Beijing aims to sinicise Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan language. Such developments pose a serious threat not only to Tibet itself but also to the wider Tibetan Buddhist cultural world
Since China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950, “ethnic unity” has been embedded in Beijing’s governing strategy for controlling Tibet. This colonial-style doctrine has now been formalised through the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress, passed on 12 March 2026 during the 4th Session of the 14th National People’s Congress and scheduled to take effect on 1 July 2026. The law is likely to have implications beyond China’s borders, particularly across Tibet and the Tibetan Buddhist cultural world, including Himalayan regions. Under its framework, Chinese authorities may expand transnational pressure on Tibet and its neighbouring countries. At the same time, the law threatens Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan language, both of which form the foundation of Tibetan Buddhist culture and national identity.
Restriction over the Monastic Education Centres in Tibet
The Chinese government’s efforts to weaken Tibetan monastic education are central to its broader campaign against Tibetan Buddhist culture. It views Tibetan Buddhism as a major source of Tibetan nationalism and identity. Trinley Dorjee, head of the United Front Work Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), has described China’s strategy as one aimed at “cutting off the monastic community”, noting that past population-control policies and later economic pressures have reduced family size and made monastic recruitment increasingly difficult. Age restrictions further obstruct recruitment: no one under 18 may enter monasteries or monastic education centres, a rule enforced across U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo in Tibet.
Recently, Chinese authorities have compelled many young monks to leave monasteries for colonial boarding schools because of age restrictions. This violates the religious freedom of Tibetan children under 18 and appears intended to prevent them from entering monastic life before adulthood. At the same time, the Chinese government restricts the recognition of new Buddhist reincarnate lamas and suppresses monks and nuns who sustain monastic institutions. Many have been forced to leave their monasteries because of severe physical and psychological pressure.
Destroying the Tibetan Language to Undermine Buddhism
Tibetan Buddhism has long been preserved through study, reflection, meditation, teaching, debate, and writing, all of which depend on the Tibetan language. Because the language is essential to the survival of Tibetan Buddhism in society, its erosion directly threatens the continuity of the tradition. The Chinese government appears to recognise this and has made the Tibetan language a further target of control.
The Chinese government has adopted measures reminiscent of the decline of the Manchu language in China. In recent years, it has expanded Chinese-medium instruction, closed private schools that taught the Tibetan language and culture, removed Tibetan from government offices, and censored or detained those who advocate online for the protection of the Tibetan language. The ethnic unity law may serve as a strategic tool to further suppress the Tibetan language.
Tibetan-language WeChat groups and public platforms have also been blocked or shut down, while activists who filed lawsuits, wrote articles, or gave speeches have been imprisoned. These policies aim not only to weaken Tibetan identity but also to undermine Tibetan Buddhism, since a people deprived of their language and national identity cannot fully preserve their religion, culture, or customs.
Eliminating Tibetan Customs Linked to Tibetan Buddhism
Many Tibetan customs are deeply rooted in Buddhism and have long shaped Tibetan identity. Tibetans commonly regard Tibet as the land of Avalokiteshvara and the Dalai Lama as his incarnation, regardless of their formal understanding of Buddhist philosophy. China views this belief as a threat and seeks to weaken these long-standing traditions.
Chinese authorities have also tried to distance Tibetan children from traditions central to their everyday lives. Images of the Dalai Lama and books on Tibetan nationalism are banned, and even mentioning his name is prohibited. Such policies seek to erase customs, practices, and ideas rooted in Tibetan Buddhist culture.
The sole purpose of building colonial boarding schools across Tibet is to reshape Tibetan children’s thought and behaviour. Even during holidays, Tibetan children are restricted from attending religious festivals or returning home. These measures are intended to erase Tibetan Buddhist customs and, ultimately, Buddhism itself from the Tibetan people’s way of life.
Ethnic Unity Law is China’s Package Strategy for Eradicating Tibetan Buddhism
For China’s leadership, Tibetan Buddhism remains a major obstacle to so-called stabilising Tibet. Monastic communities are viewed as centres of Tibetan nationalism, culture, and identity. China’s efforts to weaken the foundations of Tibetan Buddhism appear to be driven by three main motivations.
First, Tibetan monks and nuns have often played leading roles in the Tibetan national struggle movement. For instance, Trinley Choedon, a nun from Nyemo, led a protest in 1969; monks from Drepung Monastery led a peaceful march in Lhasa in 1987; and in 2008, monks and nuns participated in large-scale peaceful protests across Tibet, followed by more than 150 self-immolations. These acts of non-violent protest drew global attention to Tibet and challenged China’s official narrative. Beijing regards such protests as a secessionist threat, a view reflected in Xi Jinping’s statements at the 2016 and 2020 Tibet Work Forums that securing the nation’s borders requires first stabilising Tibet. China’s deliberate restrictions on monasteries therefore aim to prevent Free Tibet movements and weaken Tibetan Buddhist communities.
Second, China views Tibetan Buddhism as a principal barrier to dismantling Tibetan identity, culture, and customs. Despite decades of Chinese Communist ideological and educational campaigns in Tibet, Tibetans continue to regard His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama as their sole legitimate leader and symbol of Tibet. This persistence highlights the challenges China faces in severing ties between Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, as well as its efforts to intensify restrictions on images of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese leadership perceives these continued loyalties and Tibetan nationalism in Tibet as evidence of the enduring influence of Tibetan Buddhism.
Third, Tibetan Buddhism’s influence extends beyond Tibet into the Himalayan regions, China, and Mongolia, which Beijing views as a broader threat. Historically, Tibetan political life was deeply shaped by Buddhism, and China fears that this religious strength could support future resistance. Chinese documents accuse “external separatists” of using Tibetan Buddhism to create instability. As a result, Beijing treats Tibetan Buddhism as a force to be contained and neutralised
Conclusion
Following China’s military takeover of Tibet in 1950, Chinese soldiers and Party cadres sought to consolidate control by studying the Tibetan language and customs, providing public services, and promoting Party policies to win the “hearts and minds” of the Tibetan people. However, these strategies have not fully succeeded in securing their lasting control.
By using law as a strategic diplomatic tool, the Chinese government has introduced and implemented policies such as the so-called new ethnic unity law to strengthen and sustain the Chinese Communist Party’s authority in the new era. Therefore, China aims to sinicise Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan language. Such developments pose a serious threat not only to Tibet itself but also to the wider Tibetan Buddhist cultural world, as measures imposed within Tibet increasingly extend their influence across Tibetan communities globally.
Dr. Tsewang Dorji, the author of the article, is a research fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute.
PS: The views expressed here of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Tibet Policy Institute. The original article was published by FirstPost