port facilities in Myanmar, Sri Lanka

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tsewang Dorji which appeared in Taiwan Times on July 4, 2020.

and Pakistan has created commercial and trade fronts against India.<sup>2</sup>

All these geostrategic tensions are strategic ramifications of China's aggressive policy towards India.

In fact, the Tibetans were the first line of defence for India. They ultimately safeguard the 3,488 km<sup>3</sup> long border from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Since the disappearance of Tibet as a traditional buffer state between India and China in 1949, the two Asian giants have faced military escalations along the Indo-Tibetan border. The transition of the Indo-Tibetan border to Sino-Indian border itself alone has created an unprecedented geopolitical enigma in the Himalaya. The centrality of the Tibet issue in Sino-Indian geostrategic relations is one of the key means to resolve the Sino-Indian dispute over the Indo-Tibetan border.

Professor Dawa Norbu explicitly stated that,

“The crux of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry is this: if the Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important to China, the Indian counterparts think it is equally vital to Indian national security.”<sup>4</sup>

The present Chinese leadership has emphasized the strategic importance of Tibet as a central issue for China's national security and its engagement with South Asia. Thus, this is the right time for India to craft a new national Tibet policy, because China is strategizing on Tibet as their nation's palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as the five-fingers of Tibet is not a mere rhetoric. It is happening now—in the Himalaya.



## China's Strategic Thinking Towards Tibet and the Himalayas\*

The year 2020 marks the 62<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising Day. The Chinese military at the time brutally cracked down on Tibetan peaceful protests against the Chinese Communist Party's militarily occupation of Tibet on the 10 March, 1959.

Subsequently, His Holiness the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama and more than 80,000<sup>1</sup> Tibetans fled to India seeking political asylum. And the Chinese occupation of Tibet in the following decades posed geopolitical ramifications towards the South Asian region of the Himalayas.

Since the invasion of Tibet and its disappearance as a traditional buffer state between India and China in 1949, the two Asian giants of the region faced each other for the first time in history along the Indo-Tibetan border.

After the occupation of Tibet, the resurgent the People's Republic of China led the transformation of the Indo-Tibetan border into a Sino-Indian border, which has created an unprecedented and long-standing geopolitical tension in the Himalayas. Geographically as well as strategically, the mountainous regions of Tibet are the first line of defense for India.

The present Chinese leadership now considers Tibet issue as one of the core interests of China. During the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Tibet Work Forum, Xi Jinping dictated the geopolitical importance of Tibet in securing Chinese national security and unification.

As per Xi Jinping's strategy for governing Tibet in the new era put forward in the "10 Musts," in which the second 'must' is: "governing border areas is the key for governing a country, and stabilizing Tibet is priority for governing border area."<sup>2</sup>

The Tibet Work Forum is the highest decision-making body dealing with Tibet affairs in China.

The current Chinese strategy of "stabilizing Tibet first" is the updated stratagem of Mao's strategy of China's palm and the five-fingers and

the Chinese nationalists' perception of Tibet as a backdoor to China in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. These Himalayan five-fingers which China has claimed are closely attached to India.

Excluding Nepal and Bhutan, the remaining three fingers are currently under the jurisdiction of India. Moreover, Bhutan has no diplomatic relations with China, but Nepal is moving closer to Beijing. Therefore, geopolitically, any Chinese aggression across the Himalayas is a direct threat to India's national security.

Professor Dawa Norbu noted that up to 1947, there were only 753 border police who safeguarded the Indo-Tibet border which stretched from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. After the Galwan Valley military standoff in 2020, India and China additionally deployed as many as 50,000 troops from each side along the border.<sup>4</sup>

Along with these massive military deployments in the Himalayas, both heavy duty and light combat weapons are also being deployed in the high-altitude Indo-Tibet border area. The heavy military expenditure on the world's highest border remains costly for both India and China. According to SIPRO report, India's military expenditure was \$71.1 billion in 2019 which makes India the third highest military spender in the world after the US and China.<sup>5</sup>

Tsewang Rinzin, a Ph.D. research scholar at the Columbia University in his estimate revealed the share of Indian resources allocated for its defense budget by stating that,

"The fact that India has a shared border with China due to the Chinese occupation of Tibet and subsequent signing of the

\*This is an adapted version of a piece authored by Tsewang Dorji which appeared in Taiwan Times on March 10, 2020.

Panchsheel Agreement costs Indian taxpayers about US\$7.16 billion annually, on average. This amount was a little over 10% of India's total military spending in 2019, i.e., US\$ 71.1 billion. Adding up this cost from 1955 (the year after the Panchsheel agreement) to 2019, without adjustments for inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, for over 60 years, the occupation of Tibet by China has cost the Indian government US\$ 462.8 billion.”<sup>6</sup>

With this strategic cost, the centrality of Tibet in terms of demilitarization of Tibet is an ultimate resolution for resolving the Sino-Indian dispute

over the Indo-Tibet border.

For making Tibet a zone of peace, the centuries old status of Tibet as a zone of peace has to be restored between India and China. The idea of making Tibet a modern-day zone of peace was initially proposed by His Holiness the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama in the 1980s. This proposal is a win-win resolution for ending the India-China conflict in the Himalayas.

For instance, in 1975, King Birendra proposed making Nepal a peace zone between India and China-occupied Tibet. It was formally declared by Nepal's Prime Minister S.B. Thapa in 1982. China supported this initiative.

Therefore, if India and China mutually look forward to bringing peace and stability in Asia, making Tibet a zone of peace is the ultimate solution for maintaining friendship and peaceful co-existence between them.

India, along with the world democratic alliance, have the potential to bring China to the negotiating table to make Tibet a zone of peace by securing India's own northern borders and checking China's encirclement of India. Because China's strategic perception of Tibet is still premised on China's palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as the five-fingers of Tibet, as stated earlier, making Tibet a zone of peace is the ultimate solution.





## A Warrior from the Valley of Nyarong: An Obituary\*

On 3 August, Ama Adhe, the iconic Tibetan freedom fighter, former political prisoner, and human rights activist passed away in Dharamsala. She was 92. Ama Adhe—or Adhe Tapontsang—was born in 1928 to a Tibetan nomadic family in Kham Nyarong in east Tibet.

‘Ama’ means mother in Tibetan. Over the years, armed with her extraordinary story of grit and survival, she inspired and nurtured many young Tibetans and non-Tibetans to join the Tibetan freedom movement. Her loving personality and motherly warmth won many young hearts—who now see themselves as her adopted children. As someone from a nomadic Tibetan family myself, Ama’s recollections about the pristine beauty of her childhood village, the snow mountains, and the valleys teeming with trees and flowers always made me homesick. But as fate would have it, she could not live a normal life in her beautiful village like her forefathers had. Some dark forces were to upend not just her life, but also the life of her nation.

After their victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the communist regime under Mao Zedong began to occupy Tibet in the east and north. Ama Adhe was to experience and witness the horrible transformation of her country under a ruthless colonial regime. As Chinese colonial expansion was met with fierce Tibetan resistance in the eastern Tibet, violence and bloodshed ensued.

Initially, Ama Adhe and her husband planned to escape to Lhasa and then to India. However, her husband was poisoned by Chinese agents and died, leaving her with a little boy and another

baby in her womb. This changed the course of her life. Along with 300 women from her village and other villages in the surrounding area, Ama Adhe joined the Tibetan resistance movement. As the male members from her region went on to the mountains to hold strategic positions to fight against the invading enemy, the women shouldered the responsibility of providing supplies like foods and other provisions. After the Chinese army outnumbered and crushed the ill-equipped Tibetan resistance, Ama Adhe and her group were arrested. What followed next were 27 years of unimaginable torture, exploitation and humiliation at the hands of Chinese authorities.



Ama Adhe (1928-2020)<sup>+</sup>

After they were rounded up, a Chinese soldier killed her brother-in-law in front of her with a point blank shot on his head. His blood and brain splattered out, and some of it fell on her. The soldier then turned to her and asked sardonically: “Look, who is the winner?”

China imprisoned Ama Adhe and others in a jail inside China for three years. Among the 300 women, only four survived. As they were denied food and forced to work, rest of them starved or died of exhaustion within three years. When they died, some of them moved their lips and said, “Please give me some food. Please give me water”, while others cried for their family. Ama

\*This obituary is written by Palden Sonam and it appeared in the Eleventh Column and the Taipei Times on August 4 and August 9, 2020 respectively

<sup>+</sup>Photo courtesy: Claudio Raschella

Adhe had survived this ordeal and starvation as a primary witness to the inhuman suffering of her people. Then the Chinese transferred her to a Laogai (labour camp) in Tibet where she spent 24 years until her release in 1985, when Deng Xiaoping pardoned some political prisoners as China began to open its market to the outside world.

When she returned to her village, the mountains stood barren, with the forests gone due to excessive deforestation. The monasteries too were gone. Even worse, her son had died in her absence. Luckily, her daughter who was barely few months at the time of her arrest had survived and had grown up into a young woman.

But they could not recognise each other as she never had a chance to see or even know about her during the entire period of her incarceration in the labour camp.

With her freedom from Chinese labour camp, Ama Adhe could have settled in her village with her daughter. However, her moral urge and determination to tell the truth about what had happened to her country and people during the critical years of Chinese occupation compelled her to flee from her China-occupied home.

Even more, ultimately, if 'the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting', as Milan Kundera put it, then her life and story made a great contribution to resist power and defeat forgetting. Ama Adhe is survived by the fight for a free Tibet.

Ama Adhe escaped into exile to India in 1987 and settled in Dharamsala. Since then, she made every effort to tell the truth about the harsh reality of Tibetan lives under Chinese colonial rule through her own experiences, and also as a witness to the inhuman treatment of Tibetan political prisoners.

Through her book *Ama Adhe: The Voice that Remembers – The Heroic Story of a Woman's Fight to Free Tibet*, published in 1997, and numerous talks and interviews, she countered Chinese propaganda on Tibet that was couched in the typical colonial rhetoric of 'liberation, emancipation and development'.

Moreover, her heroic story of survival with dignity and courage inspired thousands. It revealed the immense ability of the human spirit to endure the unthinkable and still find the grace to smile. Her life and story symbolise the indomitable spirit of the Tibetan nation and its people, and the courage to dream for a better future despite all odds.

Though the flow of her life was terribly disturbed by the toxic combination of communist revolution and colonial politics of violence, oppression and suspicion, she had never lost her sense of humanity. And that was a great victory.



## DIGEST

### January 2, 2020

His Holiness the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama for the 10<sup>th</sup> time made into the “Most Admired Man” list in America. Based on 2019 December 15 Gallup poll, the Tibetan spiritual leader was placed ninth in the list collected from more than 1,000 US adults. The Tibetan leader is the only non-US citizen other than Pope Francis to have made into the list indicating an enduring popularity among the Americans. The Dalai Lama was also awarded the US highest civilian honor in 2007, the Congressional Gold Medal by the then President George W Bush.

### January 15, 2020

The Mayor of Prague Zdenek Hrib ended its city’s partnership with Beijing and opted for Taiwan. Beijing’s sister-city partnership with Prague ended when the city refused to commit to one China policy. Mayor Zdenek has touted Taiwan for carrying the same message and having shared values with Prague. He also criticized Chinese policies in Tibet.

### March 11, 2020

On March 11, The US State Department released the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- the Human Rights Reports- which highlighted China’s repression of freedom of speech, religion, movement, association and assembly in Tibet and Xinjiang in 2019. The new Human Rights report stated that the situation in both the regions “was more severe than in other areas of the country.” It also stated that most of the top positions in the Tibet Autonomous Region administration, police and military is held by Chinese. The report further emphasized the increasing acceleration of forced assimilation of Tibetans into mainstream Chinese culture.

### May 14, 2020

Dr. Tenzin Dorjee, the first ever Tibetan American to be appointed a Commissioner of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, completed his term on May 14, 2020. He was appointed to the Commission on December 8, 2016, by then House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi. He was reappointed by her for a second term on May 10, 2018. Tenzin Dorjee’s position was filled by Nury Turkel, a Uyghur American, who appointed as the new US Commission on International Religious Freedom under House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Turkel was appointed on May 26 and he will complete his term on May 14, 2020.

### May 19, 2020

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded that China reveal whereabouts of Tibet’s 11<sup>th</sup> Panchen Lama chosen by the Dalai Lama. Panchen Lama was regarded as one of the youngest political prisoners. He is considered the second most senior figure in Tibetan Buddhism next to the Dalai Lama. The US ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, Sam Brownback warned that Beijing should not see the Panchen Lama episode as a model for the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.

### June 24, 2020

China allowed group of diplomats to visit Tibetan areas in Sichuan Province under strict control. The Chinese state media stated that the purpose of the visit was to showcase the development in the region and to create a positive image by opening up the area for foreign visitors. However, Tibetan rights groups expressed their concerns regarding China still restricting access to Tibet except for state-sponsored tours.

**June 30, 2020**

The National Security Law for Hong Kong was passed and came into force. It gives Beijing powers to shape, intervene and control life in Hong Kong like never before. This law practically ends the ‘one country, two systems’ model undermining Hong Kong’s long cherished autonomy and also its independent judiciary.

**July 1, 2020**

Under the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA), the US State Department announced that Chinese Communist Party and government officials responsible for keeping Americans out of Tibet will be denied entry to the US. The US passed the RATA in 2018 that requires the US State Department to issue visa sanctions against Chinese officials responsible for rejecting American citizens from access into Tibet.

**July 7, 2020**

In a retaliation against US visa restrictions on Chinese officials over Tibet, China imposed visa restrictions on US citizens who have engaged in what is called “egregious” behaviour over Tibet. The US on the other hand criticized Beijing’s human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named Chen Quanguo and two other senior Chinese officials who are serving in Xinjiang, known to Uyghurs as East Turkestan, are banned for their involvement in gross violations of human rights.

**July 27, 2020**

The US Consulate in Chengdu was closed as a retaliation against US shutting down Chinese consulate in Houston on the ground that it has been involved in espionage activities. The Chinese government gave the US the same 72-hours time frame to close their Chengdu mission as Beijing had been given in Houston a week earlier. The US Consulate in Chengdu was first opened by the then-Vice President George Bush in 1985 and played a crucial role for Tibet due to its close proximity to Tibet.

**September 22, 2020**

Adrian Zenz, an independent researcher on Tibet and Xinjiang came out with a report that documented a large-scale program in Tibet that pushed more than half a million rural Tibetans off their land and into military-style training centers. This was followed by 60 parliamentarians from 16 countries demanding urgent action against the Chinese government. The parliamentarians are members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China.

**September 22, 2020**

Tibet-born, Baimadajie Angwang, who was serving as New York Police Department officer was charged with spying for China. He is also employed by the US Army Reserve, working as a civil affair specialist who is accused of being in contact with two officials at Chinese consulate. He was arrested and if convicted, he will face maximum sentence of 55 years in prison.

**October 13, 2020**

China was elected as a member of the Human Rights Council for the 2021-2023 term in an election held at the 75<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly. The Chinese government, which still has a record of wide-scale human rights violations is now re-elected to the UN Human Rights Council. There are vocal oppositions and rising criticism against China’s growing presence in UN Human Rights forums amid global concerns over crackdown in Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

**October 14, 2020**

The US appoints a senior human rights official as special coordinator for Tibetan issues amid increasing tensions with Beijing. Robert Destro, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, will assume the additional post that has been vacant since the beginning of President Trump’s tenure in 2017.

### **November 23, 2020**

The Sikyong, (president) of the Central Tibetan Administration, Dr. Lobsang Sangay was invited to Washington to meet the high level American officials. The Tibetan exile administration hailed it as the first time in six decade for the head of Tibetan government in exile to visit the White House.

### **November 21, 2020**

In a report released by the office of the US Secretary of State titled, 'The Element of the China Challenge' describes Tibet as a military occupied territory under China. The report highlighted the China's occupation and suppression of various territories and people. This is the first time a report from the US department calling out Chinese invasion of Tibet as military occupation of Tibet.

### **December 7, 2020**

The Council of European Union adopted a new framework for sanctioning human rights violators. The Council of EU adopted a Council Decision and a Council Regulation establishing the EU's global human rights sanction regime. The European Parliament in 2019 adopted a resolution calling for an autonomous, flexible and reactive EU-wide sanctions regime that would allow for the targeting of any individual, state and non-state actors, and other entities responsible for or involved in grave human rights violations.





## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I

## PRC's Leadership in the so-called TAR

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམར་ཤོག་ཚོགས་པའི་འགོ་གཙོ་རྒྱུན་འཁུར་ (ཏང་ཨུད)

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམར་ཤོག་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་བླ་ཆེ་(བླ་ཆེ་ཅི)



ལུ་དྲིང་ཅེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༥༦ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ པར་སྐྱེས། ཡུན་ཏུང་ཁང་དབྱིན་པ་རེད།

Wu Yingjie (Chinese) was born in December 1956. He is from Shandong Province. He is currently the Party Secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམར་ཤོག་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་བླ་ཆེ་གཞོན་པ་(བླ་ཆེ་ཅི་གཞོན་པ) ར།



ལྷོ་བཟང་རྒྱལ་མཆན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༧ པར་སྐྱེས། ཆབ་མདོ་བོང་ཁྱེར་བྲག་གཡལ་ནས་རེད།

Lobsang Gyaltsen (Tibetan) was born in July 1957. He is from Chamdo. He is currently a Deputy Party Secretary of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཆེ་དབང་ལྷ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ པར་སྐྱེས། ཡུན་ནན་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཉི་ཁྱེན་ནས་རེད།

Che Dalha (Tibetan) was born in August 1958. He is from Shangrila County, Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province. He is currently a Deputy Party Secretary of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཞོང་ཡན། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ པར་སྐྱེས། ཅི་ལིན་ཁོང་ཨན་ནས་རེད།

Zhong Yan, (Chinese) was born in August 1967. He is from Jilin Province. He is currently a Deputy Party Secretary of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཡན་ཅན་ཤེ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ པར་སྐྱེས། མཚོ་ཕྱོག་མེན་ཏུ་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Yan Jinhai (Tibetan) was born in March 1968. He is from Minhe County, Qinghai province. He is currently a Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the TAR.

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམར་ཆོག་གས(ཉང་ཁུད)ཀྱི་རྒྱན་ལས་ ༡༭།



བསྟན་ཁོ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ པར་སྐྱེས། མཚོ་ཕྱོག་མཚོ་ལྷོ་ཀླུང་རྟོ་ཆབ་ཆེ་ནས་རེད།

Tenkho (Tibetan) was born in September 1962. He is from Chabcha, Tsolho County, Qinghai Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཅང་ཅའེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༥ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༠ པར་སྐྱེས། ཅན་ཉུང་ཅའོ་ཀུའུ་ནས་རེད།

Jiang Jie (Chinese) was born in October 1965. He is from Shandong Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཧྲོ་ཟུན་ཏའོ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༤ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ པར་སྐྱེས། ཏུའུ་ནན་ཏུང་ཏུང་ནས་རེད།

He Wenhao (Chinese) was born in March 1964. He is from Hunan Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



པད་མ་དབང་འདུས། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༢ པར་སྐྱེས། སྤར་ཁམས་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Pema Wangdu (Tibetan) was born in February 1967. He is from Markham. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ལིཊུ་ཅང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༦ པར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་ལང་ཁྲོང་ནས་རེད།

Liu Jiang (Chinese) was born in June 1967. He is from Sichuan Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཁྱེན་ཡུང་ཆི། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༡ པར་སྐྱེས། ཅན་ཞིའི་རྩེ་རན་ནས་རེད།

Chen Yongqi (Chinese) was born in November 1967. He is from Shanxi Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཡང་ཐེ་དུང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༥ པར་སྐྱེས། ཅན་ཞིའི་ཕུན་མོས་ནས་རེད།

Wang Weidong (Chinese) was born in May 1968. He is from Shanxi Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



མང་ཁུའེ་ཅེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༡ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ པར་སྐྱེས། ཡན་ཏོས་རྩུ་ཁྲོང་ནས་རེད།

Zhang Xuejie (Chinese) was born in August 1961. He is from Anhui Province. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.



ཡང་ཁའེ་ཁྲོཊུ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡ པར་སྐྱེས། ཀན་སུཊུ་མེང་ཆེང་ནས་རེད།

Wang Haizhou, (Chinese) was born in January 1967. He is from Gansu Province. He is currently member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the TAR.

## བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམངས་འཐུས།

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམངས་འཐུས་ཚོགས་གཙོ།



ལོ་བཟང་རྒྱལ་མཚན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༧ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༧ པར་སྐྱེས། ཆབ་མདོ་བྱོང་བྱེད་གཞུང་གི་ལྷན་འཛིན་ཡིན།

Lobsang Gyaltzen (Tibetan) was born in July 1957. He is from Chamdo. He is currently the chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་དམངས་འཐུས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་གཞོན་(ལྷན་ཞི་གཞོན་པ)༡༣ །



དོ་ཐོག། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༠ པར་སྐྱེས། དཔལ་མགོན་ཐོང་སྡེ་དགོན་པ་ནས་ཡིན།

Dothok (Tibetan) was born in October 1959. He is from Palgon County, Nagchu. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



བསམ་སྡེ་དོ་རྩེ་པག་མོ་བདེ་ཆེན་ཆོས་སྒྲོན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༤༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ པར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ས་ནས་ཡིན།

Samding Dorje Phakmo Dechen Choedon (Tibetan) was born in December 1942. She is from Lhasa. She is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



འོ་ཤེར། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ པར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ས་ནས་ཡིན།

Woesser (Tibetan) was born in December 1960. He is from Lhasa. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ལུ་ས་ལྷུང་ཀོང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༥༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༡ པར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་ཁྲིན་རྩ་ཁྲུང་ནས་ཡིན།

Shu Xiaogong (Chinese) was born in November 1958. He is from Chengdu, Sichuan province. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



འཆི་མེད་རིག་འཛིན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། མཁའ་གྲོ་གུང་དཀར་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Chime Rigzin (Tibetan) was born in December 1958. He is from Meldrogongkar County, Lhasa. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ཉི་མ་ཆེ་རིང་། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༧ བར་སྐྱེས། གོང་དཀར་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Nyima Tsering (Tibetan) was born in July 1959. He is from Gongkar County, Lhoka. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ཅི་གོ་ཀང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ བར་སྐྱེས། ཅི་ལིན་ཡན་ཅི་ནས་རེད།

Ji Guogang (Chinese) was born in August 1962. He is from Jilin Province. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



མ་ཤེན་ཁང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༡ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། ཡུན་ཏུང་ལིང་ཡན་ནས་རེད།

Ma Shengchang (Chinese) was born in December 1961. He is from Shangdong Province. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ཁང་ཅུན། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༤ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༢ བར་སྐྱེས། ཀན་སུའུ་ཕིང་ལན་ནས་རེད།

Wang Jun (Chinese) was born in February 1964. She is from Gansu Province. She is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.





ཁུ་ཁྲེང་ཚང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༧ བར་སྤྱི་ཟླ་། ཡན་ཏོ་མ་ལི་ཏུ་ཡན་ནས་རེད།

Xu Chengcang (Chinese) was born in July 1963. He is from Anhui Province. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



དིང་ཡེ་ཤམ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༠ བར་སྤྱི་ཟླ་། ཡན་ཏུ་དབྱང་ཀོ་ནས་རེད།

Ding Yexian (Chinese) was born in October 1960. He is from Shangdong. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ནོར་བུ་དོན་གྲུབ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྤྱི་ཟླ་། འབྲོང་ས་རྒྱས་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Norbu Dhondup (Tibetan) was born in December 1960. He is from Chonggye, Lhoka. He is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.



ཐང་མིང་ཡིན། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༤ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༤ བར་སྤྱི་ཟླ་། སི་ཁྲོན་ལུ་ཡུ་ཡུ་ནས་རེད།

Tang Mingying (Chinese) was born in April 1964. She is from Sichuan Province. She is currently a Vice-chairman of the People's Congress of the TAR.

## བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གཞུང་།

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གཞུང་གི་འགོ་གཙོ་(ཀྲུ་ལུ་ཞི།)



ཆེ་དག་ལྷ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༨ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ བར་སྐྱེས། ཡུན་ནན་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཉི་ཁྲ་ནས་རེད།

Che Dalha (Tibetan) was born in August 1958. He is from Shangrila, Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province. He is currently the Governor of the TAR Government.

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གཞུང་གི་འགོ་གཙོ་གཞོན་པ་(ཀྲུ་ལུ་ཞི་གཞོན་པ་)༡༩ |



ཅང་ཅའེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༥ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༠ བར་སྐྱེས། རྫོང་ཅའེ་ཀྲུ་ལུ་ནས་རེད།

Jiang Jie (Chinese) was born in October 1965. He is from Shangdong Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



པད་མ་དབང་འདུས། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༢ བར་སྐྱེས། སྤར་ཁམས་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Pema Wangdue (Tibetan) was born in February 1967. He is from Markham. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཁྱ་རས་ལྷོ་བཟང་བསྟན་འཛིན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ས་ནས་རེད།

Chakra Lobsang Tenzin (Tibetan) was born in December 1953. He is from Lhasa. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



རྡོ་རྗེ་ཅེ་བུའུ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། རུ་ཐོག་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Dorje Tsedup (Tibetan) was born in December 1962. He is from Ruthok County, Ngari. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



རྒྱལ་མཚན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། ལྷོ་གདོང་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Gyaltzen (Tibetan) was born in December 1962. He is from Nedong County, Lhoka. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཀྲུང་ཡུང་ཅེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ བར་སྐྱེས། ཡུན་ནན་རྒྱུ་མེ་ནས་རིང།

Zhang Yongze (Chinese) was born in March 1969. He is from Yunnan Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཀྲུང་ཡན་ཆིང་། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༤ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༦ བར་སྐྱེས། ཀན་སུའུ་དབང་རིས་ནས་རིང།

Zhang Yanqing (Tibetan) was born in June 1964. He is from Pari County, Gansu Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ལོ་མེ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༧ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༧ བར་སྐྱེས། ཆབ་མདོ་ནས་རིང།

Lomey (Tibetan) was born in July 1967. She is from Chamdo. She is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



མེང་ཞའོ་ལིན། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༤ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡ བར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་ཨན་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Meng Shaolin (Chinese) was born in January 1964. She is from Sichuan Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



འཇམ་པལ་ལ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༠ བར་སྐྱེས། ལྷུན་གྲུབ་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Jamphel (Tibetan) was born in October 1963. He is from Lhundrup County, Lhoka. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཀྲམ་རྩང་མོ་འོ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༥ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ བར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་ཤོན་ཉན་ནས་རིང།

Zhang Hongbo (Chinese) was born in March 1965. He is from Sichuan Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



རིན་མེ། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༧༦ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༤ བར་སྐྱེས། རྩན་ཞི་ཇི་ཉན་ནས་རིང།

Renwei (Chinese) was born in April 1976. He is from Shanxi. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཕུར་བུ་དོན་གྲུབ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༧༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༡ བར་སྐྱེས། རྒྱལ་ཅེ་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Phurbu Dhondup (Tibetan) was born in November 1972. He is from Gyaltsse County, Shigatse He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.



ཡང་ཡུང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༧༡ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ བར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་ལུ་གུ་ཉན་ནས་རིང།

Wang Yong (Chinese) was born in March 1971. He is from Sichuan Province. He is currently a Vice-Governor of the TAR Government.

## བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གྲོས་

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གྲོས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་གཙོ་(གཞུང་ཞི)།



འཕགས་པ་ལྷ་དགེ་ལེགས་ནམ་ལྷུ་། བོད་རིགས་༡༩༤༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡ བར་སྐྱེས། དཀར་མཛེས་ལེ་ཐང་ནས་རིང་།

Phagpalha Gelek Namgyal (Tibetan) was born in February, 1940. He is from Kardze, Lithang. He is currently the Chairman of the TAR People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC).

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཟེར་བའི་སྲིད་གྲོས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་གཞོན་(གཞུང་ཞི་གཞོན་པ)༡༤ །



བསྟན་ཁོ། བོད་རིགས་༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ བར་སྐྱེས། མཚོ་སྔོན་མཚོ་སྒྲིང་རྟོག་ཆབ་ཆེན་ནས་རིང་།

Tenkho (Tibetan) was born in September 1962. He is from Chabcha, Tsoholo County, Qinghai Province. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.




ལྷུ་ཁང་ཐུབ་བསྟན་མཁས་གྲུ་། བོད་རིགས་༡༩༥༥ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡༢ བར་སྐྱེས། བོད་ལྗོངས་ནག་ཁུ་ནས་རིང་།

Drupkhang Thubten Khedup (Tibetan) was born in December 1955. He is from Nagchu. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



ཆེ་སྟོན་གླིང་བསྟན་འཛིན་འཕྲིན་ལས། བོད་རིགས་༡༩༥༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ བར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ས་ནས་རིང་།


Tsemonling Tenzin Thinley (Tibetan) was born in September 1950. He is from Lhasa. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



རྫོང་ལོ་བྲམས་པ་མཁས་གྲུ་། བོད་རིགས་༡༩༤༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༨ བར་སྐྱེས། ཆབ་མདོ་རྫོང་ནས་རིང་།

Zonglo Jampa Khedrup (Tibetan) was born in August 1940. He is from Chamdo. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.





ས་ལུང་ཕུན་ལགས། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༤༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ པར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ཅེ་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Salung Phunlak (Tibetan) was born in March 1943. He is from Lhatse County, Shigatse. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



བསོད་ནམས་རིག་འཛིན། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ པར་སྐྱེས། རིན་སྐང་ས་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Sonam Rigzin (Tibetan) was born in September 1959. He is from Rinpung County, Shigatse. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



ངག་དབང། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ པར་སྐྱེས། འབའ་ཐང་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Ngawang (Tibetan) was born in September 1963. He is from Batang. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



ཡང་ཡལ་ན། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༥༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༣ པར་སྐྱེས། སི་ཁྲོན་གོ་ཡིང་ནས་རེད།

Wang Yayan (Chinese) was born in March 1959. He is from Sichuan Province. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



སངས་རྒྱས་གཤགས་པ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༤ པར་སྐྱེས། ཉིང་ཁྱི་མེ་ཉོག་རྫོང་ནས་རེད།

Sangye Dakpa (Tibetan) was born in April 1960. He is from Metok County Nyingtri. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



ལྷོ་ལ་དཀར། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༣ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ བར་སྐྱེས། ལྷ་ས་ནས་རིང།

Dolkar (Tibetan) was born in September 1963. She is from Lhasa. She is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



ལས་ཀྱིས་ལུང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༡ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༩ བར་སྐྱེས། ཅན་ཞི་ལུང་ཞི་ནས་རིང།

Lei Guilong (Chinese) was born in September 1961. He is from Shanxi Province. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



བཟ་ཤིས་ལྷ་བ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༥༩ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༢ བར་སྐྱེས། འབང་ཐང་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Tashi Dawa (Tibetan) was born in February 1959. He is from Batang. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



རྒྱལ་མཚན་ལྷ་མོ། བོད་རིགས། ༡༩༦༢ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༡ བོར་སྐྱེས། ཉག་ཚུ་ནས་རིང།

Gyaltsen Lhamo (Tibetan) was born in January 1962. She is from Nagchu. She is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.



དུ་ཅན་གྲང་། རྒྱ་རིགས། ༡༩༦༡ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༦ བར་སྐྱེས། རུ་ཅུ་ནན་ཅུ་རྫོང་ནས་རིང།

Du Jiangong (Chinese) was born in June 1961. He is from Hunan province. He is currently a Vice-Chairman of the TAR PPCC.

## APPENDIX II

Tibetan Text of the "Ethnic Unity Regulations"  
 བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་སྲོལ་ཡིག

༼ ༡༠༡༠ལོའི་ལྷ་ ༡ ཆེས་ ༡༡ ཉིན་བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་མི་དམངས་འཕུས་མི་ཚོགས་ཆེན་སྐབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་པའི་ཚོགས་འདུ་ཐེངས་གསུམ་པའི་ཐོག་གྲོས་འཆམ་བྱང་ག༽

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་མི་དམངས་འཕུས་མི་ཚོགས་ཆེན་གྱི་སྤྱི་བསྐྱེད་ལས་ཀྱི་

(༡༠༡༠) ཡིག་མང་ ༩ བ།

《 བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་སྲོལ་ཡིག》འདི་ ༡༠༡༠ ལོའི་ལྷ་ ༡ ཆེས་ ༡༡ ཉིན་བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་མི་དམངས་འཕུས་མི་ཚོགས་ཆེན་སྐབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་པའི་ཚོགས་འདུ་ཐེངས་གསུམ་པའི་ཐོག་གྲོས་འཆམ་བྱང་བ་ད་ལྟ་ཁུལ་བསྐྱེད་ལས་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་དང་ ༡༠༡༠ ལོའི་ལྷ་ ༥ ཆེས་ ༡ ཉིན་ནས་ལག་བསྟར་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན།

བོད་རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་མི་དམངས་འཕུས་མི་ཚོགས་ཆེན་སྐབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་པའི་ཚོགས་འདུ་ཐེངས་གསུམ་པའི་ཀྲུང་གི་ཚོགས་པས། ༡༠༡༠ ལོའི་ལྷ་ ༡ ཆེས་ ༡༡ ཉིན།

དཀར་ཆག

ལེའུ་དང་པོ། སྤྱི་ཅུ་ལོ།

ལེའུ་གཉིས་པ། ལས་ཀྱི་འགན་འཁུལ།

ལེའུ་གསུམ་པ། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་མཉམ་ལས།

ལེའུ་བཞི་པ། དེལ་བསྐྱེད་ལས་སྤྱོད་པས།

ལེའུ་ལྔ་པ། འཛུགས་གཏོང་དང་གཞི་རྒྱ་སྤྲོད།

ལེའུ་དྲུག་པ། ཅ་འཛུགས་ཀྱི་འགན་སྐྱོང་།

ལེའུ་བདུན་པ། བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་ཀྱི་འགན་འཁུལ།

ལེའུ་བརྒྱད་པ། ཞར་བྱང་།

ལེའུ་དང་པོ། སྤྱི་ཅུ་ལོ།

དོན་ཚན་དང་པོ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་བྱ་གཞག་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་སྤྱོད་འདེད་གཏོང་ཐབས་གཏོང་བ་དང་། འབྲེལ་ཐོབ་དང་། མཐུན་སྦྲིལ། རོགས་རེས། ཞི་མཐུན་བཅས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་འབྲེལ་བ་སྤྱོད་འདེད་གཏོང་བའི་ཀྲུང་གི་མི་རིགས་གཅིག་མཐུན་འདུས་བྱུང་གྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཐབས་ཏུ་གཏོང་བ་བཅས་བྱས་ཏེ། བོད་ལྗོངས་འདི་ཉིད་རྒྱལ་ཡོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་བསྐྱེད་ལས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ལྟར་བྱེད་ཆེད། ཅ་ཁྲིམས་དང་དེ་བཞིན་ཀྲུང་གི་དམངས་སྤྱི་མཐུན་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ས་ཁོངས་རང་སྐྱོང་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་སྤྱོད་འདེད་ཁྲིམས་དང་ཁྲིམས་སྲོལ་གཞིར་བཟུང་། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་དོན་དངོས་དང་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་གྱིས་སྲོལ་ཡིག་འདི་བཅོས་པ་ཡིན།

དོན་ཚན་གཉིས་པ། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དངོན་ས་ཁོངས་ནང་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ལས་དོན་སྤེལ་བར་སྲོལ་ཡིག་འདི་སྤྱད་ན་འཕུས།

དོན་ཚན་གསུམ་པ། བོད་འདི་ཉིད་གནད་ལ་སྤྱོད་པ་བསྐྱུང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཆ་ཤིས་ཤིག་ཡིན་ཞིང་། མི་རིགས་ཁག་ཆང་མ་ནི་ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ཁྱིམ་ཆང་ཆེ་མོའི་ནང་གི་ཁོངས་མི་གསུམ་ཆེན་ཞིག་ཡིན། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མི་དཔངས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ཅུང་ཡིན། མེས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་གཅིག་གྱུར་སྤྱད་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དང་། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ལ་ཤུགས་སྤོབ་ཀྱི་དང་། དར་ཆ་གསལ་སྤོབ་ཀྱི་ས་ཁྲུལ་ལ་དོ་སྤོབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བཅས་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མི་དཔངས་ཆོའི་སྤོབ་མོང་གི་འགན་འཁུར་དང་འོས་འགན་ཡིན།

དོན་ཚན་བཞི་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་བྱ་གཞག་ལ་སྦྱུལ་སྦྱེལ་གཏོང་བའི་གལ་ཆེའི་གཞི་རྒྱ་ཞིག་དང་། འཕེལ་ཁྱུར་སྤྱད་པའི་ཡུན་རིང་བདེ་འཁོར་ཡོང་ཁྱུར་སྦྱུལ་འདེད་གཏོང་བའི་གལ་ཆེའི་བྱ་ཐབས་ཤིག་འབྲོར་ཤུགས་དང་། དཔངས་གཏོ། ཤེས་དཔལ། ཞེ་མཐུན། མཛེས་སྤྱད་བཅས་ལྷན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་དེར་རབས་ཅན་གྱི་བོད་ལྗོངས་འཛུགས་སྤྱད་པའི་གལ་ཆེའི་ཐབས་ལམ་ཞིག་ མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མི་དཔངས་ཀྱིས་མཛེས་སྤྱད་ལྷན་པའི་བྱིས་གཞིས་མཉམ་སྦྲུལ་དང་། མཛེས་སྤྱད་ལྷན་པའི་མ་འོངས་མཉམ་གཏོང་། ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ཆུབ་སེལ་ཆེན་བསྐྱར་དང་གཞི་བཞུགས་དང་ཤུགས་འདུན་མཉམ་སྦྲེལ་བཅས་བྱེད་པའི་གལ་ཆེའི་འགན་སྤྱད་ཞིག་བཅས་ཡིན།

དོན་ཚན་ལྔ་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པར། ཞི་ཅན་མིང་གི་དུས་རབས་གསར་པའི་ཁྱད་པོའི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་མཐུན་པའི་ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ་དང་། ཁྱད་པོ་གྲུང་ཁྱད་ཀྱི་འགོ་བློ་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ། མི་དཔངས་ལྟེ་བར་འཛིན་ཀྱི་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ། མི་རིགས་ཁག་ཆང་མ་འདྲ་མཉམ་ཡོང་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ། ཁྱད་པོའི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་གནད་དོན་ཐག་གཅོད་བྱེད་པའི་ཡང་དག་གི་འགྲོ་ལམ་ཐོག་བསྐྱོད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ། མི་རིགས་ས་ཁོངས་རང་སྤྱོད་ལམ་ལུགས་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་དང་འཕུས་སྤྱོད་ཆང་དུ་གཏོང་དགོས་པ། ཁྱིམ་ཁྱུར་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་བཅས་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ། དེ་བཞིན་ཁྱིམ་ཁྱུར་ཐོད་སྤྱོད་དང་། དཔངས་སྤྱད་པོད་དཔ། ཡུན་རིང་བོད་སྤྱད། མི་སེམས་གཅིག་སྦྲེལ། མང་གཞི་བཟོན་གཏོང་བཅས་ཀྱི་ཅ་དོན་མཐའ་འཁྱོངས་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་དྲུག་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པར། “ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ཁྱིམ་ཆང་གཅིག་ ཁྱད་པོའི་ཤུགས་འདུན་མཉམ་སྦྲེལ་དུ་གཏོང་”ཅེས་པ་སྤྱི་དེ་དམིགས་ཆད་དུ་འཛིན་པ་དང་། སྤོབ་མོང་ཐོག་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་འབད་འཐབ་དང་སྤོབ་མོང་ཐོག་དར་ཁྱུར་གོང་འཕེལ་ཡོང་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བརྗོད་དོན་གཅི་ཐོར་བྱེད་པ། ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་གཅིག་མཐུན་འདུས་བྱུང་གི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཐབ་ཏུ་གཏོང་ཀྱི་གཅི་རྒྱ་དུ་བྱེད་པ། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྟེ་བའི་རིན་ཐང་ལྟེ་བའི་ཉིད་ཉིད་དུ་བྱེད་པ། མི་རིགས་ཁག་དབར་མན་ཚུན་འགྲོ་ཡོང་དང་། སྦྲེལ་རིམ། མཉམ་འདྲེས་བཅས་བྱེད་པར་ཤུགས་སྤོབ་ཀྱི་ཅ་ལའི་ཐབས་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་བཅས་བྱས་ནས་ཆུབ་སེལ་ཆེན་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཆ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་དང་། ཁྱད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས། ཁྱད་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས། ཁྱད་པོ་གྲུང་ཁྱད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་བཅས་ལ་མོས་པ་བྱེད་ཤུགས་ཆེ་ཏུ་བཏང་སྟེ། མི་རིགས་ཁག་དབར་འཆམ་མཐུན་མཉམ་གནས་དང་། བྱར་བ་བྱུ་འདེགས། ཞེ་མཐུན་གོང་འཕེལ་བཅས་ཡོང་བར་སྦྱུལ་འདེད་བཏང་ཐོག་ ཁྱད་པོའི་སྤྱོད་ཉམས་དང་། ཁྱད་པོའི་རིན་ཐང་། ཁྱད་པོའི་སྤོབས་ཤུགས་བཅས་གང་ལེགས་མཛོད་པར་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བདུན་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པར། ཏང་ཨུན་གྱིས་གཅིག་གྱུར་འགོ་བཙུག་བྱེད་པ་དང་། མི་དཔངས་འཕུས་ཚོགས་ཀྱིས་ཁྱིམ་ཁྱུར་སྤྱོད་པ། སྤྱི་དཔུང་གིས་ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་འགན་འཁུར་པ། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཁག་གིས་གཞིགས་འདེགས་དམ་ཐབ་བྱེད་པ། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཕྱོགས་ཁག་གིས་མཉམ་སྦྲེལ་བྱེད་པ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ལས་ཀའི་ལམ་སྦྲེལ་ལག་བསྟར་བྱས་ནས་ཆེན་རིག་དང་མཐུན་པའི་འཆར་འགོད་དང་། གཅིག་གྱུར་ལག་བསྟར་། དཔེ་བཟང་སྟེ་ཁྱོད། ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་སྦྱུལ་སྦྱེལ་བཅས་བྱེད་དགོས།

**ལེའུ་གཉིས་པ། ལས་ཀའི་འགན་འཁུར།**

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱད་པ། རང་སྤྱོད་ལྗོངས་དང་། ས་གནས་(གོང་ཁྱུར) རྫོང་(ཆུས)བཅས་ཀྱི་མི་དཔངས་སྤྱི་དཔུང་གིས་རེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་དེ་ཆུལ་དཔངས་དཔལ་འབྱོར་དང་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཕེལ་ཁྱུར་གྱི་འཆར་འགོད་ནང་བཅུག་ཐོག་དཔལ་འབྱོར་འཛུགས་སྤྱད་དང་། ཆབ་སྤྱི་དཔུང་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་དར་སྟེལ། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཛུགས་སྤྱད། སྤྱི་ཁམས་དཔལ་ཡོན་འཛུགས་སྤྱོད་བཅས་བྱེད་པའི་བརྒྱུད་རིམ་ཉིལ་པའི་ནང་ཁྱུང་བ་བྱས་ཏེ། གཅིག་གྱུར་འཆར་འགོད་དང་ལག་བསྟར་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་དགུ་པ། རང་སྤྱོད་སྤོངས་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་  
བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལེ་འཁར་འགོད་བཅོས་ནས་དམིགས་འབེན་ལས་འགན་དང་། དམིགས་ཚད་མ་ལག ལས་ཀའི་བྱེད་ཐབས། འགན་སྲུང་བྱ་ཐབས། དེ་བཞིན་  
དབྱེད་ཞིབ་དབྱེད་བསྐྱར་དང་གཞེངས་བསྟོད་བྱ་དགའ་སོགས་ཀྱི་ནང་དོན་ཁག་སལ་བཟོ་དགོས།

ས་གནས་(ཁྲོང་ཁྱེར)དང་རྫོང་(རྫུས)མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་  
གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་འཆར་འགོད་ལ་གཞིགས་ནས་ཞིབ་ཕྱིའི་ལག་བསྟར་རྩ་ས་གཞི་བཟོ་དགོས།

ཤར་(མི་རིགས་ཤར་དང་ཁྲོང་རྒལ)མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་དང་ཁྲོམ་གཞུང་དོན་གཅོད་ཁང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་  
དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལེ་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་ལས་དོན་ལག་པོ་སྐྱབ་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱ་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་དཔལ་འབྱོར་དང་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་འགོ་བར་སྐྱལ་འདེད་གང་  
མགྲོགས་བཏང་སྟེ། མང་གཞིའི་སྤྱི་ག་བཀོད་འཛུགས་སྐྱོན་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་ནས་གཞི་ཅའི་སྤྱི་བའི་ཞབས་ཞུའི་རྒྱ་ཚད་མཐོ་རུ་གཏོང་  
དགོས་པ་དང་། སྤྱི་ཁམས་ཁོར་ལུག་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་སྟེ། སྤྱི་མེད་པའི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་ས་ཆ་སྲུང་མཁུ་དང་བདེ་སྤྱིད་ལྷན་པའི་  
ཁྲིམ་གཞིས་སྐྱོན་མཁུ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་བརྫོད་དོན་གཅོད་ཐོར་བྱེད་པའི་ཁྲོང་གསེབ་དར་རྒྱས་གཏོང་བའི་འཐབ་རྩས་ལག་བསྟར་བྱེད་པ་དང་། མི་འཕོར་ཅུང་  
ཅུང་བའི་མི་རིགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་རྒྱ་དང་། མཐའ་དར་དཔངས་སྤྱུག་གི་ལས་འགུལ་སྟེལ་རྒྱ། མཐའ་མཆོམས་འབྱོར་འབྲིང་ཁྲོང་ཚོ་སོགས་ཀྱི་  
འཆར་འགོད་བཟོ་རྒྱ་བཅས་ལ་སྐྱལ་སྟེལ་གཏོང་བ། གྲུང་རྩ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་པའི་གཞི་གཅིག་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དང་རིག་གནས་མཛོན་སྐྱབ་པའི་གྲགས་ཅན་  
ཁྲོང་ཁྱེར་དང་། གྲགས་ཅན་ཁྲོང་རྒལ། གྲགས་ཅན་ཁྲོང་ཚོ། གྲགས་ཅན་ཁྲོམ་གཞུང་བཅས་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུས་བཏང་སྟེ། རྒྱལ་གཅིས་རིང་  
ལྷགས་དང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་སྒོམ་གསལ་ཉེན་གཞི་འཛུགས་སྐྱོན་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་པ་བཅས་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱ་གཅིག་པ། གྲུང་རྩ་མི་རིགས་གཅིག་མཐུན་འདུས་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་བརྟན་དུ་བཏང་ནས་གྲུང་རྩའི་རིག་གནས་དེ་ཐོག་མཐའ་བར་  
གསུམ་དུ་བོད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་བརྟེ་སེམས་འཆར་ས་དང་། སེམས་ཀྱི་བརྟེན་ས། བསམ་པའི་ཁྲིམ་གཞིས་བཅས་ཡིན་པ་དང་། བོད་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་  
ཁག་གི་རིག་གནས་ནི་གྲུང་རྩའི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་ཁ་འབྲལ་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་ཆ་ཤས་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་བསམ་སྒྲོའི་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་སེམས་ནང་བརྟན་ཐོར་  
ཟུག་སྐབ་པ་བྱེད་དགོས། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་གྲུང་རྩའི་ཕུལ་བྱུང་སྟོལ་རྒྱུན་རིག་གནས་དང་། གསར་བརྗེའི་རིག་  
གནས། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལྷགས་ཀྱི་སྟོན་ཐོན་རིག་གནས་བཅས་དར་སྟེལ་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་། རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་གནའ་ལུལ་དང་ལུལ་བཞག་སྲུང་  
སྟོབ་དང་ཕེད་སྟོད་ལྷགས་མཐུན་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་དགོས། སྤིང་སྤྱོད་དང་། ལྷ་མོའི་འཐབ་གཞུང་། བོད་ལྷགས་གསོ་རིག་ཐང་ག་སོགས་  
མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཕུལ་བྱུང་སྟོལ་རྒྱུན་རིག་གནས་སྲུང་སྟོབ་བྱེད་པ་དང་། རྒྱུན་འཛིན་བྱེད་པ། འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་བ་བཅས་བྱེད་དགོས། མི་རིགས་ཁག་  
དབར་ཕན་ཚུན་སྟེལ་རེས་བྱེད་པའི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་ཟམ་བཅུགས་ཏེ། མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཕུལ་བྱུང་སྟོལ་རྒྱུན་རིག་གནས་དང་ཤེས་ལྡན་པ་སྟེལ་རེས་  
བྱེད་རྒྱུར་སྐྱལ་སྟེལ་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གིས་རིག་གནས་ཐང་ཕན་ཚུན་སྟོང་རོལ་དང་ཕན་ཚུན་དབྱེད་གཞི་འཛིན་རྒྱུར་སྐྱལ་འདེད་  
གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱ་གཉིས་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་སྤྱོད་སྤོངས་ཡོངས་ནས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤོངས་ལིག་གི་སྟོབ་གསོ་  
སྟེལ་རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་སྟེ། སྤྱོད་གཉིས་སྟོབ་གསོའི་བྱ་གཞག་རྒྱུན་ཆད་མེད་པར་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་བར་སྐྱལ་སྟེལ་དང་མི་རིགས་ཁག་དབར་  
ཕན་ཚུན་སྤྱོད་ལིག་སྟོབ་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་སྐྱལ་མ་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱ་གསུམ་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཚོང་དོན་དང་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལག་ཤེས་བཟོ་ལས་  
འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་རྒྱུར་རོགས་སྐྱོར་བྱས་ཏེ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་རྟགས་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ལྡན་ཐོན་ལས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་རྒྱུར་  
སྐྱལ་སྟེལ་བཏང་སྟེ་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་ཐོན་སྐྱེད་དང་འཚོ་བའི་དགོས་མཁུ་སྟོང་སྐབ་པ་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བརྒྱ་བཞི་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དཔངས་སྤིང་གཞུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལུས་ཅལ་རྟེན་གཞི་དང་སྤྱི་ག་བཀོད་འཛུགས་སྐྱོན་བྱེད་  
རྒྱུར་ལྷགས་སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་ནས་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་སྟོལ་རྒྱུན་ལུས་ཅལ་རྟེན་གྲངས་སྟོག་འདོན་དང་། རྒྱུན་འཛིན་། ཁུལ་གདལ་བཅས་གཏོང་བ་དང་། མི་



རིགས་ཀྱི་སྐོལ་རྒྱུན་ལུས་ཅལ་འགྲུག་ཚོགས་སྡེལ་ནས་གངས་ཉུང་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལུས་ཅལ་བྱ་གཞག་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་འགྲོ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་ལྟར་ལྟར་འདེད་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བཙུན་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གིས་རེས་པར་དུ་དམག་དབུང་དང་ས་གནས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ལས་དོན་ཡག་པོ་སྦྱོར་དགོས་ཤིང་། བཅའ་སྡོད་ཁུལ་གྱི་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་དམག་དང་འགྲུལ་ཆས་ཉེན་རྟོག་དབུང་སྡེ་དང་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་ཐོག་རྒྱལ་སྤྱི་བློ་བཟོ་གསོ་དང་། དམག་བཀྲར་ཁྲིམ་སྡོད་། སྲིད་བཀྲར་དམངས་གཅེས་བཅས་ཀྱི་བྱེད་སྒོ་སྡེལ་རྒྱ་དང་སྤྱུགས། དམག་དམངས་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་ཡོང་བར་སྦྱོར་འདེད་བཏང་ནས་དམག་སྲིད་དང་དམག་དམངས་དབར་གྱི་འགྲུར་མེད་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་སྤྱོད་དང་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བཙུན་པ། རྫོང་རིམ་པ་ཡན་གྱི་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་སྡེ་ཚན་གྱིས་ས་ཁོངས་དེ་གའི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པར་བློགས་བསྐྱུས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་དང་། ཞབས་ཁུ་མཐུ་བ་ཁྲིད། སྦྱོར་འདེད་ཞིབ་བཤེར་སོགས་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ཞིབ་པའི་ལས་ཀའི་འགན་འཁུར་དགོས།

རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ལས་ཁུངས་དང་། གཞུང་ཁོངས་ཁེ་ལས། བྱ་གཞག་ཚན་པ་གཞན་དག་སོགས་ཀྱིས་རེས་པར་དུ་ཚན་པ་དེ་ག་དང་ཁོངས་གཏོགས་དེ་གའི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ལས་དོན་ཡག་པོ་སྦྱོར་དགོས།

### ལེའུ་གསུམ་པ། སྤྱི་ཚོར་གྱི་མཉམ་ལས།

དོན་ཚན་བཙུན་པ། བཟོ་ཚོགས་དང་། བྱང་གཞོན་སྡེ་ཚོགས། བྱང་མེད་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་ལྷན་ཚོགས། རིག་ཅལ་ལྷན་ཚོགས། བཟོ་ཚོང་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་ལྷན་ཚོགས། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཚན་རིག་ལྷན་ཚོགས། ཚན་རིག་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཚོགས། རྒྱུ་འཕྲུལ་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཚོགས། དབང་སྡོན་ལྷན་ཚོགས། རྒྱ་གཞུང་དམངས་པོའི་ཚོགས་པ་སོགས་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཚོགས་པ་ཁག་གིས་རེས་པར་དུ་རང་སོ་སོའི་ཁྲུང་ཆོས་དང་དགེ་མཚན་དང་ཟུང་འབྲེལ་བྱས་ནས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ལས་དོན་སྡེལ་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བཙུན་པ། མཐོ་རིམ་སློབ་སྦྲིད་དང་། ཚན་ཞིབ་ཁང་། རིག་གཞུང་ཚོགས་པ་སོགས་སློབ་གསོ་དང་ཚན་ཞིབ་ལས་ཁུངས་ཀྱིས་རེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་དང་། ལམ་ལུགས། ལག་ལེན་བཅས་ལ་ཞིབ་འཇུག་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་ལུགས་སློན་བརྒྱབ་སྟེ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་ལ་རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་འདེགས་སྦྱོར་དང་ལག་ལེན་དངོས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་མཐུ་བ་ཁྲིད་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བཙུན་པ། ཚོས་ལུགས་ཚོགས་པ་དང་། ཚོས་ལུགས་སློབ་སྦྲིད་། ཚོས་ལུགས་བྱེད་སྒོ་སྡེལ་གནས་བཅས་ཀྱིས་རེས་པར་དུ་རང་རྒྱལ་གྱི་ཚོས་ལུགས་ཀྱང་གོ་ཚན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་མཐུན་འཁྲིངས་བྱས་ནས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་རྒྱ་དོན་ཁག་སྤྱི་ལམ་ལས་ལུགས་ནང་བརྟུག་ཐོག་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་དང་། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས། ལུས་རབས་ཡར་ཐོན་བཅས་ལ་ཕན་ཐོགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཁྲུང་བྱར་དམིགས་ནས་བསྐྱར་དོན་འདུལ་ཁྲིམས་དང་ཚོས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་སྟོན་འདོན་དང་འཆད་འབྲེལ་གཏོང་ཐབ་བྱས་ཏེ། ཚོས་ལུགས་མི་འདྲ་བའི་དབར་དང་། ཚོས་ལུགས་ནང་ཁུལ། དེ་བཞིན་དང་ལྷན་མང་ཚོགས་དང་ཚོས་ལ་དང་པ་མེད་པའི་མང་ཚོགས་དབར་ཕན་ཚུན་བརྩི་འཇོག་དང་། ཞི་མཐུན་མཉམ་གནས། མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་མཛུ་འཕུལ་མཐུན་བཅས་ཡོང་བར་ཁྲིད་སྟོན་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེ་ལུ་པ། རིགས་ཁག་གི་ཁེ་ལས་ཀྱིས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཁེ་ལས་ཀྱི་དོ་དམ་དང་རིག་གནས་འཛུགས་སྡེལ་ཁོང་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་བྱུང་བ་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་སྦྱོར་མ་བཟང་ནས། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁེ་ལས་དང་དཔེ་བཟང་ཚོགས་ཆུང་འཛུགས་སྡོད་བྱེད་རྒྱུར་སྦྱོར་འདེད་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་རྣམས་ལས་ཀར་འཇུག་པའི་ཐབས་ལམ་གཙོ་བོའི་རྒྱས་པ་འདོན་སྡེལ་གང་ལེགས་བྱས་ནས་བྱང་གཞག་དང་ལས་ཁུགས་དང་ཐུན་མོང་ཐོག་བྱ་གཞག་གཏོང་རྒྱུར་སྦྱོར་འདེད་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་གཅིག་པ། གནས་ཐང་དང་། འཁོར་རིགས་བབས་རྩྭ་གས། སྤོང་ཁང་། དུལ་ཁང་། ཚོང་ཁང་། མགོན་ཁང་། ཟ་ཁང་། ལུལ་སྟོར་

མངོས་ལྗོངས་ཁྲུལ། དམངས་པན་ཞབས་ཞུ་ས་ཆོག་ས་མོག་ས་སྤྱི་པའི་འདུ་གནས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཆོག་ས་ལ་འདྲ་མཉམ་  
ཞབས་ཞུ་བསྐྱབས་ནས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་དང་། རོགས་རེས། ཞི་མཐུན་བཅས་ཀྱི་ནུས་པ་གཏོང་དགོས། ལས་རིགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱར་བྱ་དང་སྤྲིག་སྒོལ་ལས་  
ལུགས་ནང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་ནང་དོན་འཇུག་རྒྱུའི་སྒྲུལ་མ་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་གཉིས་ལ། སྤྱི་པའི་འདུ་གནས་དང་། སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་བཞོད། དེ་བཞིན་སྤྱི་པའི་ཞབས་ཞུའི་ལས་རིགས་བཅས་ཀྱི་སློབ་དཔེ་དང་། བཅོ  
ཁྲུལ། གསལ་བསྐྱབས། མཆོན་རྟགས་ཡིག་བྱང་སོགས་ལ་ངེས་པར་དུ་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་དང་ས་ཁུལ་དེ་གའི་བྱང་ས་ལྷན་མི་རིགས་  
ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་མཉམ་དུ་བེད་སྤྱོད་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་སྤྱི་པའི་ཞབས་ཞུའི་ལས་རིགས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་སྤྲད་གཉིས་ཞབས་ཞུའི་སྐར་ཁུང་  
འཇུགས་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་གསུམ་ལ། བྱོང་(ལུལ་)མི་ཕུ་ཡོན་ལྷན་ཁང་དང་སྡེ་ཁུལ་གྱིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་  
གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་སྡེ་ཁུང་གྲུགས་སྒྲོན་བརྒྱབ་སྟེ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་ནང་དོན་དེ་བྱོང་མིའི་སྤྱི་ཆེད་ས་དང་བྱོང་སྒོལ་  
དམངས་ཆེད་ས་ནང་བཅུག་ནས་པན་ཚུན་བརྩི་འཇོག་དང་། ཞི་མཐུན་མཉམ་གནས། མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་རོགས་རེས་བཅས་བྱེད་པའི་བྱིས་མཆོས་ལྟ་བུའི་  
འབྲེལ་བ་ཆགས་པ་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་བཞི་ལ། བྱིས་ཆང་གི་ཁོངས་མིའི་དབར་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་བསམ་སྒྲུབ་སྒྲུའི་ཐོག་ནས་པན་ཚུན་སྒོལ་གསོ་  
དང་། པན་ཚུན་གྲུགས་བྱེད། པན་ཚུན་སྒྲུལ་སྡེལ་བཅས་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་  
ནང་བྱིས་ཆང་གི་དགེ་མཆོན་ལྷན་པའི་རུས་པ་འདོན་སྡེལ་བྱེད་དགོས།

**ལེའུ་བཞི་ལ། རིལ་བསྐྱབས་སྒོལ་གསོ་**

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་ལྔ་ལ། ལོ་ལྟར་གྱི་ཟླ་ ༥ པའི་རང་སྤྱོད་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་རིལ་བསྐྱབས་བྱེད་སྒྲུབ་ཟླ་བ་ཡིན།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་དྲུག་ལ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་རིལ་བསྐྱབས་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྡེལ་བར་ངེས་པར་དུ་གཙོ་བོ་གཤམ་གསལ་ནང་དོན་ཁག་  
ལ་དམིགས་དགོས་པ་སྟེ།

(གཅིག)ཞི་ཅིན་ཕིང་གི་དུས་རབས་གསར་པའི་གྲང་གོའི་ཁྲད་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཆོག་ས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་དང་ལྷག་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་  
ལས་དོན་དང་མཐའ་སྤྱོད་བོད་བརྟན་སྐྱོར་གྱི་སྤྱི་ཁྲབ་བྱེད་ཅི་ཞི་ཅིན་ཕིང་གི་གལ་ཆེའི་ནུས་པ་གདུག་སྒོལ་སྤྱོད་དང་། རིལ་བསྐྱབས། ལག་བསྟར་དོན་  
འཁྲུལ་བཅས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ་དང་།

(གཉིས)གྲང་ཏཱ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་གཅིག་མཐུན་འདུས་བྲུབ་ཀྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྡེལ་ཏེ། གྲང་གོའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དང་ལྷག་པར་དུ་གྲང་ཏཱ་མི་རིགས་  
འཕེལ་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དང་། གྲང་ཏཱ་མི་རིགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས། གྲང་གོའི་ཉེ་རབས་དང་དེད་རབས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས། གྲང་གོའི་གསར་བརྗེའི་ལོ་  
རྒྱུས། དེ་བཞིན་གྲང་དབྱེད་མིན་གཞུང་དང་བོད་ས་གནས་དབར་གྱི་འབྲེལ་བའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས། བོད་ཞི་བའི་བཅེངས་འགྲོལ་དང་། དམངས་གཙོའི་བཅོས་  
སྦྱར། སྤྱི་ཆོག་ས་རིང་ལུགས་འཇུགས་སྒྲུབ། སྐར་བཅོས་སློབ་དཔེ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ནུས་པ་ནང་དོན་གཙོ་བོར་བྱས་ནས། མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་  
ཆོག་ས་ལ་གྲང་ཏཱ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་མང་གཞི་གཅིག་གི་ནུས་པ་དོས་འདོན་གཏོང་ཐབ་བྱེད་རྒྱུའི་ཁྲིད་སྟོན་བྱས་ནས་ཡང་དག་པའི་མེས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་ལྷ་བ་  
དང་། མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བ། རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བ། ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བ། ཆོས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བ་བཅས་འཇུགས་དགོས་པ།

(གསུམ)སྤྱི་ཆོག་ས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བའི་རིན་ཐང་ལྷ་བའི་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྡེལ་ཏེ། རྒྱལ་གཅིས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱིས་ལྷ་བར་བྱས་པའི་མི་རིགས་  
ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་དང་སྐར་བཅོས་གསལ་གཏོང་གྱིས་ལྷ་བར་བྱས་པའི་དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་དང་བོད་སྤྱོད་ས་གནས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་  
སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་དང་ལས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་སྤྲིག་ཡིག་དང་སྡེལ་བཅས་ལྷན་པའི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་གི་དཔེ་མཆོན་དང་སྤྱོད་སྡེལ་བྱས་ཏེ་  
རིལ་བསྐྱབས་བྱེད་དགོས་པ།

(བཞི)གྲང་གོའི་ཁྲད་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཆོག་ས་རིང་ལུགས་དང་གྲང་གོའི་ལུགས་འདུན་གྱི་རིལ་བསྐྱབས་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྡེལ་ཏེ། གྲང་གོའི་ལུགས་

འདུན་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཁག་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཡོང་བའི་ཕྱགས་འདུན་  
དང་དར་རྒྱས་གོང་འཕེལ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཕྱགས་འདུན་ཡིན་པར་མི་རིགས་  
ཁག་གི་མང་ཆོག་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ངོས་འཛིན་ཐུབ་རྒྱུ་ཁོད་སྟོན་བྱས་  
ནས། རྒྱལ་སྐྱོད་ཆེན་མོ་རྒྱལ་དང་། རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས། རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས་  
གནས། རྒྱུ་ལོ་གྲུང་ཁོད་དང་། རྒྱུ་ལོ་ཁོད་ཁོད་ཆོས་ལུན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཆོགས་  
རིང་ལུགས་བཅས་ལ་མོས་པ་བྱེད་ལུགས་ཆེ་བྱ་གཏོང་དགོས་པ།

(ལྷ)ཅ་ཁྱིམ་དང་། འབྲེལ་ཡོད་ཀྱི་བཅའ་ཁྱིམ་དང་ཁྱིམ་  
སྒོལ། མི་རིགས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་བཅས་ཀྱི་དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྒོལ་ཏེ།  
སྤྱི་ཆོགས་ཡོངས་སུ་ཁྱིམ་སྒོལ་བཀྲུག་དང་། ཁྱིམ་སྒོལ་སྒོལ་  
། ཁྱིམ་སྒོལ་བཅས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་བཟང་པོ་ཞིག་ཆགས་པ་བྱེད་དགོས་པ།

(དུག)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་དེ་  
མིན་ཀྱི་དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྒོལ་དགོས་པ་བཅས་སོ།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་བདུན་པ། རིག་གནས་དང་། གསར་འགྱུར་དཔེ་  
སྐྱུན། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་བརྒྱུན་འཕྲིན། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་འཕྲིན་སྐྱེས་སྐྱེས་སྐྱེས་  
ཀྱིས་དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་དང་  
སྐྱེས་གཏོང་བའི་ཕྱགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས་དང་། རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས་ཆོས། རྒྱུ་  
འཕྲིན་བརྒྱུན་འཕྲིན་ལེ་ཆོན། དེ་བཞིན་དཔེ་སྐྱུན་དངོས་རིགས་བཅས་  
གསར་ཅེས་བཅོ་འདོན་དང་དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་གཏོང་རྒྱུ་རྒྱལ་  
མ་གཏོང་བ་དང་རྒྱལ་སྤྱི་བྱེད་དགོས་པ།

རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་བརྒྱུན་འཕྲིན་ལས་ཁུངས་དང་། ཆོགས་པར་དུས་དཔེ་  
དཔེ་སྐྱུན་ཆོན་པ། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་ཆོན་པའི་ཞབས་ཏུ་མཁོ་འདོན་བྱེད་མཁན་  
བཅས་ཀྱིས་དེས་པར་དུ་ཐོད་ཀྱི་ཞིང་བྱ་བའི་ཆོན་བརྒྱུན་བཅའ་ཁྱིམ་འགྲོལ་  
ཐོབ་པའི་བྱ་བའི་ཉེན་མོ་དང་། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་  
དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་སྒོལ་བྱེད་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་དང་། རི་མིན་ཀྱི་གལ་ཆེད་དུས་སྟོན་དང་མི་  
རིགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས་དང་རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་དང་དཔེ་བཟང་གི་བྱས་  
རིམ་རྒྱུ་ཞབས་དུ་དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་བྱེད་དགོས་པ།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་བརྒྱད་པ། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་  
དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་  
སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
ཀྱི་ནང་དོན་དེ་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
གསོ། འཕྲིན་ཀྱིས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
གསོ་བཅས་ཀྱི་བརྒྱུད་རིམ་དེལ་ཐོན་ཀྱི་དང་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་  
སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་

གི་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་དང་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་  
གཞིར་འགོད་པ་དང་། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
པ་བཅས་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་རྒྱལ་འདེད་གཏོང་དགོས། རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
དགོ་གནད་དུང་ཁག་ལ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་  
སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་རྒྱུ་རྩུ་མི་རིགས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
འཕྲིན་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
དང་ལག་ལེན་བྱེད་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་

རིམ་ཁག་ཏུ་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
ལུགས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་ནང་དོན་དེ་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་  
ལས་དོན་མི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
བཟང་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་

རིགས་འདྲ་མིན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
། རིག་གནས་ཁང་(སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་བྱེད་ཞོངས་སུ་འཕྲུག་དགོས་པ།

དོན་ཚན་ཉེར་དགུ་པ། ལུལ་སྐྱོར་གཙོ་བོ་འགན་སྐྱོར་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
དང་ལུལ་སྐྱོར་ལས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
མཛེས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
དེ་བཞིན་ལུལ་སྐྱོར་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཕྲུག་གཏོང་ལས་དོན་ཞོད་  
ལུལ་སྐྱོར་ལས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་

ལུལ་སྐྱོར་མཛེས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
ཆོས་དང་། དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་བྱེད་དེལ་བསྐྱེད་སྒོལ་གསོ་  
ཞབས་མཛོན་ཀྱིས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་  
མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་ནང་དོན་དེ་གནས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་  
བཟུག་ནས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ཀྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་  
བྱེད་དགོས་པ།

དོན་ཚན་སྤྱི་དབྱུང་སྐྱེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱིས་

པར་དུ་ཚོས་ལུགས་ཚོགས་པ་དང་། ཚོས་ལུགས་སློབ་སྦྱང་། ཚོས་ལུགས་བྱེད་སློབ་གནས་བཅས་ཀྱིས་ཚོས་ལུགས་ལས་རིགས་མི་སྣར་མི་  
རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྱོལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་བསམ་སྒྲུབ་དང་། བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་ཁྲིམས་སྒོལ། མི་རིགས་ཚོས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དྲུས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དེལ་བསྐྱགས་སློབ་གསོ་  
སྦྱོལ་བར་མཐུན་ཁྲིད་བྱས་ནས་རང་རྟོགས་རང་རྒྱལ་ཁོངས་ཀྱི་རྩལ་གྱི་ཚོས་ལུགས་ཕྱོགས་གཏོགས་ཀྱིས་མི་མ་འཛུལ་དང་གཏོར་བཤིག་གཏོར་བར་  
བཀག་འགོག་བྱེད་དགོས།

**ལེའུ་ལྔ་པ། འཇུགས་གཏོད་དང་གཞུང་སྐྱོད་**

དོན་ཚན་སོ་གཅིག་པ། མི་མཁས་མི་དམངས་སྤྱི་དགུང་གིས་ངེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྱོལ་ཡར་ཐོན་འཇུགས་གཏོད་བྱེད་སློབ་ལས་  
ཁུངས་དང་། ཁེ་ལས། སྤྱི་ཁྱེད་ལ། འག་གོང་དལ། གོང་ཚོ་གོང་ལྷན། སློབ་གྲྭ་དམག་དབུང་། ཚོས་ལུགས་བྱེད་སློབ་གནས་སོགས་སུ་སྦྱོལ་རྒྱུ་སྦྱུལ་  
འདེད་གཏོང་དགོས་པ་དང་དཔེ་བཅང་གི་ས་གནས་(གོང་ཁྲུང་)དང་། དཔེ་བཅང་གི་རྫོང་(རྩམ་)དཔེ་བཅང་གི་འག་གོང་དལ་(ཁྲིམ་གཞུང་)དཔེ་བཅང་གི་  
གོང་ཚོ་གོང་ལྷན། དཔེ་བཅང་གི་སྤྱི་ཁྱེད་ལ། དཔེ་བཅང་གི་ཚན་པ་བཅས་འཇུག་གཏོད་དང་། དཔེ་བཅང་མཉམ་སྦྲེལ་དང་དཔེ་བཅང་མི་སྐྱེལ་ལ་གཞུང་སྐྱོད་  
བསྟོན་བྱེད་རྒྱ་སྤྱོད་འཇུགས་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་གཉིས་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྱོལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་གི་ས་གནས་(གོང་ཁྲུང་)དང་། དཔེ་བཅང་གི་རྫོང་(རྩམ་)དཔེ་བཅང་གི་  
འག་གོང་དལ་(ཁྲིམ་གཞུང་)དཔེ་བཅང་གི་གོང་ཚོ་གོང་ལྷན། དཔེ་བཅང་གི་སྤྱི་ཁྱེད་ལ་བཅས་ལ་ངེས་པར་དུ་གཤམ་གསལ་གྱི་གཞི་ཅིང་ཆ་རྒྱུ་འཛོམས་  
དགོས་པ་སྟེ།

(གཅིག)དར་ཆ་གསལ་སྟོན་གྱིས་ཁ་སྐྱེལ་ལ་རོ་རྒྱལ་བྱས་ཏེ། མེས་རྒྱལ་གོང་དུ་གཅིག་གྲུབ་དང་། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྱོལ་སྤྱི་ཁྱེད་ལ། སྤྱི་ཚོར་ཞི་  
མཐུན་བརྟན་ལྷིང་བཅས་ལ་སྤྱང་སྤྱོད་མཐའ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་དང་།

(གཉིས)ཉར་དང་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་སྤྱི་དྲུས་དང་། བཅའ་ཁྲིམས། ཁྲིམས་སྒོལ་བཅས་ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་དོན་འཁྲོལ་བྱེད་པ།

(གསུམ)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྱོལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཅང་འཇུགས་གཏོད་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་ཀྱི་ཅ་འཇུགས་ལས་ཁུངས་ཚགས་རྩྭ་དང་རྒྱན་རྩས་  
ཅན་གྱི་སྤྱི་གཞི་སྒོལ་ལས་སྒོལ་འཇུགས་ཚང་ཡིན་པ།

(བཞི)འཕེལ་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་བསམ་གཞི་གསར་པ་ལག་བསྟར་དོན་འཁྲོལ་བྱས་ནས་གོང་གསལ་དར་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་འཐབ་རྩས་དང་། མཐའ་དར་དམངས་  
ལྷན་གྱི་བྱ་སྤྱོད། དེ་བཞིན་གོང་ཁྲུང་དང་གོང་གསལ་མཉམ་འདྲེས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་དྲུས་བྱ་ཐབས་ལག་བསྟར་ཏུ་ཐག་བྱས་ནས་ཁྱེད་  
ཁོངས་དེ་གའི་དཔལ་འཕྱོར་དང་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་སྤྱི་ཚད་མཐོ་བའི་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་ལ་སྦྱུལ་འདེད་བཏང་སྟེ་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་ཡོང་འབབ་རྒྱ་  
མཐུད་འཕར་སྟོན་མཁྱོགས་པོ་ཡོང་བ་དང་མི་དམངས་ཀྱི་འཚོ་བ་ཐམ་མི་ཆད་པར་ལེགས་སུ་གཏོང་བ།

(ལྔ)གཞི་ཅིང་སྤྱི་པའི་ཞབས་ཞུའི་མ་ལག་འཇུག་སྒྲོ་ཆད་དུ་བཏང་སྟེ། གཞི་ཅིང་སྤྱི་པའི་ཞབས་ཞུ་འདྲ་མཉམ་ཅན་དང་ཁྲབ་མཉམ་རང་བཞིན་ལ་  
སྦྱུལ་འདེད་གཏོང་བ།

(དྲུག)སྤྱི་ཚོགས་བཅོས་སྒྱུར་བྱེད་ཐབས་གསར་གཏོད་བྱས་ཏེ། བན་ཚུན་གསལ་འཇུག་རྩམ་པའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་གྲུབ་ཆ་དང་སྤྱི་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་ཁོང་  
ལུག་འཇུགས་རྒྱར་སྦྱུལ་འདེད་གཏོང་བ།

(བདུན)མི་རིགས་དང་ཚོས་ལུག་གི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུན་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་འགལ་ཁྲ་དང་ཅོད་གཞི་དུས་ཐོག་ཏུ་འདུམ་སེལ་དང་ཐག་གཅོད་ལག་ལོ་  
བྱས་ཏེ། མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་ཁྲིམས་བཞིན་བཅོས་སྒྱུར་བྱེད་པའི་རྩ་ས་པ་ཆེ་དང་རྒྱ་ཆད་མཐོ་དུ་གཏོང་བ།

(བརྒྱུད)རི་ཕྱོ་རྒྱ་དྲངས་གསལ་དཔལ་རི་ལས་ལྷག་པའི་འདུ་ཤེས་དོན་འཁྲོལ་བྱེད་པ་དང་། སྤྱི་ཁམས་ཁོར་ལུག་སྤྱང་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལུགས་  
སྟོན་བརྒྱབ་ནས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ཁམས་བདེ་འཇགས་སྤྱང་བཅད་བརྟན་དུ་གཏོང་བ།

(དབུ)མི་རིགས་ས་ཁུལ་གྱི་དཔལ་འཕྱོར་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་དང་རིག་གནས་དར་སྤེལ་གཏོང་རྒྱུའི་དོན་དངོས་ལ་གཞི་རྒྱགས་ཏེ། མི་

རིགས་ཁག་གིས་མཉམ་སྦྲེད་བྱེད་པའི་ཀྲང་ལྷ་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་མངོན་གསལ་ཆེ་བའི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་མཆོན་རྟགས་དང་ཀྲང་ལྷ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་  
མཐོང་ཆོར་གྱི་གཟུགས་བརྟན་གཏོང་བ་དང་མངོན་ཆེར་འཛིན་པ།

(བརྟན་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཕུལ་བྱུང་སྒོལ་རྒྱན་རིག་གནས་སྒོལ་འདོན་དང་། ལྷར་སྦྱོབ། ལྷར་སྦྱོབ། དེ་བཞིན་རྒྱན་འཛིན་བཅས་བྱེད་པ།

(བརྟན་གཅིག་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་ལ་སྦྱུང་འདེད་གཏོང་བའི་ཁྱོད་དེ་མིན་གྱི་ལེགས་  
སྦྱེས་འབྲུལ་བ་བཅས་སོ།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་གསུམ་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཚན་བར་དེས་བར་དུ་གཤམ་གསལ་གྱི་གཞི་རྩའི་ཆ་རྒྱན་འཛོམས་དགོས་  
པ་སྟེ།

(གཅིག)དར་ཆ་གསལ་སྟོན་གྱིས་ཁ་སྤལ་ལ་ངོ་ཚྏ་ལྟས་ཏེ། མེས་རྒྱལ་གོང་དུ་གཅིག་གྱུར་ལ་སྤང་སྦྱོང་མཐའ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་དང་མི་རིགས་  
མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་གྱི་མང་གཞི་སྤྱི་བརྟན་དང་ནམ་པ་ལེགས་སུ་གཏོང་བ་དང་།

(གཉིས)ཉང་དང་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་སྤྱི་དུས་དང་། བཅའ་ཁྲིམས། ཁྲིམས་སྒོལ་བཅས་ཕྱོགས་ཡོངས་ནས་དོན་འཁྲོལ་བྱེད་པ།

(གསུམ)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་ཀའི་ལམ་སྒོལ་ཆགས་ཚུད་དུ་གཏོང་བ།

(བཞི)ཀྲང་ལྷ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་གཅིག་མཐུན་འདུས་བྱུང་གྱི་སྒོལ་གསོ་དང་ལག་ལེན་གྱི་བྱ་སྦྱོང་ལ་ཕན་འབྲས་ཐོན་རྒྱུ་ལ་འདེད་གཏོང་བ།

(ལྔ)མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་ཕུལ་བྱུང་སྒོལ་རྒྱན་རིག་གནས་དང་ཡུལ་སྒོལ་གོམས་གཤེས་བཟང་པོར་བརྩི་འཛིན་དང་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་  
ཀྱི་ཆོས་དད་རང་སོམས་ལ་བརྩི་འཛིན་བྱས་ཏེ། མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་ཁྲིམས་མཐུན་ཁེ་དབང་ལ་འགན་སྦྲུང་བྱེད་པ།

(དྲུག)སྤྱི་དུས་བཟོ་བའམ་ཡང་ན་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་ལས་དོན་སྒྲུབ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་མཐུན་རྒྱུན་ལ་བསམ་གཞིགས་གང་  
ལེགས་བྱས་ཏེ། ཚན་བ་དེ་གའི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལ་འདེད་གཏོང་བ།

(བདུན)མི་རིགས་དང་ཆོས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུན་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་འགལ་ཁྲུ་དང་ཚོད་གཞི་དུས་ཐོག་ཏུ་འདུམ་སེལ་དང་ཐག་གཅོད་ཡག་པོ་  
བྱེད་པ།

(བརྒྱད)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཇུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་ཁྱོད་དེ་མིན་གྱི་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་འབྲུལ་བ་བཅས་སོ།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་བཞི་པ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་མཉམ་སྦྲེད་དང་དཔེ་བཟང་མི་སྤྱི་དུས་དེས་བར་དུ་མེས་རྒྱལ་ལ་དགའ་  
ཞེན་དང་། ཀྲང་གོ་བྱུང་ཁྱད་ཉང་གི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ལ་བརྩི་བཀུར། ཀྲང་གོ་འཁྲུང་ཆོས་ལྡན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཆོགས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལམ་ལུགས་ལ་བརྩི་བཀུར་བཅས་  
བྱས་ནས་ཉང་གི་མི་རིགས་སྤྱི་དུས་ལག་བསྟར་ནན་ཉན་བྱེད་པ་དང་། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་དང་ཁྲིམས་སྒོལ་ལ་བརྩི་སྦྱང་ཞུ་མཁན་གྱི་མིག་  
དཔེ་བྱེད་པ། ལས་གནས་ལ་གཞི་རྒྱགས་པ་དང་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་འབྲུལ་པོད་པའི་ཁར། གཤམ་གསལ་གྱི་ཆ་རྒྱན་གསལ་ཤིག་འཛོམས་དགོས་པ་སྟེ།

(གཅིག)ཁ་སྤལ་ལ་ངོ་ཚྏ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་དང་། མེས་རྒྱལ་གོང་དུ་གཅིག་གྱུར་སྤང་སྦྱོང་བྱེད་རྒྱུ། མཐའ་སྤང་སྤྱི་བརྟན་ཡོང་རྒྱུ། དེ་བཞིན་དམག་  
དམངས་དབར་དང་ཉེན་རྟོག་པ་དང་མི་དམངས་དབར་གྱི་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཟབ་ཏུ་གཏོང་རྒྱུ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྲུལ་བ་དང་།

(གཉིས)མི་རིགས་ཁག་ཐན་ཚུན་འགྲོ་འོང་དང་། སྒེལ་རེས། མཉམ་འབྲེས་བཅས་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལ་འདེད་དང་། ཀྲང་ལྷ་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་གཅིག་མཐུན་  
འདུས་བྱུང་གྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཟབ་ཏུ་གཏོང་རྒྱུ་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྲུལ་བ།

(གསུམ)དཔལ་འབྱོར་དང་སྤྱི་ཆོགས་གོང་འཕེལ་འགྲོ་བར་སྦྱུང་འདེད་གཏོང་བའི་འཕེལ་རིམ་ཁྱོད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྲུལ་བ།



(བཞི)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ལ་སྐྱལ་འདེད་དང་། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་བརྟན་ལྗོངས་སྤངས་སྤྱོད་། དེ་བཞིན་འབྲམ་མཉམ་དང་། མཐུན་སྦྲིལ། རོགས་རེས། ཞི་མཐུན་བཅས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་རིང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་སྤྱི་བརྟན་དང་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་གཏོང་རྒྱུ་ལྟེ་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

(ལྔ)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་སློབ་གསོ་དང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་ལས་དོན་སྤེལ་སྐྱབས། མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་བྲིམས་མཐུན་ཁེ་དབང་སྤངས་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྟེ་ཐད་ལེ་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

(དྲུག)ཁ་གཏང་བོད་སྐྱོར་ལས་དོན་ཁྲོད་དཔལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་དང་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་བརྟན་ལྗོངས་སྤངས་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱལ་འདེད་བཏང་སྟེ། མང་ཚོགས་ལ་བྱ་བ་དངོས་དང་བྱ་བ་བཟང་པོ་བསྐྱབ་རྒྱུ་ལྟེ་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

(བདུན)དུས་ལུན་རིང་པོའི་ནང་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་བསྐྱབས་ཏེ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་བྱ་གཞག་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

(བརྒྱད) བདེ་འཇགས་ཐོན་སྐྱེད་དང་། གཞོད་འགོག་གེགས་སེལ་དང་། ལུང་སྐྱོབ། འཕམ་བཟུན་རོགས་སྐྱོབ་སོགས་འཕམ་བཟུན་དོད་མ་གྱི་ལས་དོན་ལ་སྐྱལ་སྤེལ་བཏང་སྟེ། མི་དམངས་མང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་ཆེ་སློག་དང་རྒྱ་ཁོར་གྱི་བདེ་འཇགས་སྤངས་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྟེ་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

(དགུ)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་གྱི་ལས་དོན་ཁྲོད་དམིགས་བསལ་གྱི་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་གཞན་དག་འབྱུང་བ་བཅས་སོ།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་ལྔ་བ། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་གཞི་ལས་དོན་གྱི་ལྟེ་ཐད་ལེགས་སྦྱེས་མངོན་གསལ་དོན་པོ་འབྱུང་བ།

ལེའུ་རྒྱག་གི་ཅ་འཇུག་གི་འགན་སྐྱུང་།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་དྲུག་བ། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱིས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་གྱི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ཚོགས་ཚུང་བཅུགས་ཏེ་ལྗོངས་ཏང་ཨུད་ཀྱི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་འགོ་གཅིག་གྱུར་འཆར་འགོད་ཀྱིས་འཛུགས་གཏོང་ལས་དོན་ལ་སྐྱལ་སྤེལ་གཏོང་བ་དང་། ལས་ཀྱི་འཕམ་སྐྱོལ་འཛུགས་པ། འགན་བཞོལ་ཁ་གསལ་བཟོ་བ། སྤྱི་དྲུས་ཀྱི་བྱེད་ཐབས་བཟོ་བ་བཅས་བྱས་ཏེ་གཙོ་ཆའི་གནད་དོན་རིགས་མཐུན་སྐྱོར་རང་ཐག་གཅོད་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་བདུན་བ། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱིས་རེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་སྐྱབ་ཤེས་མིན་དང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་བྱེད་ཤེས་མིན་དེ་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ལས་བྱེད་པར་ཞིབ་དཔྱད་བྱེད་པའི་གལ་ཆའི་ནང་དོན་ལ་བརྟེན་ཏེ། ཏང་གི་མི་རིགས་རིག་གཞུང་སྤྱི་དྲུས་དང་མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་ཤེས་རྟོགས་ཐུབ་མཁན་དང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་བྱེད་མཁན་གྱི་ལས་བྱེད་པ་གསོ་སྐྱོང་དང་འདེམས་སྐྱོང་བྱེད་རྒྱ་མ་ཐད། ལས་བྱེད་ཤེས་ལྡན་པ་གསོ་སྐྱོང་དང་། གནས་སྐྱར་སྐྱོང་བཅས་སྤེལ་རེས་འགན་བསྐྱོར་བཅས་ཀྱི་ལས་སྐོལ་འཕུས་སྐོར་ཆང་དུ་གཏོང་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་བརྒྱད་བ། རང་སྐྱོང་ལྗོངས་ཀྱིས་རེས་པར་དུ་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ལས་བྱེད་པས་མི་རིགས་ཁག་དང་ལས་རིགས་ཁག་གི་འཕུས་ཆབ་མི་སྣ་དང་འབྲེལ་གཏུག་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་ཀྱི་ལས་སྐོལ་འཕུས་སྐོར་ཆང་དུ་གཏོང་རྒྱ་དང་། ལག་བསྟར་དོན་འཁྲོལ་བྱས་ནས་མི་རིགས་དང་ལས་རིགས་ཁག་གི་འཕུས་ཆབ་མི་སྣ་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་བྱེད་རྒྱ་དང་། སློབ་གསོ་གཏོང་རྒྱ། ཞབས་ཞུ་བསྐྱབ་རྒྱ། ཁྲིད་སློབ་བྱེད་རྒྱ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་ལག་པོ་བསྐྱབས་ཏེ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ཁྲོད་མི་རིགས་ཁག་དང་ལས་རིགས་ཁག་གི་འཕུས་ཆབ་མི་སྣའི་དགེ་མཚན་ལྡན་པའི་བྱས་པ་འདོན་སྤེལ་གང་ལེགས་ཐུབ་པ་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་སོ་དགུ་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གིས་དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་  
བྱེད་རྒྱ་དེ་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ཚན་ཁག་གི་ལས་ཁུངས་དབྱེད་ཞིབ་ཀྱི་ནང་དོན་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས། ལས་ཁུངས་དབྱེད་ཞིབ་ཀྱི་མ་ལག་ནང་བཅུག་ནས་འགོ་ཁྲིད་འགན་  
འཁུལ་ལས་ཁུགས་དང་ལོ་འཁོར་དམིགས་ཚད་དབྱེད་ཞིབ་ལས་ཁུགས་ལག་བསྟར་བྱེད་དགོས།

གོང་རིམ་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གིས་དེས་པར་དུ་འོག་རིམ་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གི་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་  
འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་གྱི་ལས་སྟོན་ཚད་སྒྲིལ་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་བཞི་བཅུ་པ། རྫོང་རིམ་བ་ཡན་གྱི་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གིས་དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་  
འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་དེ་རིམ་བཞེད་གཞི་ནོར་སྲིད་གྱི་སྡོན་ཅིས་ནང་འཛུགས་དགོས།

དཔེ་བཟང་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱ་ཡུལ་ལ་རིམ་ཁག་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་དང་དེའི་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་སྡེ་ཚན་གྱིས་དེས་པར་དུ་སྲིད་ཁྲིམས་དང་། རྒྱུ་  
གྲངས། མ་དདུལ་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཐད་སྡོན་ཚད་ནས་རྒྱ་བསྐྱོར་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་གཅིག་པ། མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་སྡེ་ཚན་དང་དེ་བཞིན་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་སྡེ་ཚན་གྱིས་དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་ལས་དོན་ཐད་ཀྱི་སློབ་དཔུགས་  
ཐོན་པའི་གལ་ཆའི་དོན་རྒྱུ་གྱི་ཉན་ཐོན་སྡོན་བཞུགས་དང་། འབྲེལ་བཟུན་ཐག་གཅོད་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་སྟོན་དང་སྡོན་རྒྱུས་འཛུགས་སློབ་ཆ་པོ་བཟོ་བ་དང་  
ཆགས་ཚུད་དུ་བཏང་སྟེ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ལ་ཤུར་རྒྱུ་ཐེབས་པའི་འགལ་ཆ་དང་ཚོད་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་འགོག་དང་འདུལ་འགྲོག་བྱེད་དགོས།

རིམ་ཁག་སྲིད་འཛིན་ལས་ཁུངས་དང་ཁྲིམས་འཛིན་ལས་ཁུངས་ཀྱིས་དེས་པར་དུ་སྤྱི་བའི་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་ཀྱི་ཞབས་ཞུའི་མ་ལག་འཛུགས་རྒྱ་  
ཤུགས་སྡོན་བརྒྱབ་སྟེ། མི་དམངས་འདུལ་འགྲོག་དང་། སྲིད་འཛིན་འདུལ་འགྲོག་ ཁྲིམས་འཛིན་འདུལ་འགྲོག་བཅས་ཀྱི་མཉམ་འབྲེལ་ལས་ཀའི་མ་  
ལག་དང་ཁྲིམས་འཛིན་རྒྱུ་སྟོན་མ་ལག་འཛུགས་སློབ་ཆ་དུ་བཏང་ནས་མི་རིགས་ཁག་གི་མི་དམངས་ཀྱིས་ཁྲིམས་མཐུན་དང་ཁེ་བན་རེ་འདོད་ཀྱི་  
བའི་ཐབས་ལམ་ཤར་གཏོང་བྱེད་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་གཉིས་པ། རིམ་ཁག་མི་དམངས་འཛུགས་མི་ཚོགས་ཆེན་རྒྱུ་ལས་ལྷ་ཡོན་ལྷན་ཁང་གིས་དེས་པར་དུ་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་  
ཐོན་གྱི་འབྲེལ་ཡོད་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་དང་ཁྲིམས་སྟོན་ལ་ཁྲིམས་སྒྲུར་ཞིབ་བཤེར་བྱེད་རྒྱ་མ་ཐད། རིམ་མཚུངས་མི་དམངས་སྲིད་གཞུང་གི་མི་རིགས་  
མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་སྡོན་ལྷན་ཀྱི་ཉན་ནས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་  
འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་ལ་ལྷ་སྟེན་བྱེད་རྒྱ་ཤུགས་སྡོན་བརྒྱུ་དགོས།

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་གསུམ་པ། ཅ་འཛུགས་གང་ཞིག་དང་མི་སྤྱི་ཞིག་ཡིན་རུང་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་  
པའི་ལས་དོན་ཐད་རྒྱུ་ཁབ་ལས་ཁུངས་ལ་བསམ་འཆར་དང་གྲོས་འགོ་འདོན་པའི་དབང་ཆ་ཡོད་པ་དང་། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་འཛུགས་  
གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་ཁོང་རྒྱུ་ཁབ་ལས་ཁུངས་དང་དེའི་ལས་བྱུར་ཁྲིམས་འགལ་དང་འགན་ཁུས་ཤོར་པའི་བྱེད་སྟོན་ཡོད་རིགས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་དང་  
། ལྷ་སྟེན། ཐེར་འདོན་བཅས་བྱེད་པའི་དབང་ཆ་ཡོད་ལ། མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་ལ་འགོག་རྒྱུ་བཟོ་བ་དང་གཏོར་བཤིག་གཏོང་བའི་ཁྲིམས་  
འགལ་གྱི་བྱེད་སྟོན་རིགས་བཀག་སྡོམ་དང་ཐེར་འདོན་བྱེད་པའི་དབང་ཆ་འདོད།

**ལེའུ་བདུན་པ། བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་ཀྱི་འགན་འཁུལ།**

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་བཞི་པ། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་མི་སྣས་མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲེལ་ཡར་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་བཟང་ཁུལ་འཛུགས་གཏོང་བྱེད་པའི་ཁོང་འགན་  
དབང་གང་རྒྱུ་དུ་སྟོན་པ་དང་། འགན་འཁུལ་སྤྱད་མེད་དུ་འཛིན་པ། ཉར་སྟོགས་གཡོ་ཐོལ་བྱེད་པ་བཅས་ཀྱི་རིགས་ལ་ཁྲིམས་ལྟར་ཆད་པ་གཅོད་རྒྱ་  
དང་། ཉེས་གསོག་གི་ཆད་ལ་སྤྱི་བས་ཆེ་ཁྲིམས་ལྟར་ཉེས་དོན་འགན་འཁུལ་བཅའ་འདེད་གཏོང་རྒྱ།

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་ལྔ་པ། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ལས་ཁུངས་དང་། སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཚོགས་པ། ཁེ་ལས་བྱ་གཞག་ཚན་པ། དེ་བཞིན་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཅ་འཛུགས་གཞན་དག་  
བཅས་ལ་གཤམ་གསལ་གྱི་བྱེད་སྟོན་གསལ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཆེ། དེའི་གོང་རིམ་གཙོ་འགན་སྡེ་ཚན་ནས་ཡང་ན་ལྷ་ཞིབ་ལས་ཁུངས་ཀྱིས་དུས་བཅད་ནང་  
ལེགས་བཅོས་བྱེད་དུ་འཛུགས་རྒྱ་དང་། དུས་ཚད་ཡོལ་ཡང་ལེགས་བཅོས་མ་བྱས་ཆེ་བཟུལ་བཏང་ནས་སྟོན་བཞོད་བྱེད་རྒྱ་དང་ཆབས་ཅིག་འགན་

འཁྲུང་བ་གཙོ་བོ་དང་། ཐད་ཀའི་འགན་འཁུར་བ། འབྲེལ་ཡོད་མི་ལྷན་པཅས་ཀྱི་བབ་མཚུངས་ཀྱི་འགན་འཁུར་བ་དང་འདྲེད་གཏོང་རྒྱ་ཉི།

(གཅིག)མི་རིགས་མ་ཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡང་ཐོན་གྱི་དཔེ་ཤམ་ཁྲུལ་འཇུགས་གཏོད་ཉེད་པའི་ལས་དོན་གཏན་འཕེལས་འཁོན་མ་སླེལ་བའི་སྒྲིལ་སྒྲུབ་སྒྲིལ་སྒྲུབ་སྒྲིལ་སྒྲུབ་པ་བཟོས་པའི་རིགས་དང་།

(གཉིས)མི་རིགས་མ་ཐུན་སྒྲིལ་ཡང་མོན་པ་ལུགས་སྟེན་དན་པ་ཐེངས་པའི་ལག་པ་རྒྱ་དང་ཅོད་རྟོག་ཏུ་མོག་ཏུ་ཐག་གཅོད་དང་འདུལ་སེལ་ས་ལུས་པའི་སྟེན་གྱིས་མཐུག་འབྲས་ཆོས་ཆེན་པོས་པའི་རིགས།

(གསུམ)སློལ་ཡིག་འདིའི་ནང་གཏན་འཁེབས་བྱས་པའི་འགན་འཁེབས་པའི་ལག་བསྟར་མ་བྱས་པའི་རིགས་བཅས་སོ།

དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་དུག་པ། ཅ་འཛུགས་གང་ཞིག་དང་མི་སུ་ཞིག་ལ་གཤམ་གསལ་གྱི་ཕྱེད་སྡོད་གསལ་ཤིག་ཡོད་ཆོ། དེ་གནས་སའི་ཚན་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་  
ཡོད་ཕྱེ་ཚན་གྱིས་སྡོད་བཟོད་དང་། སློབ་གསོ་གཏོང་བ། ལེགས་བཅས་བཅས་ཕྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་སྐྱུ་དང་། བདེ་འཇགས་དོད་པ་དང་ལགས་པའི་ཕྱེད་སྡོད་  
ཡོད་ཆོ། སྤྱི་བདེ་ལས་ཁུངས་ཀྱིས་ཁྲིམས་ལྟར་བདེ་འཇགས་དོད་པ་གྱི་ཉེས་ཆད་གཅོད་སྐྱུ། ཉེས་གསོག་གི་ཆད་པ་སླེབས་ཆོ་ཁྲིམས་ལྟར་ཉེས་དོན་  
གྱི་ལགན་འཁྲི་བདེ་འཇགས་ཏོང་སྐྱུ་སྟེ།

(གཅིག)མི་རིགས་མ་སྤྱད་ཤིང་ཡར་ཐོན་ལ་གཞོན་པའི་གཏམ་སྒྲེར་སྒྲེལ་རིགས་དང་།

(གཉིས)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ཡང་ཐོན་ལ་གཞོད་པའི་ཆ་འཕྲིན་བཞོ་སྦྲེལ་བྱེད་རིགས།

(གསུམ)མི་རིགས་མཐུན་སྦྲིལ་ལ་གཏོང་བའི་གཞུང་བ་དང་། མི་རིགས་ཁ་སྤེལ་གཏོང་བའི་དན་སྒྱལ་གྱི་ད་པ། གླི་ཆོག་ས་བརྟན་གྱི་ད་ལ་གཏོང་  
སྡོད་པའི་བཅས་ཀྱི་གྱེད་སྡོད་རིགས།

(བཞི)ཁ་སྐལ་ལ་རོཝོ་གེད་བྱེད་པའི་མཆང་ཙོན་ཁྲོད་ཡངས་ཕྱོགས་བརྟན་པོ་མེད་པ་དང་རྒྱུ་རྩུབ་གསལ་པོ་མེད་ཅིང་། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་བདེ་  
ཤར་གསལ་དང་མེས་རྒྱལ་གོང་དུ་གཉེག་སྦྱར་ལ་གཏོད་མཛེ་གཏོང་བའི་བྱེད་སློན་ཡོད་པ་བཅས་སོ།

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དོན་ཚན་ཞེ་བརྒྱན་པ། གྲོལ་ཡིག་འདིའི་གཏན་འཁེབས་ལས་འགལ་བའི་ཁྱེད་ལྷོད་རིགས་ལ་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་དང་ཁྲིམས་གཞན་དག་ནང་ཉེས་ཆད་གཅོད་རྒྱུའི་གཏན་འཁེབས་ཡོད་ཆེ་གཏན་འཁེབས་དེ་བཞིན་ལག་བསྟར་ཁྱེད་རྒྱ།

ལེན་བརྒྱད་པ། ཞར་བྱུང་།

དོན་ཚན་ཞི་བརྒྱད་པ། རྒྱལ་ཡོག་འདི་ ༢༠༢༠ ལོའི་ཟླ་ ༥ ཚེས་ ༡ ཉིན་ནས་བརྒྱད་པག་བསྟར་ཤེད་ཀྱི་འཇམ་ལོ།

(ཚོགས་འདུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བྱང་ཡིག་ཁྱུ་ཅུ་ནས་མཁོ་འདོན་བྱས་པ་གཞིར་བཟུང་)

## Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAC	Cyberspace Administration of China
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
FYP	Five Year Plan
GPS	Global Positioning System
ICT	International Campaign for Tibet
MEM	Ministry of Emergency Management
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
MWR	Ministry of Water Resources
NMC	National Meteorological Center
NPC	National People's Congress
OCAO	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
PAP	People's Armed Police
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
QNNP	Qomolangma National Nature Preserve
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SARA	State Administration for Religious Affairs
SEAC	State Ethnic Affairs Commission
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNP	Sanjiangyuan National Park
TPA	Tibetan Policy Act
TPI	Tibet Policy Institute
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership

TPSA	Tibet Policy and Support Act
TWF	Tibet Work Forum
UFWD	United Front Work Department
USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom



## Notes

### 14th Five-Year Plan of China: Securing Political Stability in Tibet

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